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ABSTRACT 
ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE 2008 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION: MOBILIZING OR REINFORCING? 
Kenneth M. Winneg 
Michael X. Delli Carpini 
Dissertation Supervisor 
Participation is at the core of democratic society.  However, studies have shown 
that participation is biased toward those who are better educated, more affluent, and in 
greater possession of civic skills.  Scholars have pointed to the Internet as a possible 
remedy for the disparity in participation for its potential to lower barriers and increase 
access to those who lack the time, money, and/or necessary civic skills.  Research has 
been mixed about whether the Internet mobilizes new or marginalized participants to the 
electoral process, simply reinforces those who are active in that process already, or does 
both.  In the 2008 U.S. presidential election campaign, all major presidential candidates 
utilized the Internet and email as a tool for mobilizing, recruiting, communicating and 
raising money.  New media, especially the Internet and other Information 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), played a significant role in extending and perhaps 
even supplanting more traditional methods of political participation.   Because of the 
greater role played by the Internet and ICTs in 2008, the ability to test the mobilization 
and reinforcement hypotheses was much greater than in previous elections.  My research 
adds to the general debate by 1) testing the reinforcement versus mobilization theories 
related to the impact of the Internet on political participation; 2) refining these theories by 
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testing whether mobilization or reinforcement occurs differently in online versus offline 
participation; and 3) exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are 
contingent on activities of individual campaigns.  The 2008 National Annenberg Election 
Survey is the data source for this research.  
This dissertation provides evidence to support each of the mobilization and 
reinforcement hypotheses I proposed.  However, the mobilized groups varied across the 
campaign by activity.  No single group either advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, 
was mobilized consistently throughout the primaries and general election campaigns. 
While this study offers evidence of mobilization and reinforcement in a number of 
instances and among a number of demographic groups, it raises additional questions 
which cannot be easily resolved with the available data.  Nevertheless, the results do 
illustrate that Internet usage in certain instances is more likely to motivate certain groups 
to engage in participation activities.  Further, online campaign contact is a strong 
predictor for most participation activities. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF PROBLEM 
 
In their seminal work, Participation in America, Verba and Nie (1972) write: 
If democracy is interpreted as rule by the people, then the question of who 
participates in political decisions becomes the question of the nature of 
democracy in society. Where few take part in decisions there is little democracy; 
the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is (p. 1).  
 Although most scholars grant that participation is at the core of a democratic society, 
Verba and Nie’s (1972) research and studies by others (Campbell et al., 1960. Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995, Conway, 2000) show that some segments of 
society are more likely to participate, specifically the better educated and affluent, and 
those in greater possession of civic skills.  While this would have satisfied the founding 
fathers, it does not satisfy democratic theory. Thus, the decisions Verba and Nie write 
about are influenced most strongly by a relatively limited and advantaged segment of 
society.  
The type of participation I focus on in this dissertation relates directly to engaging 
in electoral process activities leading up to, but not including voting, the ultimate act of 
political participation. The activities leading up to voting, including persuading, 
discussing, campaign volunteering, contributing are as important in bringing the more 
disadvantaged and newer participants into the democratic process. 
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With the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s, its potential role for opening up the 
process of political participation to a wider and more diverse range of citizens has drawn 
much speculation:    
The Internet could have a significant impact on broadening political participation 
by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of organizing 
groups and opening up new channels of information that bypass traditional media 
gatekeepers. (Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006, p. 299) 
Contrary to these optimistic predictions,1  others argue that the Internet is unlikely to 
bring in those who have not traditionally participated.   For example, Margolis and 
Resnick (2000) argue that cyberspace is not the utopian democratic meeting ground some 
have envisioned:    
It will not empower the powerless because those who are powerful outside of 
cyberspace are taking those advantages with them in the Internet.  Direct 
democracy will not happen nor is it desired.  Representative democracy is more 
realistic. Most people neither have the time, inclination, nor aptitude to be aware 
of the myriad of policy issues.  Public policy issues are too complicated and 
citizens too distracted to devote the time and effort to public affairs that such a 
society would require. (p. 205)   
 
                                                 
1 In the grand scheme of communication, the Internet has been characterized by some as having the 
potential to bring people together to form communities of either common interests or diverse backgrounds 
and viewpoints (Rheingold, 1995). Were the Internet to do so, it might expand the public sphere as 
envisioned by Habermas (1989).   This utopian view is very deterministic, assuming that the Internet 
technology is an unassailable democratic force (Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Coleman, 2006).  However, some 
like Putnam (2000) say the Internet will decrease the public sphere and decrease rather than increase 
participation. 
3 
 
Taking a related view, Bimber and Davis (2003) argue that while the Internet is 
indispensible for campaigns and the electoral process, its campaign messages are aimed 
primarily at niche audiences which actively seeks the online tools relevant to their 
political interests.  As more people become connected to the Internet, the effects will 
become even smaller as the Internet audience would change from one that is more 
purposive and interested to one that is more like a mass audience.  Unlike television 
viewers, the Internet users are not a captive audience and cannot do as television and 
newspapers do and “saturate a large audience with messages that interrupt citizens’ focus 
and direct it toward the campaign and, more specifically, a candidate’s message” (Bimber 
and Davis, 2003, p. 147).  Rather, the interactive nature of the medium allows them to 
become both direct and indirect participants in the political process. 
Simplifying somewhat, the likely impact of the Internet on the amount and 
diversity of political participation has created two camps: Mobilization theorists and 
Reinforcement theorists.  Mobilization theorists believe the Internet will enfranchise 
those who have been traditionally marginalized by bringing them into the political 
process and thereby enhancing democracy.  In Weare’s (2002) summary of mobilization 
and reinforcement, he asserts that such theorists  predict that the “the open, decentralized 
and interactive nature of Internet communications will enfranchise marginalized sectors 
of the electorate by making political information more easily accessible and more 
germane to their concerns and improve the openness of government by equalizing access 
to information” (Weare, 2002, p. 679).  Lower communications and networking costs will 
make it easier for citizens to  enter the political process and perform such activities as 
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learning candidate stands on issues, contacting elective officials, or organizing networks 
with others on local issues (Norris, 2001; DiGennaro and Dutton, 2006). 
According to summaries by Weare (2002) and Norris (2001), reinforcement 
theory argues that while the Internet may expand and decentralize communication 
patterns, making information accessible to more people, it will continue to primarily 
benefit those who are already participants, namely “elites” who have greater access to the 
technology and who are already highly politically interested (e.g., Bimber and Davis, 
2003).  The technology offers just another resource for the most motivated, active, and 
informed members of society (Norris, 2001), at best allowing existing biases in who 
participates to remain, and at worst exacerbating these disparities.2 
Results from the relatively limited but growing number of empirical studies 
testing the mobilizing versus reinforcing effects of the Internet have been mixed and 
inconclusive.  Some studies have shown evidence of mobilization (e.g., see Weaver, 
Loumakis and Bergman, 2003, Tolbert and McNeal, 2003, Shah et al., 2001, Gibson, 
Lusoli, and Ward, 2005; Best and Krueger, 2005; Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal, 
2008). Others tend to support the reinforcement hypothesis. (e.g., see Bimber, 1999; 
Kaye, 1998; Johnson and Kaye, 1998; Bimber, 2001; Norris, 2001; Scheufele and Nisbet, 
2000; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Johnson and Kaye, 2004; Polat, 2005; Xenos and Moy, 
2007; Shah et al. 2007).  Most recently, a meta-analysis (Boulianne, 2009) has also 
shown equivocal results. 
                                                 
2
There is also a body of literature which argues that both reinforcement and mobilization can occur (see 
Norris, 2001).  Some prior research sets up a false dichotomy between mobilization and reinforcement, 
when both could occur simultaneously by mobilizing some groups and reinforcing others. 
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One limitation of most of the earlier studies is their exclusive focus on traditional 
forms of campaign participation as measured by Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba et al. 
(1995).  These activities include attending political campaign rallies, contributing money 
to a campaign,  and/or working for a campaign, with no attention to whether these and 
other activities are done “offline” or “online.”  Ignoring or failing to distinguish “online 
participation” may hamper our ability to uncover the mobilizing and/or reinforcing 
effects of Internet use (Gibson, Lusoli, and Ward, 2005).   
In one of the more recent studies to address this issue, Gibson et al. (2005) 
describe a more contextualized model of online participation as one that “takes into 
account a wider range of online participatory behaviors and incorporates the various new 
forms of stimuli present in the new media that can kick-start those behaviors.” (p. 10)   
Examples of online participation include, discussing politics online in a chat group or via 
email, forward campaign emails or video to others, viewing campaign ads and other 
video on sites like YouTube, visiting a campaign website to learn about the issues, and 
volunteer or donate online. Using these measures, they found some evidence of 
mobilization among those previously disengaged in the 2002 British elections.  Since the 
publication of their work, others have measured participation using online and offline 
variables, but again with mixed results (e.g., Best and Krueger, 2005; Shah et al. 2007; 
Xenos and Moy, 2007). 
Two additional shortcomings of the extant research are the under-theorizing of the 
role played by campaign organizations themselves, and the rapidly changing and growing 
use of the Internet by both citizens and campaign organizations. First, as work by 
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Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and others (Kramer, 1970; Cain and McCue, 1985; 
Caldeira, Clausen and Patterson, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993 as cited in 
Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeil, 2008) make clear, contact by political campaign 
organizations is an important predictor of actual campaign participation.   
Second, access and use of the Internet by citizens has increased dramatically in 
recent years.  So too has the frequency and innovativeness of Internet use by candidates 
for office, since even the 2004 presidential election cycle.  For example, during the 2008 
presidential election campaign the mainstream media often pointed to the Internet’s role 
in the campaign, particularly as a fundraising tool, especially among small donors, as a 
tool for mobilizing and recruiting supporters, and as a means of communicating 
campaign messages (e.g., see USA Today, May 2, 2008; New York Times, July 17, 2008 
and March 22, 2008, and the Washington Post, January 1, 2008).   The Internet was 
integral to the campaigns of all the major presidential candidates in 2008.  During the 
primaries and caucuses, some attributed Sen. Barack Obama’s success over Sen. Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and the other Democratic candidates to his campaign’s greater 
effectiveness with using the technology to contact and activate new and younger voters to 
build a strong and successful base of support.  
In short, findings examining earlier elections may not be a good indication of the 
current or future impact of the Internet. Based on, but not a replication of, Gibson et al.’s 
(2005) contextual model of political participation, Verba et al.’s (1995) Civic 
Voluntarism Model of political participation, and Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) work 
on campaign contact and mobilization, and drawing on data from the 2008 presidential 
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campaign, my dissertation is intended to add to our understanding of the mobilizing 
and/or reinforcing effects of the Internet by specifically addressing the following  
questions:  1) Overall did Internet use by candidates and voters in the 2008 presidential 
election lead to the political mobilization of previously under-represented citizens or the 
reinforcement of existing biases?  2) Did mobilization or reinforcement occur differently 
for different kinds of participation (e.g., campaign giving, volunteering, voting) and/or 
for different modes of participation (i.e., “offline” vs. “online” activities)? 3) Did 
mobilization or reinforcement vary by different demographic groups (e.g., young adults, 
women, minorities)? And 4) is mobilization or reinforcement contingent on the extent 
and ways in which candidates used the Internet and other Information Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) in their campaigns?   
The data source for my dissertation is the 2008 National Annenberg Election 
Survey (NAES) rolling cross-sectional national probability telephone survey and the 
NAES post-election telephone panel survey.  NAES was in the field continuously from 
mid-December, 2007 until Election Day.  On November 5, 2008 the day following the 
general election, NAES conducted a post-election telephone panel study.  In this 
dissertation,  I analyzed data the NAES collected during four distinct periods: February 1 
through March 10, 2008—a period when 39 primaries and caucuses took place; July 2, 
2008 through August 4, 2008, the post-primary period, where I retrospectively measured 
respondents primary season participation activities;  August 8 through October 2, 2008, 
the first two months of the general election period; and November 5 through November 
12, 2008, a retrospective panel of individuals interviewed from August 8 through 
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November 3, 2008.  In each of these periods I was able to place questions specifically 
designed to help answer the four research questions listed above on the surveys, after 
consultation with and approval by the senior directors of the survey.   
1-1: Overview of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized in the following way.   In the remainder of this 
chapter I describe two major models of political participation developed before the 
Internet became a widely used medium.  I then relate these models to the Internet, 
detailing how attributes and processes of the Internet act as parts of these models. .  
 Chapter 2 contains both a review of the empirical research related to the 
mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses and a discussion placing the dissertation in 
the context of the very unique 2008 presidential election.  This chapter shows that the 
studies in these areas, taken in their totality, provide mixed conclusions about whether the 
Internet leads to mobilization, reinforcement, or both.  These studies offer a rationale for 
my study as a way to contribute to clarifying the debate.  The discussion of the Internet 
and participation within the context of the 2008 election revolves around the uniqueness 
of that election and presents descriptive data from the NAES on Internet usage, political 
interest, and comparative measures of participation throughout the 2008 campaign and to 
the 2004 presidential election. 
Chapter 3 is the methods chapter.  I present my hypotheses and research 
questions. In addition, this chapter contains the details about the methodology and the 
data used to test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. This chapter includes 
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the sample frame, data collection methodology, survey question design, and the analytical 
techniques.  
I present the findings of my research in chapters 4 through 8. Chapters 4 and 5 
focus on the data from the primaries related to mobilization and reinforcement (Cases 1 
and 2), while chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on the general election data (Cases 3 and 4). In 
Chapter 8, I present the findings from the test of the activation hypothesis—Hypothesis 
3—which examines the role of communication of the campaigns themselves on 
mobilization and reinforcement.  Finally, this dissertation concludes with a discussion of 
the implications of my study for the political process and, more broadly, for the field of 
political communication.   Finally, I will conclude with what I believed this research has 
contributed to the field and what should be the next steps. 
In this dissertation, I provide evidence to support each of the mobilization and 
reinforcement hypotheses I have proposed.  However, and this is an important point, the 
groups that were mobilized varied by case and activity.  No single group either 
advantaged or disadvantaged in the past, was mobilized consistently throughout the 
primaries and general election campaigns. One can argue that a stronger case for the 
Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a pattern of mobilized groups 
emerged across the four cases. This lack of consistency could be due to the methodology, 
question wording, or time of interview.  The data reveal that while much had been made 
of the increased amount of participation among some segments of the population, relative 
to the 2004 campaign, participation levels, excluding voting, remained about where they 
were for all adults and within most demographic segments, except for African 
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Americans, where there was an increase compared to 2004.  It is unclear what factors 
may have contributed to the limited amount of mobilization, but the data are suggestive 
that low levels of participation across the population combined with a continued digital 
divide may be the major contributors.  Without a further narrowing between those who 
have and those who do not have access to the Internet, we may not see wholesale 
movements toward mobilization.  Therefore, while this study offers evidence of 
mobilization and reinforcement in a number of instances and among a number of 
demographic groups, it raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with 
the available data.  Nevertheless, the results do illustrate that Internet use in certain 
instances is more likely to motivate certain groups to engage in participation activities.  
In short, there is ample evidence that the advantaged are most likely to benefit from what 
the Internet has to offer, however, there is evidence that heretofore disadvantaged groups 
like African Americans and the young were mobilized by the Internet to participate, but 
the mobilization was relatively low.  More optimistically, this research found evidence 
that online campaign contact was more likely than offline campaign contact to lead to 
political participation.  Therefore, online targeting by campaigns may be an effective way 
to encourage participation. 
Before moving to a more specific review of the literature related to mobilization 
and reinforcement, it is necessary to present the foundation of traditional political 
participation, weaving in how the Internet relates to and connects with the traditional 
methods.  To make the relationship and connections clearer, I discuss specific methods of 
participation found online. 
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1-2: Traditional Models of Political Participation 
Emerging from rational choice theory (Downs, 1957), noteworthy studies (Verba 
et al., 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) are built upon the assumption that citizens 
participate when they see potential benefits outweighing the costs.  In turn, political elites 
mobilize citizens to participate by providing them with benefits and reducing the costs, 
with the expectation of their support in return.  While voting is the most common form of 
such support, political participation and more broadly, civic participation can involve 
multiple activities. Traditional forms of political participation  include working or 
volunteering on electoral campaigns or for political or civic organizations, contributing 
money to those entities, contacting government officials, attending protests, marches, or 
demonstrations, placing a candidate’s sign on a lawn, and wearing a button in support of 
a candidate.   
Prior research consistently finds inequities in who participates and, therefore, who 
benefits from such activities.  These disparities are drawn across demographic and 
attitudinal lines and result from a lack of resources, insufficient psychological 
engagement or political interest, and being outside the recruitment network  (Verba and 
Nie, 1972; Verba et al.,1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  Those more likely to 
participate are generally better educated, more affluent, possess more developed civic 
skills, have a greater interest in politics, and generally have increased levels of 
engagement.  As a result, they are more advantaged and more successful in ultimately 
pushing for policy change.  
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In their landmark work, Verba et al. (1995) describe a participation model focusing 
on three things: resources, engagement, and recruitment. Their Civic Voluntarism Model 
(CVM) attempts to explain and predict political participation.  Verba et al. categorize 
participation into four types of acts: time-based acts, political contributions, voting, and 
political discussion. The elements which have the greatest impact on fostering time-based 
acts include education and free time. Income is the best predictor for making political 
contributions.  Political interest, knowledge/education, and partisanship are the best 
predictors for voting, and political interest is the strongest predictor for political 
discussion (see also Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995).  
Citizens need more than just these resources to participate. There must also be 
external mechanisms at work, such as recruitment. Institutionally-based political 
recruitment is also a significant predictor of political participation when placed in the 
CVM.  When those who are members of organizations are asked to participate by other 
members of their organizations they are likely to do so. The types of activities developed 
in religious and voluntary non-political civic organizations provide a wealth of benefits to 
the citizenry—civic skills, social networking opportunities, and is a fertile ground for 
recruitment.  Members of these networks are more likely to know each other. 
In Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) theory of political activation, recruitment plays 
a central role.  Candidates, political parties, the media and other contributors (groups and 
activists) induce citizens to participate. Rosenstone and Hansen point to two types of 
activation: direct and indirect.  Direct activation takes place in the form of meetings, 
door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for money by the candidate 
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directly. These are the methods which the Obama campaign asserted was the key to their 
primary and general electoral victories (Jamieson, 2009).  Indirect activation can occur 
through family, friends, co-workers, and social networks making people responsive to 
activation from these sources. Social networks help get the word out, therefore 
multiplying the effects of activation.  The strategy of political motivation consists of 
targeting and timing of the activation.  
The conclusions reached by the authors in these works on recruitment indicate 
participation does not occur in a vacuum. There needs to be a mechanism to motivate 
citizens to become engaged and a method by which they can participate.  These works 
have shown that participation has been biased towards those equipped with the most 
resources and motivations to participate. Those most potentially in need of policy change 
are either unwilling or unable to press for it because of the barriers to traditional 
participation. These works also suggest recruitment tend to focus on those who are most 
likely participate, thus reinforcing the current cycle of political participation. 
As noted above, the development of the Internet and its growing use by citizens and 
political elites raises both the possibility that this “vicious cycle” could be turned into a 
“virtuous” one (Norris, 2000) by bringing formerly marginalized citizens into the 
process, or that it simply provides new means for those already engaged to maintain or 
increase their participatory advantages.  Determining which of these viewpoints (or more 
accurately what combination of them) is the more accurate depends in part on 
conceptualizing how the Internet fits into or revises the traditional models developed by 
Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). The foundations of their work are based 
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on the importance of having the resources of time, money, and civic skills, a certain level 
of political engagement, and the susceptibility for recruitment. I argue in the next section 
that while these models can be applied to Internet-based politics, the conclusions one 
draws about this new technology’s likely effect on the amount and distribution of 
citizens’ political participation are potentially quite different than those drawn in the pre-
Internet era.  
1-3: Relating Online Participation to the Established Models 
1-2.1: Online participation activities and resources and engagement 
Many forms of traditional participation can be performed online in a more 
efficient manner because of the technology.   Further, the convenience of performing 
these acts online is high but the costs are low.  According to a study by the Pew Internet 
and American Life Project, people cite convenience as the top reason for going online 
(Rainie et al., 2005). There are many election-related online participation activities that 
parallel traditional participation models.   Persuading, recruiting, volunteering, and 
contributing can be performed both online and offline.  However, the Internet also creates 
new forms of participation such as viewing or posting political videos on YouTube or 
other peer-to-peer (P2P) sites, or passing along emails or videos to others.  While each of 
these activities requires a certain level of resources such as time, civic skills, or money, or 
levels engagement such as political interest, political efficacy, or need for political 
information, these requirements may be lower than for offline participation.    
For instance, visiting a campaign/party/political website may be, by itself, a form 
of information-seeking.  However, if one visits the site in order to sign-up to volunteer or 
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to contribute money, then it becomes an active form of participation.  This action is an 
extension of traditional activities of volunteering to work for a campaign and contributing 
money.  Necessary for this activity is time and the best engagement predictor is political 
interest. 
Another activity, signing up for a campaign e-mail/bulletin provides an advantage 
to both the citizen and the campaign. The citizen signs up and becomes informed about 
the campaign/candidate, possibly leading to further action.  The campaign builds up a 
database which can be used for future mobilization, i.e., fundraising efforts aimed at a 
maximum number of potential donors in a fairly quick amount of time. This method 
extends traditional methods because of the ability to build up a large database and 
maximize fundraising efforts efficiently.  This is akin to contacting a campaign and 
requesting information about the candidate’s stance.   
Sending an email to, or receiving an email from, a politician, campaign, candidate 
or organization is a potentially effective means of pushing a policy issue. Officials place 
differing weights on what they perceive to be mass-mailings from organizations rather 
than an individual note or email (Bimber, 2000; Williams and Trammell, 2005).  This 
activity requires time, civic skills, political interest and a level of political efficacy. 
Discussing politics online in a chat group or joining an email discussion group is 
an extension of the traditional activity of discussing politics with friends and family at 
home, school, work, or the local watering hole. This activity has changed dramatically 
online as the social network extends beyond real friends and family to online “friends” 
who may never meet face-to-face, but engage in political discussion and, more 
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importantly, persuasion. This activity requires the resources of time and civic skills, 
along with a level of political interest and need for political information. 
Viewing online political advertising and videos on sites like YouTube is an active 
form of political participation since once you enter a candidate’s web site, you must 
actively click to view the video. The campaign’s desired outcome is for the citizen to take 
action. The ability to view the videos/ad on demand is unique to the technology. Ad 
viewing, traditionally has been a passive activity. In the 2008, campaign, YouTube 
played a major role.  For example, Senator Hillary Clinton’s boasts of her foreign policy 
experience including references to arriving “under sniper fire” in Bosnia were debunked 
initially by CBS News, but subsequent video on YouTube was viewed nearly two million 
times in a week.  Senator Barack Obama’s erstwhile pastor/advisor, the Reverend 
Jeremiah Wright’s sermons have also had a multitude of views on YouTube.  The ability 
to upload video quickly on file sharing sites like YouTube can bypass mainstream media 
and have an impact on a campaign. While viewing this video is not active political 
participation, passing it on to a friend may be considered a form of persuasion. 
Donating money online to a campaign or political organization is an extension of 
one of the most critical elements of any successful campaign—raising money and making 
contributions. Using the Internet for this effort has shown in prior presidential campaigns 
to be highly effective. The campaigns of the 2008 presidential candidates raised millions 
of dollars from via the Internet, allowing smaller contributions by more donors.  High-
end donors are continued to be reached by traditional fund-raising efforts.  Online 
solicitation for campaign contributions reaches millions of small donors.  Rather than 
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making separate efforts to send out fund-raising letters or telephone calls, the Internet can 
link contributors to donation pages via multiple pathways—email, blog, and campaign 
web site.  
Volunteering online to help with a political campaign/cause is an extension of 
traditional volunteering activities.  One can now sign up online to work for a campaign or 
campaigns can recruit potential volunteers via the Internet, using email databases.  
Campaigns can use these databases to mobilize people to travel to different areas of need, 
be it within the area or out of state (as the Kerry campaign did in Ohio in 2004). This 
method of mobilizing can be more efficient than traditional methods.   
Posting to a political blog is akin to engaging in political discussion in a chat 
room/forum. Web blogs became most prominent in 2004 and continue to play a role 
today.   Blogs claimed credit for Ned Lamont’s Democratic primary win in the 2006 
Connecticut Senate race, but were unsuccessful during the general election campaign. 
Nevertheless, blogs can help mobilize people to action as seen in 2004 when a number of 
liberal blogs helped stop a conservative owned television group (Sinclair) from airing 
what Democrats considered biased propaganda against John Kerry’s Vietnam war record 
(Benkler, 2006).  
1-2.2: Online participation and recruitment  
In the prior section, I described how online participation activities can parallel 
traditional offline activities and how some activities extend the definition of participation 
because of the uniqueness of the technology. In this section, I discuss how campaigns and 
civic organizations can use the Internet to recruit and mobilize citizens to participate.  In 
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Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995), recruitment takes place both 
directly and indirectly.  Therefore, the traditional direct forms of mobilization including 
in-person meetings, door-to-door canvassing, petition signing, and media appeals for 
money by the candidate directly, can now be performed, perhaps more effectively and 
efficiently through the Internet.   Campaigns can utilize the Internet to reach a maximum 
number of potential voters, supporters, or contributors via email recruiting using 
databases, links from their own web sites, links from other web sites and blogs.  Through 
these sites, and through the sophisticated methods of microtargeting, campaigns can 
focus on those most susceptible to recruiting, the “low hanging fruit.”  (If campaigns or 
advocates for a particular policy wish to mobilize fundraising to buy media or engage in a 
mass emailing campaign they can do so without much more effort than creating a 
message on their server and sending it out to those on their email list with the added 
request to pass it on to others.)  In this way, online recruitment accomplishes two things. 
First, it gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with hope of spurring them into 
action. Second, it helps expand this message to those who may be interested but up until 
the point of contact were unsure how to act. The financial cost to the campaign is 
significantly lower than engaging in  a more traditional mailing campaign.  This method 
was foreseen by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. in their discussion of 
effective recruiting among ones social network. In these times of the Internet, social 
networks have expanded.  This ease of mobilization at a significantly reduced cost can 
help more grass roots organizations make their voice be heard and push their policy.   
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The traditional resources found in Verba et al.’s (1995) CVM and Rosenstone and 
Hansen’s (1993) work should facilitate online participation (Krueger, 2002).  While 
commitments of time and money limit participation in traditional non-voting forms of 
political participation, the Internet could work to neutralize these barriers due to the 
medium’s ease of access and convenience of use.  However, constraints to effective 
online political participation to which I alluded earlier include the digital divide where 
those who are more likely to become politically engaged—those with greater educational 
and income levels—are more likely to participate online.   
Scholars have debated the role and the benefits of the Internet in encouraging 
participation, deliberation, and community with some empirical studies supporting the 
arguments. However, the argument over whether the Internet is a mobilizing or 
reinforcing mechanism has yet to be settled. The next section of this proposal reviews the 
extant literature centering on the debate about the Internet as either a mobilizing or 
reinforcing mechanism.  As Internet technology became more diffuse, scholars began 
investigating its impact on the political participation process. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW—ONLINE PARTICIPATION: 
REINFORCEMENT AND MOBILIZATION 
There have been a limited number of empirical studies to prove either the 
reinforcement or mobilization theories. In the few studies undertaken and published thus 
far no consensus emerges among the scholars as to the impact of the Internet on political 
participation.  A recent meta-analysis conducted by Boulianne (2009) bears this out.  In 
her fairly comprehensive review, Boulianne provides evidence that the Internet neither 
negatively affects political engagement, nor significantly increases it.  Her analysis of the 
studies finds, perhaps logically, that the effect of the Internet is greater for the most 
recent studies.  As is the problem with any meta-analysis and most literature reviews, for 
that matter, the studies she examines generally lack a consistent single unit of 
measurement, making comparability of the studies difficult.  She does create a common 
measure by essentially averaging the coefficients of the regression models the studies 
produce.  She concludes that the Internet does not contribute to civic decline, and perhaps 
may positively impact engagement, but the effect sizes are generally small and therefore 
puts into question how significant a contributor the Internet is to increasing civic 
engagement.  Boulianne also suggests from the meta-analysis that measuring Internet by 
including online news in the operationalization the likelihood for political engagement 
increases.  In my dissertation, I do not include Internet media use in the 
operationalization, but rather as a control variable.  Within that framework, the following 
sections review the major studies published to this point most relevant to addressing my 
hypotheses on reinforcement and mobilization.   
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2-1: The Case for Reinforcement: A Review of the Literature 
The studies I review in this section echo the argument that online technology 
applied to the political process advantages those with the most resources and highest 
level of engagement. Yet, in many cases, the studies suffer from limited samples and 
poor designs.  Another issue is that among the many studies conducted, there is no single 
unit of measurement for Internet use and therefore comparability is difficult.  Further, 
some argue that Internet skills and level of civic skills go hand-in-hand (Bimber, 1999; 
Best and Krueger, 2005; di Gennaro and Dutton, 2006) but do not necessarily lead to 
mobilization (Johnson and Kaye, 2002).  I detail these and other studies below. 
Bimber (1999) found evidence of reinforcement in his study of citizens’ 
engagement with government services. Those more likely to contact government 
agencies either offline (phone or letter) or online (email) in this study conducted in 1996 
and 1997 were those who fit the reinforcement profile—better educated, older,  male, and 
more politically connected.  However, there were small effects suggesting mobilization in 
one of Bimber’s models which showed that younger people were more likely than older 
people to use email to contact government officials.  However, when looking at those 
who have contacted government officials at least one time, the age effect reversed itself. 
That is, once older citizens tried contacting by email, they are more likely than younger 
people to do so frequently.  Bimber used both an RDD telephone survey and a large-
sample on-line survey that ran for a year on selected political and government web sites.   
This study was conducted at a time when familiarity with the Internet was lower than it is 
today, but it is one of the first conducted on the effects of the medium.  He attributes the 
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findings to a “transition effect” caused by the medium moving from an exclusive 
technology to a mass medium. 
In a more recent study, Bimber and Davis (2003) found further evidence of 
reinforcement.  While acknowledging that no campaign can succeed without the Internet, 
their research shows that the Internet attracted very few new or marginalized participants 
to the campaigns.  They looked at how candidates presented themselves on line, how it 
compared to traditional media, and the influence of Internet-based political campaigns on 
voter knowledge, attitudes, and behavior.  Methods included a series of randomized 
sample telephone surveys conducted nationally and in Missouri. In addition, Bimber and 
Davis conducted controlled experiments in four cities among those who visited campaign 
Web sites. They argue that as the Internet becomes more diffuse, then effects will become 
even smaller as the Internet audience will change from one that is more purposive and 
interested to one that is more like a mass audience.  Unlike television, the Internet is not a 
captive audience and cannot do what television and newspapers can which to “saturate a 
large audience with messages that interrupt citizens’ focus and direct it toward the 
campaign and, more specifically, a candidate’s message” (p. 147).  They argue while 
advertising can capture an audience in an unsuspecting state, the Internet is more 
directed.  The Internet is most successful at mobilizing activists, the most politically 
interested, to volunteer, donate, communicate with others, and ultimately, though not 
assuredly, vote.  Further, they found that people will use the Internet to satisfy their 
campaign information needs, but will not produce mobilization.  Thus, they conclude that 
rather than narrowing the digital political divide, the Internet will expand it. 
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Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) concluded that while Internet use leads to an increase 
in personal perceptions of political efficacy, it does not lead to “objectively measurable 
changes in political involvement or information” (p.70).  Looking at Internet users and 
non-Internet users, they find no evidence that Internet use led to traditional political 
participation. Scheufele and Nisbet examined three types of Internet use, political 
information seeking, entertainment use, and nonpolitical information seeking. None of 
these types of online usage had any impact on traditional forms of participation (attended 
a neighborhood meeting, writing a letter to a local candidate, working for a political 
campaign, contacting a local public official, and contributing money to a local 
organization).  Consistent with Verba et al., the authors found that the SES variables 
explains much of the variance but newspaper reading is the strongest predictor of 
traditional participation. Other media variables, viewing television for news or 
entertainment, had no impact on traditional participation. 
Jennings and Zeitner (2003) showed that while Internet had positive effects on 
several indicators of civic engagement, the authors concluded that there was evidence 
suggesting that the Internet would mirror the inequalities already in place regarding who 
participates in the electoral process and who does not.   This study, therefore, falls within 
the reinforcement camp of studies.  They used a quasi-experimental design employing a 
panel design to examine, longitudinally, changes in civic engagement among users and 
non-users of the Internet.  Among Internet users, the more politically involved, the more 
likely they were to use the Internet for political information. This was especially true of 
the younger cohort in the sample than the older one.  The benefit of Jennings and 
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Zeitner’s study is that they used the panel data to examine individual level changes over 
time. 
In two studies published in 1998 and 2003, Johnson and Kaye found that people 
who go online for political information are already politically engaged.  However, those 
online tended to be less trustful of government and less likely to vote than those more 
trustful or offline. Thus, those online when these studies were conducted, perhaps were 
more politically extreme and cynical than those who did not. In their 1998 study they 
found that while the Internet had a positive and significant impact on political interest, 
there was a negative impact between reliance on the Internet and trust in government, 
efficacy, and voting behavior (1996 elections). More importantly for the reinforcement 
theory, those who are more web reliant are not any more likely to vote or express interest 
in the campaign than more casual users. Johnson and Kaye make another interesting 
assertion:  
While politically interested web users participate in politics and believe they have 
the power to influence the system, this group remains distrustful of politicians 
with levels of distrust highest among the heavier users of the Internet.  However, 
scholars have suggested that the mixture of high efficacy and low trust might 
actually be desirable (Johnson and Kaye, 1998, p131-32). 
Distrust might lead to citizen action.  However, Nie and Erbring (2001) find that 
sociability decreases and alienation and societal disconnection increases with Internet 
use. 
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In a more recent study, consistent with reinforcement theory, Johnson and Kaye 
concluded that those who are politically interested are more likely to seek out political 
information from the media more so than the general public (Johnson and Kaye, 2004). 
“Political attitudes may have little influence on online credibility because studies suggest 
that online users rather than being socially isolated and apathetic, are politically 
interested and more likely to seek out information from the media than the general 
public” (p. 626).  The authors conducted an online survey aimed at blog users, 
representing diverse ideologies and weblogs. Their sampling technique was a “Snowball 
design,” so they had some difficulty in building a representative sample.  They conclude 
that the web has moved to a more demographically mainstream place from a bastion of 
young, white, affluent, highly-educated, males.   
In another study showing reinforcement with a potential for mobilization, Solop 
(2001) found that the Internet attracted both those with a higher level of education, and 
younger voters.  In this study on the effects of Internet voting, Solop examined 
differences between those choosing to vote via the Internet and those voting in the 
traditional manner at a polling place during a Democratic primary in Arizona. Solop 
initially finds that more affluent, better educated, white, and younger voters were more 
likely to choose the Internet voting option. A logistic regression showed that the best 
predictors for Internet voting were education and age.   Additionally, Internet voters 
scored higher on a scale of political efficacy than non-Internet voters. The findings seem, 
on the one hand, to provide evidence for the reinforcement hypothesis, and the 
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mobilization hypothesis, but on the other, it shows that younger voters are more attracted 
to Internet voting.  
 In a study among those already online, Norris (2001), finds that a virtual political 
system will “most likely facilitate further knowledge, interest and activism of those who 
are already most predisposed toward civic engagement, reinforcing patterns of political 
participation” (p. 228).  Norris studied the characteristics of online users versus nonusers 
in the European Union in 1999.   
However, some question whether the Internet is a separate medium for politics, 
representing a major paradigm shift.  They argue that it is merely an extension of the 
offerings of the main stream media (MSM), supplementing other sources of political 
information (Hill & Hughes, 1998; Kaye, 1998).  If anything, the Internet foils the 
MSM’s gatekeeper status. 
Weber, Loumakis and Bergman (2003) found a positive relationship between 
engagement on the Internet and civic and political participation.  However, it appears to 
exacerbate the socioeconomic bias already exhibited by civic and political participation 
prior to the rise of the Internet. This study suffers from self-selection bias in the sampling 
procedure because they used Survey 2000, an online survey, which used a non-
probability, self-selected sample.  
With the wide array of information available in cyberspace, citizens need to be 
able to know where to access political information and possess the necessary skills to 
trust the information.  Internet proficiency is closely related to online political 
participation. DiGennaro and Dutton (2006) found in their study of Internet use and 
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political participation in the United Kingdom that fifty-six percent of highly proficient 
Internet users participated in at least one political function, compared with 33% of 
moderate experts, and 19% of the novices.  They base their findings on the 2003 and 
2005 Oxford Internet Studies (OxIS), a national telephone survey of Internet use in the 
UK. While DiGennarro and Dutton’s findings point to reinforcement—those with the 
necessary skills are most likely to participate, the authors still see a greater opportunity 
for mobilization by arguing that building Internet skills should increase both internal and 
external political efficacy and thus increase active participation. 
Xenos and Moy (2007) conducted a secondary analysis on 2004 ANES data to 
address two hypotheses related to the Internet and civic and political engagement. The 
first: exposure to online political information is positively related to civic and political 
engagement. The second: The effects of online political information exposure on civic 
and political engagement are contingent on levels of political interest.  The results 
generally pointed to reinforcement. They found support for differential effects, 
specifically that participation was more contingent on levels of political interest.  Using 
the Internet for participation was greater for those with higher levels of political interest.  
On the positive side, regardless of level of political interest, the Internet use increased 
levels of political knowledge.   
A paper presented by Kroh and Neiss (2009) at the 2009 meeting of the American 
Political Science Association asserts that cross-sectional studies attempting to address the 
mobilization versus reinforcement questions fall short in that most participation results 
from “unspecified background variables” and “self-selection of politically active citizens 
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into Internet use.”  The Internet benefits, at best, are small and marginal since those who 
are most likely to use the Internet for political participation are those already engaged.  
The data source is a longitudinal panel conducted in Germany called the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) from 1995 through 2008.  The authors measure self-
selection by analyzing the panel data across time beginning in 1995 when the Internet 
was not widely used in the population through 2008.  This allows them to create a 
“before and after” test for the introduction of the Internet.  The authors analyze 
differences in political engagement by comparing Internet users and non-users using 
cross-sectional data from the 2005 SOEP.  The authors use a very limited measure of 
Internet access—either one has it or does not.  This presents a problem in that that those 
who are more active online may be very different from those who spend little time online, 
yet they are both categorized together.  I address this problem in my own research in 
cases 2-4 (see Chapter 3 methodology).  Second, their measures of political engagement 
are limited to party strength, political interest, and active political work.  They find that 
Internet access is a relative weak predictor of active work in politics and political interest.   
They find that “further education” is a somewhat stronger predictor.  Their study, like 
others, does not take into account the interaction between Internet use and education to 
determine if Internet access moderates the effect of education, which would provide 
evidence of a greater impact of the Internet on participation. 
   
2-2: A Case for Mobilization: A Review of the Literature on Online Participation 
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While there have been studies supporting the reinforcement thesis, scholars have 
found some support for mobilization, albeit limited in nature.  A common thread across 
many of these studies has been youth appeal of the Internet.   
A study of 18 to 29 year old citizens’ use of the Internet for campaign purposes in 
the 2004 presidential campaign shows that online campaigns strongly facilitated political 
engagement among those with at least some interest in the campaign. (Georgetown 
University/Brigham Young University 2004 Presidential Election Internet Study—a 3 
wave panel conducted during October-November, 2004 in Owen, 2006).  While voters in 
this study used the Internet primarily to search for political information, a significant 
number used it to express their opinions and to become active online in the election.  
Shah, Kwak and Holbert (2001) found that those most likely to be mobilized are 
younger people and those with the greatest familiarity and experience with the Internet 
regardless of socioeconomic status. Their major research aim was to understand how 
“patterns of new media use that provide information or contain the possibility of 
strengthening strong ties are positively related to the individual level production of social 
capital—including civic voluntarism. They measure voluntarism based on self-reported 
frequency of activity.  While overall Internet use had a negative impact on civic 
engagement, it was significant predictor of civic engagement among “GenXers” (defined 
as those between the ages of 18-34).  Television viewing, either generally, or for “hard 
news” viewing had no effect on civic engagement for “GenXers” or any other age group.   
Shah et al. (2007), in a more recent study,  looked at whether online news 
information seeking and political discussion leads to political participation, found that 
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using the Internet and the Web as a means for information and messaging leads to 
political participation. However, they show no evidence of whether those participating 
are new to the political process. Their theoretical model accounted “for effects of the 
Internet use on participation while also accounting for a much broader array of 
communication behaviors” (p. 683)” Their findings suggest that young people may be the 
best targets of mobilization by the Internet, especially through political messaging. They 
suggest future research look at the effects across age groups. 
Quintelier and Vissers (2008) studied the online habits of sixteen year olds in 
Belgium and hypothesized that the more time young people spend online the more likely 
they will be to participate in politics offline and  different forms of Internet use will have 
positive and/or negative effects on offline political participation.  Using a large sample 
survey of Belgian youth, the authors find that frequency of Internet use has no effect on 
offline political participation.  Rather, variables such as political interest, membership 
associations, and parental discussion have a greater impact.  However, some online 
activities, such as blogging, forwarding political emails, and following the news online 
have a positive effect on offline participation.  While the age of the subjects of this study 
is too young for comparability to what I did with the NAES data, the important finding is 
the relationship between certain online participation activities and offline participation—
something which I investigate in this dissertation. 
There has been some empirical evidence of mobilization across all age groups.  
Tolbert and McNeal ( 2003) found those with access to the Internet and online election 
news were significantly more likely to report voting in the 1996 and 2000 presidential 
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elections (using NES data) even after controlling for a SES, partisanship, attitudes, 
traditional media use, and state environmental factors.  The dependent variable was 
voting and the causal mechanism for turnout was Internet access and reading election 
news online. 
Mossbacher, Tolbert and McNeal (2008) empirically showed the relationship 
between engaging in such online activities as chat rooms and email and voting.  For 
example, “the probability of voting increases between 21 and 39 percent, comparing 
individuals who regularly send and receive political e-mails, with those who rarely do. 
(page 85).   The range of probability depends on the impact of other media. For example, 
heavy users of television and newspapers for news are less likely to vote as a result of 
sending or receiving political emails, and are more likely to vote as a result of sending or 
receiving emails if they do not use television or newspapers as a information source.   
This is in line with Rosenstone and Hansen’s work (1993).  
In addition to sampling issues, what most studies on mobilization have failed to 
do is to better specify the nature of the Internet activities.  Doing so would create a 
clearer understanding of the effects (Shah et al., 2002).  
Gibson, Lusoli and Ward (2005) also argue scholars show an incomplete 
understanding of online political participation, most specifically by excluding 
examination of contextualized online resources that may encourage mobilization. Gibson 
et al. go beyond prior studies of the Internet and political participation by widening the 
understanding of online political participation as well as introducing Internet-specific 
variables as part of their contextualization model of Internet effects.  In examining the 
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level of political participation by those who are and are not Internet users just prior to the 
2002 British parliamentary elections, they found support for their contextualization 
model showing that the Internet is expanding the number of those who are politically 
active among those who had been previously disengaged in more traditional offline 
political activities.  The difference in their research is the inclusion of the contextualized 
variables not typically found in prior studies of online political participation. 
De Huniga et al. (2009) show the impact of the Internet on the political 
environment in their study of how reading web logs (blogs) affects participation.  They 
find that blog usage significantly increases online political participation and discussion, 
but has no effect on offline participation.  Missing from their sets of controls is political 
interest, so it is difficult to determine how blog usage would impact participation by 
controlling for that.  However, one could treat one of their media variables, “political 
book readership” as a proxy.  Additionally, they find that media use in general minimally 
predicts participation, except that using online news sources does significantly predict 
online participation.  In my dissertation, I treat blog reading and posting as a form of 
participation, so I am unable to compare De Huniga et al.’s findings with my own.  The 
import of their research is they find a relationship between blog reading and online 
participation, but no connection between Internet usage and offline participation, 
generally.  Therefore, the shows some evidence of mobilization, but again without 
controls for political interest, one cannot be certain. The study was based on a secondary 
data analysis of Pew Internet and American Life data from the 2008 campaign. The 
definition of blog usage is very general and as the authors state, there is no distinction for 
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level of blog traffic or blog content. Therefore the relationship between blog use and 
participation could have been underestimated.   
Two papers presented at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science 
Association held in Toronto, Canada examined how online social networking and online 
social capital had an effect on offline participation and engagement.  Feezell, Conroy, and 
Guerrero studied Facebook users to measure their level of offline political engagement.  
They conducted a survey among political science students who were actively on 
Facebook and found a positive linkage between Facebook usage and offline participation.   
Using OLS regression and an aggregate measure of participation (which they do not 
define in their paper) as the dependent variable, they find that membership on Facebook 
is associated with offline political participation.  However, while Facebook users are 
more likely to participate offline, the authors find no significant effect of increased 
political knowledge among the users.   The primary drawback I see with this study is the 
use of a sample of political science students.  By choice or by nature, this group is 
probably more likely to participate offline in any event compared with non-political 
science students.  While this is a serious limitation, the research moves in the right 
direction and is but one example of the research that is currently taking place to 
determine the impact of the Internet on participation.   
Gibson and McAllister (2009) also presented a paper on virtual social capital and 
civic engagement and participation.  Using data collected from the 2007 Australian 
Election Study (AES), the authors found that building a bonding type of social capital is 
positively associated with political efficacy and active social engagement than is a 
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bridging type of social capital.  Building a bonding form of social capital simply means 
using the Internet to contact others one knows already in an offline context.   Bridging 
refers to expanding a network to a wider and more diverse group.  Further, younger 
people tended to be more likely to engage in this form of social network building than 
older people.  The implication of this study is that targeting tighter networks comprised 
mainly of friends and family will be more effective in encouraging participation and 
perhaps support around a candidate or issue.   
Both Feezell, Conroy, and Guerrero and Gibson and McAllister’s papers provide 
further evidence that the Internet has a positive impact on political engagement and 
participation.  However, neither study go far enough in showing that it is the Internet 
itself which helps foster such engagement and participation. 
2-3: Evidence of both Mobilization and Reinforcement 
There have been at least two studies showing evidence of both reinforcement and 
mobilization.  I review two of them in this section.  Best and Krueger (2005) find 
evidence of both reinforcement and mobilization in their examination of offline and 
online political participation.  The best predictors of online political participation are not 
civic skills (e.g., attending a community meeting, sending a letter to an elected official, 
planning or chairing a meeting, giving a presentation or speech) but political interest and 
Internet skills (e.g., designing a web page, sending an attachment via email, downloading 
a file, and posting something on the Internet), suggesting that online participation 
behavior differs from offline participation behavior.  They support reinforcement in 
finding that higher SES and highly politically interested people are more likely to 
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participate either offline or online. Internet skills, a predictor of online political 
participation, are related to higher SES.  However, an important exception to their finding 
is young people.  Controlling for everything else, younger people have greater Internet 
skills, and their levels of online participation is not lower than older people, whereas, 
everything being equal, older people are more likely to engage in traditional political 
participation than younger people.  Age was not a significant predictor of participation, 
so the authors point to the Internet skills as a key determinant. 
Kwak et al. (2004) find evidence for reinforcement and mobilization in their study 
of the relationship between high-speed Internet and knowledge and participation. Using a 
differential gains model, they posit that as technology changes and improves, i.e., the 
adoption of broadband, the patterns of “political and social consequences that are 
different from those introduced by the adoption of narrowband Internet” (p. 427).  Since 
broadband offers greater entertainment opportunities the gains would be smaller than a 
switch from no Internet to narrowband (slower service).  While Kwak et al. found that 
improved technologies—narrowband to broadband—led to greater socializing (non-
political) and “soft knowledge” (non-political, but highly publicized), it had no effect on 
increased political discussion or “hard knowledge” (political and international issue 
knowledge).  Moving from no Internet to narrowband, however, did significantly increase 
political discussion.  Improved technology, they argue, is more in line with civic 
disengagement (citing Shah, 2001) rather than civic engagement.  The problems I see 
with their study are a very small sample size, limited geographic area of study, and 
Internet access was measured at home only.  Additionally, the authors did not measure 
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Internet frequency in any way, they only were interested whether someone had 
narrowband or broadband, which of course is critical to their study, but by measuring 
frequency or literacy, one could better determine the effect of narrowband.  The study 
shows evidence for reinforcement because there is no effect on civic engagement when 
moving to a faster technology. Mobilization is seen when going from no Internet to 
narrowband. Finally, the study is somewhat dated since fewer services offer the slower 
narrowband technology. 
The studies reviewed in this chapter point to a rather inconclusive judgment about 
whether the Internet and new media are mobilizing forces or tools for reinforcement.  As 
the Internet becomes more diffuse and as the digital divide narrows with later adopters 
going online, the mix of Internet users may change dramatically, becoming more 
representative of the population as a whole.   Yet, prior studies point to youth as great 
hope for mobilization. There is significant  potential for future research, especially for 
models based on more contextualized measures of online political participation, similar to 
what Gibson et al. conducted    I plan to undertake research that will be based on the 
foundations of Verba et al. and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). However, I  will expand 
on traditional activities and incorporate those political participation activities which 
extend the traditional ones and will take into account the uniqueness of the information 
and communication technologies in the design,  to provide a more academically sound 
answer to the reinforcement and mobilization debate. 
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  2-4:  The 2008 Election in the Context of this Research  
 Before describing the methodology for my research, it is important to 
understand the context in which this study was conducted.  The 2008 election is arguably 
the singularly most unique presidential contest in the history of the United States.  In 
2008, Americans saw a convergence of several factors hitherto not seen in any national 
election—an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate 
who was considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice 
presidential nominee, a collapsing national economy, and extensive use of online tools. 
Hillary Clinton, a former First Lady and at the time a U.S. Senator, was the Democratic 
party front runner in the period prior to the first caucuses in Iowa, and remained a strong 
contender throughout the primaries and caucuses season.  Sarah Palin, at the time the 
governor of Alaska, was selected by Republican party nominee, Senator John McCain to 
be his vice presidential running mate. Palin was the first Republican woman to appear on 
a national ticket.  Barack Obama, a U.S. Senator was the first African American to be 
nominated by a major political party and the first to be elected U.S. president.  The 
overriding theme of the 2008 election was about hope and change .  According to his 
campaign advisors and supporters, Barack Obama was seen as the candidate who was 
going to turn the hopes of those who voted for him into real change (Jamieson, 2009).   
 There were also numerous media reports about the great enthusiasm the election 
would generate among the voting age population.  Some of the headlines readers saw in 
late Fall, 2008 included, “Obama campaign banks on enthusiasm” (St. Petersburg Sun-
Times, September, 28, 2008); “Registration gain favor Democrats; Voter rolls swelling in 
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key states” (Washington Post, October 6, 2008); and “A race to keep voters engaged” 
(New York Times, October 18, 2008).  More people voted in this election than any other, 
and turnout as a proportion of the voting eligible population increased slightly from 2004 
from 60.1 percent to 61.7 percent (United States Election Project, April 26, 2009).  
Further, the Census Bureau reported a significant proportional increase among minorities 
and the young. Based on estimates from the Center for Population Statistics (CPS) survey 
conducted following the 2008 election, two million more African Americans and two 
million more Hispanics cast ballots than the Census Bureau reported for the election in 
2004. The change in voters aged 18 to 24 increased significantly by two percentage 
points to 49 percent in 2008 from 47 percent in 2004 U.S. Census Bureau, July 20, 
2009)3.    
The Internet had been used effectively as a fund raising tool in the 2000 
campaign, especially by John McCain (Kaye, 2009) and as a fund raising and organizing 
tool in the 2004 campaigns, especially by Howard Dean. The role of the Internet 
expanded considerably in the 2008 campaign as all the candidates sought to take 
advantage of the technology and observers noted its many uses and forms in the 
campaign.  The Internet was utilized by all actors in the electoral process—campaigns, 
media, bloggers, advocates for both candidates, interest groups, and the general voting 
public.  In 2008 the Internet was not only used to raise money, but to contact potential 
supporters to amass large databases for mobilization purposes, and social networks to 
produce an efficient well-organized campaign communication and Get Out the Vote 
                                                 
3 Census Bureau conducted the November 2008 Voting and Registration Survey as a supplement to that 
month's Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly labor force survey in which interviews 
are conducted in approximately 56,000 households across the country.  
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(GOTV) effort.  YouTube, a peer to peer video sharing site, which did not exist in 2004, 
served an important function as both a campaign tool to inform and as a way to become 
informed. Viral videos and emails quickly and efficiently made their way through 
cyberspace to spread both accurate and deceptive information about the candidates.  
Political news sites served as aggregators of campaign news, opinion, and polling to help 
feed both the media and the general public.  Blogs of all political and ideological 
persuasions helped promote or attack candidates throughout the campaign, link to other 
blogs, news sites, and political sites, and offered forums for people to express their views 
online.  The Internet also served a fact-checking functions with sites like FactCheck.org 
and PolitiFact.com. For example, FactCheck.org pointed out deceptions in each 
candidate’s tax, energy, Social Security, and Iraq war positions (FactCheck.org, 
September 25, 2008). 
The Internet was also a source for political advertising, but not on the scale of 
broadcast and cable in dollars spent.  For example, the Obama campaign, which spent 
more money than all other candidates, allocated just 6 percent of the $380 million 
advertising budget to Internet advertising while it allocated 85 percent to television (FEC 
estimates, January 2008 as cited by Kay, 2009).   Of course, buying advertising time on 
television and cable is significantly more expensive, but the disparity between television 
spending and Internet spending  is so great, that one can only conclude that most of the 
advertising efforts were placed on television.  However, perhaps more spending on 
Internet advertising would  have been advisable  since  a  Pew Center for the People and 
the Press finding showed that a third of voters cited the Internet as their primary source 
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for election news and 72 percent cited television as their primary source (Pew, October 
31, 2008). 
Internet advertising held very little persuasive powers compared with broadcast or 
cable television (Kaye, 2009).  However, the campaigns attempted to use online 
advertising as a persuasive tool, but mainly the Internet was used to communicate 
information through advertising.  In the case of the Obama campaign, the Internet served 
their  campaign best as a means of  building their  grassroots volunteer organization..   
According to Jon Carson, national field director for the Obama campaign, the Internet 
was the net and not the engine.  The online efforts of the Obama campaign were targeted 
mainly toward quickly mobilizing volunteers toward a number of activities.   The Internet 
was used to build rapid response teams from state to state.  Most of the success in voter 
contact by the Obama campaign resulted from the more traditional field methods such as 
going door to door and telephoning to recruit and solicit donations. Yet, without the 
massive database built from the Internet, they argued the ground forces would never had 
been as successful (Jamieson, 2009).   
To illustrate the significant role played by the Internet in 2008, I present some 
figures from the 2008 general election related to the Obama campaign.  During the 2008 
campaign, the Obama campaign collected “13 million email addresses, more than a 
million cell phone numbers, and a half-billion dollars online”.  Further, the Obama 
campaign utilized many different forms of online communication and social media. 
These included signing on to My.BarackObama.com to create profiles, communicate 
with other supporters, and plan and execute hundreds of thousands of offline events such 
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as offline dinners and fundraisers.  As previously mentioned,  volunteers  could go online 
to download lists of swing voters and their contact information in key battleground 
states.. In the final four days of the campaign, this database allowed supporters to make 
three million calls to voters.  Further, information from the database was analyzed to help 
volunteers identify potential voters to tap for support through door-to-door activity in 
those final days.  While McCain had a web presence and online efforts it was miniscule 
compared to the Obama effort. “Obama had four times the number of Facebook 
supporters, 24 times the Twitter devotees, and three times the visitors to his site in the 
final campaign week.  The public watched about 15 million hours of Obama campaign 
videos on YouTube” (Ratliff, 2009).     
Furthermore, in 2008, as in 2004, the Internet played a major role in fundraising.  
The media portrayed the Internet as source of fundraising from  small (single donations 
totaling less than $200) versus large donors (e.g., USA Today, May 2, 2008), with the 
assumption that these small donors were those contacted though and subsequently  
donated through the Internet.  However, the non-partisan Campaign Finance Institute 
concluded after an analysis of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data that Obama 
raised 80 percent more from large donors than small donors. This represents a much 
higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential candidate. Additionally, the CFI 
analysis showed that Obama raised about the same percentage from small donors 
(amounts of less than $200) in 2008, as George W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).   
While it is clear that the Internet played a large and important role in the 
campaign, for the Internet to mobilize effectively, those segments of society politically 
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marginalized in the past, at least must be able to access the Internet to engage and 
participate.  The digital divide has existed since the advent of the Internet and 
consequently there are large disparities among those who have and do not have access to 
the Internet and thus providing advantage to those who have access. This digital divide 
has existed since the Internet’s introduction (Norris,2001).  Further, reinforcement 
theorists argue that those who are already who are highly politically interested are more 
likely to use the Internet.  In the next section, I present descriptive data from the 2008 and 
2004 NAES data sets showing the levels of Internet access, usage, political interest, and a 
traditional measure of political participation based on Verba et al. (1995).  The index 
made no differentiation between  online and offline participation since NAES did not 
measure online participation in 2004.  The purpose of the index is to establish at the most 
descriptive level whether there are any differences in the levels of access, interest and 
participation between the two election years.  These baseline numbers serve to provide 
context to the analysis presented in the main findings of this dissertation. 
  2-5: Data on Internet Use, Political Interest, and Participation from the 2008 and 
2004 NAES 
Tables 2-1 and 2-2 present descriptive date for all adults and among key 
subgroups collected during   periods of 2004 and 2008.    The data is presented for two 
broad reasons: first, to assess the level of change in Internet access, political interest, and 
participation between the 2004 and 2008 elections; and, second, to assess changes within 
the 2008 election year from the primaries to the general election.  The descriptive 
analysis helps to establish baseline and context for the main analysis presented in the 
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findings section. Internet access is a broad measure meant to show the level of access in 
the United States and to establish whether the digital divide continues in the general 
public.  The level of political interest is measured by the proxy of how closely one is 
following the presidential campaign.  The participation measure is a combined index 
aggregating five activities: persuading others to support or oppose a candidate, doing 
work on behalf of a candidate, donating money to a campaign, attending a meeting or 
rally in support of a candidate, and wearing a campaign button, or placing a lawn sign or 
bumper sticker.  The five participation measures were utilized in both the 2004 and 2008 
NAES surveys and do not distinguish between online and offline participation activities.    
The access data from Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show evidence of a continued digital 
divide between those who have access and those who do not have access to the Internet. 
The numbers scarcely change from 2008 to 2004. Higher educated and more affluent 
adults continue to hold a clear advantage in the level of Internet access, and equally 
important, participation did not significantly change between 2004 and 2008 either.   
Demographically, participation remained about the same in 2008 when compared 
to 2004, except for younger people and African Americans. The data show a slight 
decrease among 18 to 29 year olds and a significant increase among African Americans 
in participation.  African Americans were potentially energized to participate because of 
Barack Obama, but controls were inserted for Obama support in my analysis to account 
for those biases.  Despite everything said and written about young people participating in 
the 2008 election, the decrease is surprising. However, this measure of participation does 
not include online activities and therefore might be misleading, and thus furthers the 
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argument to include online participation activities when measuring participation 
behavior.  
The 2008 campaign did, however, generate a significantly higher level of interest 
when compared to 2004.  Tables 2-1 and 2-2 show a 14 point increase in the level of 
political interest between 2008 and 2004. The increase in interest is evident across all 
demographic subgroups presented in the table.  Most notable in 2008 is the relatively low 
level of interest expressed by the youngest group.  However, this number is consistent 
with the 2004 data among 18 to 29 year olds. 
Participation levels did increase significantly between the primaries and general 
election period--generally in the double digits. The relative proportions remained about 
the same except for 18 to 29 year olds were there was a small increase relative to a larger 
increase for older people.   
Looking closely at 2008, comparing the general election to the primaries, Table 2-
2 shows slight increases in Internet access as the campaign progresses but the same 
differences are found among the groups. Net usage, measured by online frequency (asked 
after the primaries and caucus season ended), is significantly higher for the advantaged 
groups, except for non-African Americans who were not significantly higher in their 
usage than African Americans.   
  The description of the online landscape suggests that mobilizing will be difficult 
as long as the digital divide remains wide between the “digital haves” and “digital have 
nots.”  The levels of traditional participation remain relatively static when compared to 
2004, but increases among African American and decreases among young adults point to 
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two critical trends. First, there certainly was greater enthusiasm about the 2008 election 
among African Americans, in general, but the data does not show a similar level of 
increased enthusiasm among younger adults.  However this could be a result of not taking 
into account online activities.  This dissertation will demonstrate that young people were 
more likely to engage in online participation behavior.
46 
 
    Table 2-1: Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity (Traditional) 2004 NAES4 
 
 All 
Adults  
%  
College 
Graduate 
Or  
Higher 
% 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
 
 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
Age 30 or 
older 
% 
African-
American 
% 
Not 
African-
American 
% 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
2004 GENERAL ELECTION             
 Have Internet Access (n=55,550)) 76.1 90.8*** 67.0 78.9*** 73.9 84.6*** 74.7 72.6*** 76.4 94.7*** 72.8 
 Following campaign very closely 
(n=39,543)   
33.2 41.5*** 28.1 37.7*** 29.5 17.5*** 35.9 30.6*** 33.4 44.3*** 31.2 
Participation (n=5,051) 57.9 65.5*** 53.1 58.1* 57.7 56.2 58.2 58.6 57.8 67.3*** 56.1 
 
***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked in 2004. The 2004 participation data were collected from September 20, 2004 through November 2, 
2004, when the questions were on the survey.  The general election access and campaign interest data were collected beginning March 9, 2004, when the general 
election effectively began as Sen. John Kerry became the presumptive Democratic nominee and President George W. Bush began airing his first general election 
ads. 
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    Table 2-2: Internet Use, Campaign Interest, and Participation Activity: 2008  NAES5 
 
 All 
Adults  
%  
College 
Graduate
Or  
Higher 
% 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
Male 
% 
Female 
% 
 
 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
Age 30 
or older 
% 
African-
American 
% 
Not 
African-
American 
% 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
2008 PRIMARIES             
 Have Internet Access (n=29,771) 76.6 90.6 67.4 80.5 73.6 86.3 75.7 71.5 77.0 95.1 71.6 
 Following campaign very closely  
(n =29,596) 
40.3 48.3 35.0 43.1 38.2 21.4 41.9 45.4 39.9 49.3 37.9 
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE) 
(n=2,217) 
39.8 46.9*** 34.9 38.7 41.3 45.1 39.3 53.8*** 38.7 47.8*** 37.6 
2008 GENERAL ELECTION             
 Have Internet Access (n=24,266) 78.9 91.4*** 70.4 81.9*** 76.6 87.1*** 78.2 74.3*** 79.2 95.6*** 74.2 
Use the Internet at least several hours per 
day ++ (n=19,134) 
39.4 47.0*** 32.6 42.2*** 37.3 44.6*** 39.0 36.9*** 39.6 51.8*** 35.1 
 Following campaign very closely 
(n=19,134)  
47.2 55.7*** 41.2 50.0*** 45.1 28.8*** 48.6*** 53.8*** 46.6 57.7*** 44.3 
Participation (RETROSPECTIVE) 
(n=3,737) 
58.0 64.3*** 52.6 60.4** 56.1 51.2^ 58.3 66.9** 57.4 66.5*** 55.2 
***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05, ^Chi Square is significant p<.10
                                                 
5 Use of the Internet at least several hours per day not asked during the 2008 primaries and caucus seasons.  The 2008 participation data represented in this table reflect a 
retrospective measure of participation, while access, interest and usage were collected during the campaigns.  The 2008 Primaries retrospective data were collected from July 2, 
2008 through August 4, 2008-when the survey asked about primary activity. The contemporaneous primaries access and interest data were collected from Jan. 2, 2008 through 
June 10, 2008—during the primaries season. The 2008 General Election access, usage and interest data were collected from July 2, 2008 through November 2, 2008.  The 
retrospective general election participation data were collected from November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008 among a panel of respondents who completed a survey 
initially during the General Election period in order to collect data reflecting participation from the 2008 general election campaign.   
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CHAPTER 3.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND STUDY DESIGN 
 This dissertation addresses three research questions related to the role of the 
Internet in campaigns and elections: (1) Does the Internet mobilize new participants or 
reinforce existing biases in participation? (2) Does mobilization or reinforcement vary 
depending on whether participation occurs offline or online? (3) Does mobilization or 
reinforcement depend upon the ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their 
campaigns? The theoretical mechanism that will drive mobilization is the decentralized 
nature of the Internet which lowers communication and networking costs, providing a 
convenient, easy, and efficient means of acting and being acted upon by a campaign and 
its supporters.  The outcome would be an increase in the number of those less likely to 
engage in the political process to take action and participate.  In this chapter I describe 
these three research questions and the related hypotheses that emerge from them in 
greater detail.  I will then turn to a description of the research design, data, measures and 
methods I will use to test these hypotheses.  
3-1: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does using the Internet mobilize new participants or 
reinforce the participation of the already engaged?  
Whether Internet use alleviates or aggravates existing biases in political 
participation is at the heart of this dissertation.  This dissertation investigates whether the 
extent to which the Internet acts as a mobilizing mechanism includes mobilizing the types 
of citizens who are traditionally less engaged (i.e., the young, the less educated, the 
economically disadvantaged, minorities and women).  At the same time however, Internet 
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use also has shown demographic biases in favor of the better educated, the economically 
advantaged, and whites.  How these sometimes competing, sometimes reinforcing 
patterns affect levels of participation is unclear.  As the previous chapter makes clear, the 
answer to this question is uncertain since prior research provides both theories and 
findings in support of both mobilization and reinforcement.  For this reason RQ1 
generates the following competing hypotheses, each of which can be compared to the 
“null hypothesis,” which assumes no effect from Internet use:   
Hypothesis 1a (H1a):   Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged 
citizens.  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b):  Using the Internet will reinforce the participation of 
already engaged citizens.  
Research Question 2 (RQ2):  Does mobilization or reinforcement vary depending 
on whether participation occurs offline or online?  
As also discussed in Chapter One, the potential mobilizing or reinforcing effects of the 
Internet are further complicated by the fact that the Internet not only provides a means for 
becoming more informed or motivated, but also an avenue for actually participating (e.g., 
by contributing money online).  As a result, its mobilizing or reinforcing effects may vary 
by whether the resulting participation is online or offline.  Again extant theory and 
research is equivocal on this issue, leading to a second set of competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a):   Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged 
citizens to participate offline. 
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Hypothesis 2b (H2b):  Using the Internet will reinforce the offline participation of 
already engaged citizens. 
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged 
citizens to participate online. 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): Using the Internet will reinforce the online participation of 
already engaged citizens. 
 Research Question 3(RQ3):  Does mobilization or reinforcement depend upon the 
ways in which candidates utilize the Internet in their campaigns?   
The final research question to be answered is the extent to which mobilization or 
reinforcement is dependent on the effectiveness with which different candidates and their 
campaigns utilize the Internet.  As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) posit in their work on 
political mobilization, recruitment and candidate contact play a critical role in any 
campaign.  Through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and activation, campaigns 
build up their organization and base of support.  A more effective activation effort leads 
to greater success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out, 
therefore multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an 
attempt to maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support. 
Online recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of 
spurring them into action and also helps to expand this message to those who may be 
interested but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act.   
Therefore, I hypothesize  
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Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to 
participate than those contacted offline  
The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008 
presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the 
Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out 
online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential 
supporters.  Given this perception, I further hypothesize 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b):  Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to 
have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton 
in the primaries.  
Hypothesis 3c (H3c):  The Obama campaign online contact would more likely 
lead to political participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.  
3-2 Study Design 
In order to test the hypotheses and begin to answer the research questions described 
above, I utilized data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Telephone survey.  In 
this section I provide an overview of this data set and how I employed it through a series 
of discrete “case studies,” discuss the specific measures of key variables used in my 
analyses, and describe the statistical methods that make up the bulk of my analyses.   
3-2.1 Data Source: National Annenberg Election Telephone Survey (NAES)  
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 The data source for this research is the telephone component of the multimodal6 
2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES).  The component consisted of a 
roughly 100 item, 30 minute pre-election telephone survey utilizing a national rolling 
cross-sectional (RCS) telephone design, 7  and a shorter post-election telephone panel 
survey.  The surveys were designed to measure the dynamics of the 2008 U.S. 
presidential campaign.  The respondents were adults, age eighteen or older living in the 
United States. The field period for the pre-election survey was December 17, 2007 
through November 3, 2008 (day before Election Day), producing a robust sample size of 
57,967 nationally representative household interviews.8 The post-election panel consisted 
of re-contacts with 3,737 respondents from the pre-election survey and was fielded from 
November 5, 2008 through November 12, 2008.   
 My research is divided into four different phases of the 2008 election cycle, 
which I present as case studies. In Case 1, the data are from a major portion of the 
primaries and caucuses period. Data were collected from February 1 through March 10, 
2008 (N=4,812).9  In Case 2, I utilize the data collected during part of the post-primaries 
                                                 
6 The 2008 NAES was conducted as two separate studies: A telephone survey instrument looking at 
aggregated changes over time fielded by ABT-SRBI of New York, NY and an online panel measuring 
individual changes across five waves conducted by Knowledge Networks of Menlo Park, CA. 
7 Briefly, the RCS approach is composed of a series of repeated cross-sections collected over time.  The 
benefit of using repeated cross-sections is the ability to identify changes between two or more points in 
time. In the NAES RCS design, each cross-section is composed individuals selecting using a random-digit 
dialing (RDD) technique.  NAES is run on a daily release schedule, and is managed in such a way that the 
date of an interview is considered a random event. In this way, researchers can treat each days as an 
individual, representative study (Romer et al., 2006).   
8 Nationally representative of the 48 contiguous United States; no interviews are conducted in Alaska and 
Hawaii. 
9 Case 1 encompasses the period  when thirty-nine primaries and caucuses took place, including the twenty-
two states on Super Tuesday, February 5, 2008. The states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,  Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
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and caucuses period, July 2 through August 4, 2008 (N=2,217).  In Case 3, the data 
collection covered the time of the pre-convention period through part of the general 
election period, from August 8 through October 2, 2008 (N=6,832).10  Case 4 consists of 
the post-election period from November 5 through November 12, 2008 (N=2,026).  The 
cases are structured in such a way to uniquely answer my research questions and address 
my hypotheses.  
Table 3-1 displays the time periods and sample sizes within the cases, along with 
an indication of which hypotheses and questions have been addressed by the available 
information:   
                                                                                                                                                 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition, the District of 
Columbia held its primary on February 12. 
10 The Case 3 period ends on October 2 because other pressing questions had to become part of the survey 
related to the presidential debates, therefore we made the decision to suspend the participation questions. 
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Table 3-1: Sample Periods and Hypotheses/Questions Addressed 
 Data 
Collection 
Period 
Proposed 
Sample Size 
Hypothesis/RQ to 
be Addressed 
Case 1: Mobilization and 
Reinforcement during the 
Primaries and Caucuses on and 
around Super Tuesday 
 
February 1 
through 
March 10, 
2008 
4,812 H1a-b and H2a-d 
 
Case 2: A Retrospective Measure 
of Mobilization, Reinforcement 
and Activation during the 
Primaries and Caucuses  
 
July 2 through 
August 4, 
2008 
2,217 H1a-b and H2a-d 
H3a-c 
 
Case 3: Mobilization and 
Reinforcement during the General 
Election Period-Pre-Convention 
Period to  October 2, 2008*  
 
August 8 
through 
October 2, 
2008 
 
6,832 (mainly 
asked of a 
third of the 
sample) 
H1a-b and H2a-d 
 
Case 4: A Retrospective Measure 
of Mobilization and 
Reinforcement during the General 
Election using the Post-Election 
Panel 
 
November 5 
through 
November 12, 
2008 
 
2,026 re-
contacts (who 
were not 
asked the 
participation 
battery in 
their initial 
interview) 
H1a-b and H2a-d 
 
        
3-2.2 Criterion variables 
 
3-2.2.1   Overview of participation measures in the NAES.   The participation 
questions in this study are based on work by Verba and Nie (1972), Verba et al. (1995), 
and Gibson et al. (2005), among others, and have been tailored to fit the 2008 election.  
In this section I will describe the participation measures used in each research case.  Due 
to a number of circumstances, including space on the survey, time period within the 
campaign cycle, and research focus, the participation measures varied from case to case. 
However, as discussed later in the chapter, there was a consistent pattern of participation 
activities running through each case study.  The general structure of the measures is as 
follows: 1) Participation activities without regard to whether they were performed online 
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or offline; 2) Participation activities performed online; and, 3) Participation activities 
performed offline.  Each of the participation activities are dichotomous and were 
measured discretely by asking respondents whether or not (yes/no) they performed each 
activity during a given time-frame. 
My analysis mainly focuses on individual activities because different motivations 
may underlie decisions to undertake diverse activities. While my analysis of mobilization 
and reinforcement is primarily based on individual participation activities, it also includes 
a combined index of online participation and a combined index of offline participation.  
For example, the most significant predictors of donating to a campaign may be very 
different from the most significant predictors of forwarding a campaign email to friends, 
or posting to a political blog.   
3-2.2.2  Participation activities without regard to whether they are done offline or 
online.   Internet use or online campaign contact may have an impact on engaging in 
certain activities, regardless of whether the activity itself was performed online or offline.   
Prior research generally measured engaging in such activities. In this dissertation, there 
are three activities that fall within this category: 1) Persuading someone to support or 
oppose a candidate for president, 2) volunteering to work for a presidential campaign, 
and, 3) donating to a presidential campaign (see Table 3-2).    In each of the case studies, 
while the survey questions for these behaviors are worded without any reference to 
whether they were performed offline or online, each of these questions is followed up 
with a more specific inquiry.  The results of this analysis help to test Hypotheses 1a and 
1b.  (See Appendix 1 for the complete wording of all questions).  
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Table 3.2: Participation Activities Without Regard to Online or Offline Performances 
Case 1-4 (Complete Wording in Appendix)* 
 
 Cases 1-4 
Persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate for president   
Volunteer to work for a presidential campaign   
Donate money to a presidential candidate or campaign    
*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no) 
3-2.2.3  Offline participation activities—detail. This section details the specific 
offline participation activities I have analyzed in each of the cases (see Table 3). During 
Cases 1 and 3, I asked respondents about their behavior in the prior week, based on the 
assumption that respondents would best recall the time frame closest to the interview 
date, and thus allowing for real-time measurement.  In Cases 2 and 4, I asked, 
retrospectively, about participation behaviors performed at any time during the primary 
campaign. In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were included: offline 
persuasion of others to support or oppose a candidate, offline volunteering for a 
campaign, and offline donating to a campaign.  This turned out to be a rather limited set 
of participation variables, which I discovered after testing for reliability during a pilot test 
(α=.16).  Consequently, I determined that it was necessary to expand the list of activities 
to include other traditional offline campaign related variables used by Verba et al. (1995) 
and others: attending a campaign event in support of a presidential candidate, and 
wearing a presidential campaign button or placing a bumper sticker or sign. These 
variables became part of NAES, and hence, part of my research design.  The results of 
the analysis of the offline activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d. 
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Table 3.3: Offline Participation Activities during—Cases 1-4 (Complete Wording in 
Appendix)* 
 
 Case 1** Case 2*** Case 3** Case 4**** 
Persuade someone to support or 
oppose a candidate for president: 
Offline  
        
Volunteer to work for a 
presidential campaign: Offline 
        
Donate money to a presidential 
candidate or campaign: Offline 
       
Attend campaign event in support 
of a  presidential candidate: 
Offline  
       
Wear a presidential campaign 
button,  place presidential 
candidate sign in yard: Offline  
 
       
*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no) 
**Activity asked about in the prior week,  ***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses, 
****Activity during the course of the general election 
 
Note that in Case 3, the data concerning whether a respondent made a campaign 
donation online or offline could not be used because of a typographical error in the 
survey. This error made it impossible to distinguish between online or offline donations.   
3-2.2.4 Online participation questions—detail. In Cases 1 through 4, online 
participation consisted of up to eight online behaviors (see Table 3-4).  In Case 2, due to 
space limitations on NAES only five of the eight online participation activities were 
measured.  The three variables excluded were, 1) reading/posting to a political blog, 2) 
discussing politics online in a chat group, and 3) viewing video on sites like YouTube 
during the primaries and caucuses. As with the analysis of offline variables, Cases 1  and 
3  measured participation behavior performed in the prior week, Case 2  measured  
retrospective activities  over the course of the entire primary and caucus period, and Case 
58 
 
4  measured online acts  retrospectively over the course of the general election.  The 
results of this analysis of online activities provide a test for Hypotheses 2a through 2d.  
Table 3-4: Online Participation Activities Measured During Cases 1-4 (Complete 
Wording in Appendix)* 
 =Asked during Case 
 
 Case 1** Case 2*** Case 3** Case 4**** 
Persuade someone to support or 
oppose a candidate for president: 
Online  
        
Volunteer to work for a 
presidential campaign: Online 
        
Donate money to a presidential 
candidate or campaign: Online  
       
Discuss politics online in a chat 
group 
 
       
 
Visit a presidential 
campaign/party/political website 
        
View video on sites like YouTube 
about the presidential 
candidates/campaign 
       
Read a political blog/Post to a 
political blog or discussion forum 
 
       
Forward emails/audio/video about 
presidential candidates or 
campaigns to friends, family, co-
workers or other people you 
know 
        
*All variables are dichotomous (yes/no)**Activity asked about in the prior week 
       ***Activity during the course of the primaries and caucuses  
      ****Activity during the course of the general election 
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3-2.2.5 The offline and online indexes.  In each case, the offline index variable 
was created by combining the “yes” responses to the offline questions, The online 
participation index was created by combining the “yes” responses to the questions related 
directly to online participation. As a result, these indexes were used as a tool to test 
hypotheses 1a-b and 2a-d. 
3-2.2.6 Retrospective measures to address h3a-c: the activation hypotheses. The 
survey included the following question areas to address Hypotheses 3a-c on activating 
supporters: whether a presidential campaign contacted the respondent either online or 
offline, the frequency of such contact, and the results of such contact related to 
participation.  In addition, the survey measured most of the online and offline 
participation activities noted in the prior sections (See Table 3-5). 
Table 3-5: Questions Measuring Activation and Participation during Retrospective Post-
Primaries and Caucuses Period (Case 2) (Complete Wording in Appendix) 
 
Activity During Primaries and Caucuses—Case 2 
Contact from any of the campaigns 
Which campaign contacted respondent 
Mode of contact—online, phone, mail, in-person 
Frequency of contact 
Did Obama/Clinton campaign email respondent to contact others 
How did respondent act on contact 
Presidential campaign work (offline/online) 
Persuade a friend co-worker to vote a certain way in the presidential election 
(offline/online) 
Presidential campaign contribution (offline/online) 
Visit a presidential campaign/party/political website 
Forward emails/audio/video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, 
family, co-workers or other people you know 
Wear a presidential campaign button,  place presidential candidate sign in yard 
Attend campaign event in support of a  presidential candidate 
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3-2.3  Internet usage variables: internet access and internet frequency.   
Internet usage measures are critical to test whether mobilization or reinforcement 
occur in any particular case.  In the NAES there were two general Internet usage 
questions.  The first was a dichotomous Internet access question which measured whether 
someone has access to the Internet at home, work or elsewhere.  The second question, 
added to the survey at the beginning of the Case 2 time period (July 2, 2008),  measured 
the respondents’ frequency of general Internet use: several hours per day, almost every 
day, at least once per week, a few times a month, every month or so, rarely, or never.  
This more detailed measurement of Internet use allowed me to expand the breadth of 
analysis I could perform for Cases 2 through 4 including the ability to test interactions 
between level of Internet use and the demographic variables for both online and offline 
political participation (See Table 3-6). 
The Internet access variable is a dichotomous variable and was of limited usage 
since one is unable to discern the level or frequency of Internet activity from it.  Further, 
since Internet access is a prerequisite for answering the questions regarding online 
participation, its use was limited in Case 1.  I could not test for interactions between 
Internet access and the independent variables to determine online mobilization.  
Therefore, in Case 1, I focused only on the interaction between Internet and the 
independent variables in predicting offline participation. 
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Table 3-6: Internet Usage Questions 
 
Question Asked in Which Case  
On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at 
home, at work or someplace else?   
1-4 
On average, which of the following best describes how often 
you are on the Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every 
day, at least once per week, a few times per month, every month 
or so, rarely,  or never? 
2-4 
 
3-2.4  Independent and control variables used in the analyses.  
 The survey contained a number of independent and control variables which I 
employed in my analysis. These represent the demographic questions measured in the 
extant research, including education, gender, age, race, income and frequency of religious 
attendance and serve as the basis for addressing the mobilization and reinforcement 
hypotheses.  Control variables include, party identification, ideology, campaign interest,  
campaign contact, media use for campaign information, using the Internet for campaign 
information about the presidential campaign, candidate support, and the aforementioned 
Internet access and frequency measures (See Table 3-7).  Control variables are used to 
rule out alternative explanations, but at the same time shed light on what the best 
predictors are for a given activity. 
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Table 3-7: Independent and Control Variables including Internet Access and Internet 
Frequency 
 
 Data Collection Period 
Age All 
Education All 
Race All 
Income All 
Frequency of religious attendance All 
Party identification All 
Ideology All 
Campaign interest All 
Internet access All, but in the model only during Case 1 
Internet frequency All, Except February 1 through March 10 
(not on survey) 
Campaign contact online All 
Candidate support All 
Media usage All 
 
 
For purposes of the analyses, I set the demographic variables as dichotomous 0,1 
variables (See Table 3-8).  I have chosen the age category, “18 to 29 years old” to 
measure age because prior research suggests that this younger category is more 
technologically sophisticated (e.g., Zukin et al., 2005; Howe and Strauss, 2000).  The 
education and income variables were set at higher levels, so that they could be used as 
markers for the traditional biases in participation.   Race as a variable was categorized 
simply as black/non-black to test the levels of participation activities of African-
Americans, a group considered to be disadvantaged, politically.   
Religious attendance is not a dichotomous variable in my analysis. Instead, I 
recoded it as a numerical variable ranging from one to five, where one means “never 
attend religious services” and a five means, “attend religious services more than once a 
week.”  
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Table 3-8: Recoded Independent Variables for Analyses 
 1 0 
Age  18-29 Not 18-29 
Education College Grad or higher Not College Grad or higher 
Race Black Not Black 
Income Household Income $100K or 
higher 
Household Income Not $100K 
or higher 
Gender Male Female 
 
3.3 Analytic method 
Tables 3-9 and 3-9a display an outline of the analytical methods used to test the 
hypotheses, followed by a detailed description of the methods as they apply to the four 
case studies that comprise my analysis.  Generally, each case follows a similar pattern to 
address the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses: descriptive frequencies, 
correlation analyses, and determining predictors of political participation using 
multivariate analyses.   Most of the multivariate models involve logistic regression 
because each of the participation dependent variables is dichotomous. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression was an inappropriate technique for most of analysis because 
dichotomous variables violate at least two of the five assumptions necessary to undertake 
a linear model: homoscedasticity and normal distribution.   Binomial logistic regression 
uses maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent variable into a 
logit variable which means that the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable 
occurring or not. Logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring.11  
However, I did use OLS regression to estimate the predictors for the online and offline 
participation indexes.     
                                                 
11 For a further discussion on logistic regression, see Allison (2006) 
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The regression models included interactions to test whether a third variable 
moderates the influence of an independent variable on the outcome or dependent 
variable.  In Case 1, the interaction terms are made up of the Internet access variable and 
the demographic independent variables.  In Cases 2 through 4, the interaction terms 
include frequency of Internet use and one of the demographic independent variables.12  
For purposes of the multivariate analyses, I made the decision to collapse the frequency 
of internet usage variable into a dichotomous high frequency of Internet usage.  Those 
who indicated they use the Internet several hours per day were re-coded as “1” and less 
frequent internet users were coded as “0”.13  If the interaction term decreases the 
influence of the independent variable, significantly, then the interaction has a moderating 
effect on the original relationship, and thus provides evidence for mobilization.14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 In a personal conversation with Eszter Hargittai, a professor of communication at Northwestern 
University on December 10, 2008, she mentioned that a nuanced  measure of  Internet literacy/skill is a 
better Internet classification variable than frequency, but we never measured literacy.  Therefore, I cannot 
empirically test her assertion, but believe that Internet frequency is sufficient.  She suggested I make it clear 
that more recent studies on Internet use (by her) use literacy rather than frequency as a better classification 
variable. 
13 From the beginning of Case 2 (July 2, 2008) through the end of the field period (11/3), 31.2% said they 
were frequent Internet users 
14 For more on interactions, see Jaccard and Turis, 2006) 
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Table 3-9: Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 1 and 2 
Case 1 Hypothesis to be Addressed 
Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and 
Caucuses Period February 1 through March 10  
H1a-b and H2a-d 
Step 1:  Descriptive analysis using primary data  
Step 2: Correlations of  participatory behaviors  
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most 
robust predictors of  online and offline participation 
 
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions 
between Internet use and predictors 
 
Case 2  
A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and 
Reinforcement during the Primaries and Caucuses  
H1a-b  and H2a-d 
Step 1:  Descriptive analysis using retrospective primary 
data 
 
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors  
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most 
robust predictors of  online and offline participation—A 
Retrospective Analysis 
 
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions 
between Internet use and predictors--A Retrospective 
Analysis 
 
A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the 
Primaries and Caucuses  
H3a-c 
Step 1: OLS Regression to determine if  online campaign 
contact during the primaries and caucuses was more likely 
to activate political participation than offline campaign 
contact—A Retrospective Analysis  
 
Step 2: Descriptive analysis of online political participation 
activities performed during the primaries and caucuses to 
determine effectiveness of Obama online communication 
compared with Clinton online campaign communication--A 
Retrospective Analysis 
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Table 3-9a: Outline of Analytical Method for Cases 3 and 4 
Case 3  
Mobilization and Reinforcement during the General 
Election Period-Pre-convention Period to  General Election 
Day (Data Collected August 8 through October 2) 
H1a-b  and H2a-d  
Step 1:  Descriptive analysis using pre-election data  
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors  
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most 
robust predictors of  online and offline participation 
 
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions 
between Internet use and predictors 
 
Case 4  
 A Retrospective Analysis of Mobilization and 
Reinforcement during the General Election using the Post-
election Panel 
H1a-b  and H2a-d  
Step 1:  Descriptive analysis using pre-election data  
Step 2: Correlations of participatory behaviors  
Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most 
robust predictors of  Online and Offline participation 
 
Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test interactions 
between Internet use and predictors 
 
 
 
3-3.1 Testing the mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses 
For each of the four cases, I conducted a test of the mobilization and 
reinforcement hypotheses (H1a-b and H2a-d) applying univariate, bivariate and 
multivariate analytical techniques.  For each of the cases, I followed specific steps which 
are described in detail in the next section.  I discuss Case 1 separately because the 
Internet measure in terms of access was qualitatively and quantitatively different from the 
Internet measure in the other cases in terms of frequency of usage. 
 
3-3.2 Case 1: Mobilization, Reinforcement During the Primaries and Caucuses Period 
February 1 through March 10  
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3-3.2.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation—Case 1. As 
a first step, I describe the type and frequency of online and offline participation activities 
reported by respondents. I then conducted a bivariate analysis of these participation 
activities by the key demographic independent variables as a means of establishing 
whether the traditional biases occurred or if new biases emerged, potentially as a result of 
the Internet’s influence. 
3-3.2.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities 
and key demographic and behavioral variables—Case One. In this step, I conducted a 
correlation analysis to determine if there were significant relationships between, and 
among, the participation variables and key demographic and political behavioral and 
attitudinal variables, such as party identification and campaign interest.  This is an 
important step to undertake because before I attempt to establish causation, I need to 
show whether relationships to exist between and among these variables. 
3-3.2.3 Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to Determine the Most Robust 
Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation—Case One . In order to 
determine the predictors of the variety of participation activities, I ran a series of logistic 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models.  These predictors will provide 
additional evidence that either the traditional biases continue in the presence of controls 
or new biases occur (e.g. older people less likely to view political video online).   The 
dependent variables, in Case 1, were the three general participation variables measured 
without regard to whether they were done online or offline (persuasion for support, 
volunteering for campaign, donating to a campaign), the variety of individual online and 
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offline political participation behaviors, and the two offline and online indexes.  The 
independent variables in the model included age, gender, race, education, income, and 
religiosity. The control variables were party identification, ideology, campaign contact, 
Internet use, campaign interest, candidate support, and media usage for political 
information.  
Within each of the participation activities, the most robust predictors are those 
with the highest odds ratios estimated by the logistic regression models when compared 
within category.    If the odds ratios are significant and higher among younger people, 
African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then this would be 
evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after applying controls.   
Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the unstandardized “b” coefficients 
are significant and greater for the non-traditional independent variables, then this would 
be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not emerge.  Furthermore, if the 
coefficients are significant and greater for online participation than offline participation 
then that is also evidence of mobilization (See Table 3-10). 
3-3.2.4  Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet 
use and predictors—Case One.  I estimated discrete logistic regression models for the 
discrete participation variables and OLS regression models for the indexes to test for 
interactions between Internet access and age, gender, race, income and education. In Case 
1, Internet access could be a moderator of the effect of one of the independent variables 
on offline political participation, the outcome variable. During the primary period, 
Internet access was measured as a dichotomous variable: “yes” or “no” to a question 
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asking whether respondents had Internet access at home, work, or elsewhere. These 
interactions will indicate if having Internet access impacts the effect of demographic 
variables on offline participation. If the offline political participation regression model, 
before interactions, shows support for the reinforcement hypothesis, where the traditional 
biases are upheld, then a significant and negative interaction between the demographic 
variables and Internet access could moderate the effect and, therefore provide evidence 
for mobilization (See Table 3-10). 
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Table 3-10: Case 1-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-b (Steps 3 and 4) 
Model/Hyp Dependent Variable Independent Variable Interaction 
Variables* 
1-3 
 
H1a-b 
Political participation 
variables without regard to 
being offline and online:  
1) Persuading others to 
support or oppose a candidate,  
 
2) Volunteering to work for a 
campaign, 
 
 3) Donating to a campaign 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, Religious 
attendance, Campaign 
interest, Party Identification,  
Ideology,  Internet access, 
Media use for political 
information, Candidate 
Support 
Internet Access X 
Age, Education, 
Race, Gender, 
Income, Religious 
Attendance 
4-11 
 
Determine 
Predictors 
Online political participation 
variables (See Table 5) 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, Religious 
attendance, Campaign 
interest, Party Identification,  
Ideology,  Internet access, 
Media use for political 
information, Candidate 
Support 
N/A 
12-14 
 
H2a-b 
Offline political participation 
variables (See Table 2) 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, Religious 
attendance, Campaign 
interest, Party Identification,  
Ideology, Internet access, 
Media use for political 
information, Candidate 
support 
Internet Access X 
Age, Education, 
Race, Gender, 
Income, Religious 
Attendance 
15 
 
Determine 
Predictors 
Online political participation 
Index 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, Religious 
attendance, Campaign 
interest, Party Identification,  
Ideology,  Internet access, 
Media use for political 
information, Candidate 
Support 
N/A 
16 
 
H2a-b 
Offline political participation 
Index 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, Religious 
attendance, Campaign 
interest, Party Identification,  
Ideology, Internet access, 
Media use for political 
information, Candidate 
support 
Internet Access X 
Age, Education, 
Race, Gender, 
Income, Religious 
Attendance 
*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable’s  
coefficient is significant. 
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3-3.3: Cases 2 through 4: An analysis of mobilization and reinforcement 
  
In Case 1, the analysis focused on testing mobilization and reinforcement during 
the early and middle primary and caucus period (February 1 through March 10, 2008).  I 
was limited in my test because of the lack of a truly discriminating internet usage 
question.  Beginning with Case 2, I was able to put such a measure in place.  Therefore, I 
was able to expand the number of tests I could perform on my hypotheses.  This section 
details the steps I followed in testing these hypotheses in Cases 2 through 4.  I will point 
out the slight differences in each case, but for the most part, the process was the same.  
Case 2 took a retrospective look at mobilization and reinforcement during the 
entire primary and caucus period.  The retrospective primary and caucus questions 
differed somewhat from the primary period questions since the focus was mainly on 
activation by the campaigns (H4a-b) rather than solely on participation activities.  Case 2 
represents a slightly different way to test mobilization and reinforcement since it covers 
the entire primary and caucus period.  Case 3 focuses on data collected during much but 
not the entire general election period (August 8 through October 2, 2008).   The analysis 
of the Case 3 data shows whether mobilization, reinforcement, or both occurred during 
the 2008 general election campaign.  The participation variables are somewhat different 
from those in Case 1 and Case 2 and, therefore, present a slightly different test of the 
hypotheses.      Last, during Case 4, the final phase of data collection, NAES collected 
retrospective participation data from respondents who completed the survey from August 
8, 2008 through November 3, 2008.  The retrospective participation questions were 
similar to the pre-general election questions in Case 3, but I asked the respondent to recall 
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participation activities throughout the general election period, rather than during the prior 
week (See Tables 3,4, 6 and 7 for questions used in each of the cases related to the 
mobilization and reinforcement hypotheses).    
3-3.3.1 Step1: Descriptive Analysis—Cases 2 through 4.  In Step 1, I describe the 
type and frequency of online and offline participation activities undertaken in each case, 
followed by a bivariate analyses of these participation activities by the key demographic 
independent variables as a means of showing if the traditional biases occurred or if new 
biases emerged. 
3-3.3.2 Step 2: Correlations between online and offline participation activities 
and key demographic and behavioral variables—Cases 2 through 4.  Similar to Case 1, I 
performed a correlation analysis to determine if the relationships between the 
participation variables and key demographics, political variables, and relevant behavioral 
variables are significant.  However, cases are not directly comparable because the set of 
participation questions are slightly different.   
3-3.3.3  Step 3: Logistic and OLS Regression to determine most robust predictors 
of Online and Offline participation— Cases 2 through 4.   In Step 3, I determined the 
predictors of online and offline participation, by conducting a series of logistic 
regressions for the particular participation items, and an OLS regression for the combined 
online index and the combined offline index.    As in Case 1, the independent variables in 
the model include age, gender, race, education, income, and religiosity. Control variables 
include party identification, ideology, campaign contact, frequency of Internet use 
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(replacing Internet access), campaign interest, candidate support/vote, and media usage 
for political information (See Table 11).   
3-3.3.4 Step 4: Logistic and OLS Regression to test Interactions between Internet 
use and predictors--Cases 2 through 4.  As the final and most direct test of the 
mobilization versus reinforcement hypotheses I added interaction terms (between 
frequency of internet use and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic 
regression analyses (see Table 3-11).  The logic of these analyses is straightforward.  
Consider, for example, the frequency of offline political discussion.  Suppose that in the 
initial logistic regression analyses describe in “step three” I find that frequent internet use 
increases offline political discussion, but being young (18-29) decreases offline 
discussion.  If internet use acts to reduce age-related biases in participation beyond the 
direct or main effects of being young and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a 
mobilizing effect), then the interaction between these two variables should be significant 
and positive.  If, however, it acts to reinforce this bias, it should be negative. Beyond this, 
the size of the interaction (relative to the main effects of age and Internet use) and the 
specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it is being driven by young people who 
use the internet frequently increasing their political discussion or Internet users 
decreasing their political discussion) provides further evidence in support or opposition to 
the mobilization hypothesis.      
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Table 3-11: Cases 2-4-- Regression Models to Test H1a-b and H2a-d (Steps 3 and 4) 
Model/Hypoth Dependent Variable Independent Variable Interaction Variables* 
1-3 
 
H1a-b 
Political participation 
variables without regard to 
being offline and online: 1) 
Persuading others to 
support or oppose a 
candidate,  
 
2) Volunteering to work 
for a campaign, 
 
 3) Donating to a campaign 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Internet access, Media use 
for political information, 
Candidate Support, 
High Internet Use X 
Age, Education, Race, 
Gender, Income,  
Religious attendance 
 
4-11 
 
H2a-d 
Online political 
participation variables (See 
Table 6) 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Internet access, Media use 
for political information, 
Candidate Support 
High Internet Use X 
Age, Education, Race, 
Gender, Income,  
Religious attendance  
12-16 
 
H2a-b 
Offline political 
participation variables (See 
Table 3) 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Internet access, Media use 
for political information, 
Candidate support 
High Internet Use X 
Age, Education, Race, 
Gender, Income,  
Religious attendance  
17 
 
H2c-d 
 
Online political 
participation Index 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Internet access, Media use 
for political information, 
Candidate Support 
High Internet Use X 
Age, Education, Race, 
Gender, Income,  
Religious attendance  
18 
 
H2a-b 
Offline political 
participation Index 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Internet access, Media use 
for political information, 
Candidate support 
High Internet Use X 
Age, Education, Race, 
Gender, Income,  
Religious attendance  
*I will only test Interactions when the demographic independent variable’s  
coefficient is significant. 
 
75 
 
3-3.4: Testing H3ac: Case 2-- A Retrospective Analysis of Activation during the 
Primaries and Caucuses (July 2 through August 4, 2008) 
 
Research Question Four presents the following hypotheses:   
H3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those 
contacted offline  
H3b: Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted 
online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton 
campaign in the primaries. 
H3c:  Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more likely to be 
mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign  
 
I analyzed Case 2 data (the retrospective primaries and caucuses) to test Hypotheses 3a-
c.  To test H3a and H3c, I used OLS regression to determine if campaign contact 
activated political participation.  To test H3b, I used descriptive analysis of online 
political participation activities performed during the primaries.  
3-3.4.1 Step 1: OLS Regression To Determine If Campaign Contact Activated 
Political Participation, Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3a and H3c).  In order to 
test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I constructed several OLS regression models to determine if 
campaign contact activated political participation.   I ran several regression models 
addressing this hypothetical claim that those contacted online were more likely to be 
mobilized than those contacted offline. I then ran several more regression models 
addressing the claim of hypothesis 3c that those contacted online by Obama were more 
likely to be mobilized than those contacted online by Clinton. The key dependent 
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variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c are political participation (without specifying 
offline or online), offline political participation, and online political participation.    
There would be support for hypothesis 3a if the positive coefficients are greater for online 
contact variables than for offline contact.  Support for hypothesis 3c would exist if the 
positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact variables than for the Clinton 
contact variables (See Table 3-12). 
3-3.4.2  Step 2: Descriptive Analysis of Online Political Participation Activities 
Performed During the Primaries Using Primary Retrospective Data (H3b.  In this final 
part of the analysis, I ran a straightforward descriptive analysis showing the types of 
offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the primaries. In 
addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign contact by the 
Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with the participation 
activities. 
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Table 3-12:  Case 2-- Regression Models to Test H3a-c (Step 2) 
Model Dependent Variable Independent Variables Controls 
1 Offline Political Participation 
 
a) Contacted by Either 
Clinton or Obama  
 
b) Contact by Campaign 
Online 
 
c) Contact by Campaign 
Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Level of Internet access 
2 Online Political Participation  
 
a) Contacted by Either 
Clinton or Obama  
 
b) Contact by Campaign 
Online 
 
c) Contact by Campaign 
Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
3  Political Participation 
(combined) 
a) Contacted by Either 
Clinton or Obama  
 
b) Contact by Campaign 
Online 
 
c) Contact by Campaign 
Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
4 Offline Political Participation 
 
a) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign 
 
b) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Campaign interest, 
Religious attendance, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Level of Internet access 
5 Online Political Participation  
 
a) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign 
 
b) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Campaign interest, 
Religious attendance, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
6 Political Participation 
(combined) 
a) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign 
 
b) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Obama 
Campaign Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Campaign interest, 
Religious attendance, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
7 Offline Political Participation 
 
a) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
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b) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Offline 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology,  
Level of Internet access 
8 Online Political Participation  
 
a) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign 
 
b) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
9 Political Participation 
(combined) 
a) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign 
 
b) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Online 
 
c) Contact by the Clinton 
Campaign Offline 
Age, Gender, Race, 
Education, Income, 
Religious attendance, 
Campaign interest, Party 
Identification,  Ideology, 
Level of Internet access 
 
 
 
79 
 
3.4:  Limitations to Design 
 There are several limitations to this design that I must point out here.  
First, measures are based on self-report, which have been shown to be less reliable 
measures of behavior (See Hovland, 1959; Converse, 1964; Prior, 2009).  Additionally, 
Hargittai (2005, 2009), asserts that nuanced measures of Internet literacy/skill are 
superior to self-reported frequency or general self-reported Internet literacy.  Other 
studies have used Internet skills as a measure to predict participation, also (DiGennaro 
and Dutton, 2006).  However, NAES does not measure frequency in that way and 
contains no measures of Internet literacy; therefore, I accept this as a limitation of this 
study.  Second, the political participation questions have not been consistent throughout 
the survey periods, and therefore there is no mechanism to directly compare results 
among the time periods.   However, each case can be viewed as a separate study of 
mobilization and reinforcement contributing important findings related to different 
measures.  Third, it might be difficult to assess the wider applicability of these results 
beyond 2008 because of this presidential campaign’s uniqueness.  This is a campaign 
where for the first time a major party has nominated an African American, and nearly 
nominated a woman.  The excitement generated by the Obama and Clinton candidacies in 
attracting voters might overpower the effects of the Internet.  However, with my study, 
which controls for those variables, I will demonstrate how the campaigns effectively used 
the Internet as part of the activation process.    
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MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART I:  
THE 2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES 
 
I have divided the findings related to mobilization and reinforcement into two 
parts.  Part I presents the analysis of the two cases covering the 2008 primaries and 
caucuses—Case 1 (Chapter 4) and Case 2 (Chapter 5).  Part II presents the mobilization 
and reinforcement findings from the two cases concentrating on the general election 
period—Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7).   I have organized the findings in this 
way, so the reader may easily follow and compare the results from these two distinct 
periods in the 2008 presidential campaign.   
The four case studies illustrate in multiple ways how political participation 
occurred online and offline during the 2008 campaign, how often, who was more likely to 
participate and/or predict participation, and finally, determine whether reinforcement, 
mobilization, or both occurred.  Prior research is equivocal about the impact of internet 
on participation.  The results presented in the following chapters are an attempt to the 
provide clarity, but in the end, they raise more questions.  Nevertheless, I conclude that 
the data suggest strongly that mobilization took place. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE 1-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE 
2008 PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES ON AND AROUND SUPER TUESDAY 
 
The findings contained within this chapter are from the Case 1 data collected as 
part of the NAES rolling cross section telephone survey from February 1, 2008 through 
March 10, 2008.  The data cover the period in which there were thirty-nine primaries and 
caucuses, including twenty-two that took place on Super Tuesday, February 5.  During 
this period the candidates from both the Democratic and Republican parties engaged in 
intensive efforts to involve more potential voters than at any other point during the 
primaries and caucuses.   
Findings presented in this chapter and the subsequent ones related to mobilization 
and reinforcement (Chs. 4-7) are structured similarly. Minor variation will be noted 
accordingly in the specific chapter. Chapter 4 includes the following analyses of Case 1: 
• A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported 
retrospectively; including a correlation analysis among participation activities; 
• Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online 
participation;  
•  Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between Internet access and 
demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization and/or 
reinforcement—focusing only on offline participation. 
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4-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities 
In Case 1, political participation activities were measured by respondent recall of 
engagement in selected activities during the week prior to being interviewed.  The results 
indicate a relatively low level of participation, but interesting patterns emerged from this 
data collection method.   A major premise underlying this study of mobilization and 
reinforcement rests on the notion that there is systematic bias in the levels of political 
participation across different demographic groups.  Prior research, noted in Chapter 2, 
has demonstrated  that those who are better educated and  more affluent are most likely to 
engage in political participation activities, while the less educated, minorities and young 
adults are least likely to be involved in such actions.  The descriptive analysis detailed in 
this chapter partly affirms and contradicts the past biases in a variety of ways. 
Demographically, some of the Case 1 findings provide evidence of the bias 
reported in prior research, with more affluent and better educated adults more likely to 
engage in the measured participation activities, both online and offline.  However, 
countering the biases, the data show that younger people were more likely to report 
engaging in most of the measured online behaviors and most of the offline behaviors, 
pointing, perhaps, to greater youth involvement in the campaign.  More significantly, 
African Americans emerge as a group more likely to say they engaged in several of the 
online and offline behaviors.  This finding also contradicts prior research on participation 
among African Americans during the primaries (See Table 4-1), and may reflect the 
effects of the presence of a “serious” African American candidate.15  This first picture of 
                                                 
15 The most direct comparison is the 2004 NAES.  During the primaries, African Americans were 
significantly less likely than whites to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate and contribute to 
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African American activity is rather incomplete since Table 4-1 provides descriptive data 
only, without the presence of controls. Subsequent analyses will provide a clearer picture.  
As for the frequency of activity among the adult population, generally, the Case 1 
data show more adults reported participating by attempting to persuade someone they 
knew to either support or oppose a candidate (27.2%) than any other activity.  However, 
they were much more likely to say they engaged in this type of persuasion offline 
(24.1%) than online (3.0%).    
Few adults reported performing the other offline activities measured during this 
period.  Two percent or fewer reported they volunteered to work for (0.7%), or 
contributed to one of the candidates, offline (2.1%).   
In Case 1, the survey measured eight online participation activities (See Chapter 3 
for detail).  A nearly equal proportion of adults said they performed one of the three 
activities: forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (14.7%), viewing political 
video on sites like YouTube (13.4%), visiting web sites of one of the campaigns (12.3%), 
or discussing politics online (11.4%). Among the unique online activities measured, 
fewer said they read or posted to a blog having to do with politics or the campaign (7.3%) 
(See Table 4-1). 16  Not surprisingly, these four uniquely online activities are moderately, 
but significantly and positively correlated with each other. For example, forwarding 
political emails is moderately correlated with discussing politics online (r= .45), viewing 
political video online (r= .29), and visiting a campaign website (r= .28).  Visiting a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the primary campaign of one of the candidates.  During the 2008 primaries and caucus period measured in 
Case 1, the gap has closed—See Table 4-1. 
16 Unique because there is no equivalent offline activity 
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campaign web site is also moderately correlated with viewing a political video (r= .36) 
and reading or posting to a political blog (r= .24) (See Appendix for correlation table).    
It is important to note that the while the   relationships are moderate and positive, 
they are not strong enough to be concerned about collinearity.  The Case 1 correlations 
among the variety of participation activities range from r= .02 to r=.45, suggesting that it 
is proper to examine the mobilizing or reinforcing effect of each activity, rather than 
combining them into an index. 
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       Table 4-1: Case 1 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls) 
Activities Regardless of 
Whether it Was Performed 
Offline during the presidential 
primary campaign  done in the 
prior week 
All 
Adults  
%  
 
 
(n=4,812) 
College 
Graduate 
Or  
Higher 
% 
(n=1,914) 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
 
(n=2,898) 
Male 
% 
 
 
 
(n=2,047) 
Female 
% 
 
 
 
(n=2,765) 
 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
 
(n=377) 
Age 30 or 
older 
% 
 
 
(n=4,435) 
African-
American 
% 
 
 
(n=425) 
Not 
African-
American 
% 
 
(n=4,387) 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
(n=990) 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
(n=3,822) 
 Attempt to persuade someone 
to support or oppose a 
presidential candidate  
27.2 32.2*** 23.8 28.0 26.5 33.4** 26.6 30.8 26.5 33.6*** 25.5 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential   candidates  
1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.6 0.9 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
 Contribute money to 
campaigns or candidates   
3-3 5.4*** 1.8 3.4 3.1 2.1 3.3 3.5 3.2 5.8*** 2.6 
 OFFLINE Activities during the 
presidential primary campaign 
done in the prior week  
           
 Attempt to persuade someone 
OFFLINE to support or oppose  
a candidate  
24.1 27.8*** 21.7 24.5 23.9 28.6* 23.8 28.2* 23.8 28.7*** 23.0 
 Done any work for one of the 
presidential  candidates 
OFFLINE  
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.9** 0.6 0.4 0.8 
Contribute money to campaigns 
or candidates OFFLINE 
 
 
2.1 3.0*** 1.4 2.2 1.9 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 3.1** 1.8 
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ONLINE Activities during the 
presidential primary campaign 
done in the prior week  
           
Attempt to persuade someone to 
support or oppose one of the 
presidential candidates 
ONLINE 
3.0 4.4*** 2.1 3.5 2.7 4.8* 2.9 2.6 3.1 4.9*** 2.5 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential candidates 
ONLINE 
+ 
+ 
0.5 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.8 + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.5 + 
+ 
Contribute money to campaigns 
or candidates ONLINE 
 
1.1 2.4*** + 
+ 
1.5 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 2.6*** 0.8 
Discuss Politics ONLINE 11.4 16.4*** 8.1 12.4 10.6 19.6*** 10.7 11.4 11.1 16.9*** 10.0 
Visited Website of a 
presidential campaign or 
political party 
12.3 17.9*** 8.7 13.9** 11.2 20.7*** 11.6 17.2** 11.9 18.9*** 10.6 
Viewed video on sites like 
YouTube about the presidential 
candidates or campaign 
13.4 18.1*** 10.2 16.6*** 11.0 26.0*** 12.3 19.8*** 12.8 19.5*** 11.8 
Read or posted a comment on a 
blog having to do with politics 
or a campaign 
7.3 9.9*** 5.6 8.8** 6.3 13.0*** 6.9 10.6** 7.0 9.9** 6.7 
Forwarded emails, audio or 
video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to 
friends, families, co-workers or 
other people you know 
14.7 19.5*** 11.5 15.1 14.3 15.9 14.6 14.1 14.7 23.2*** 12.5 
 
++=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05 
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4-2:  Determining Predictors of Offline and Online Political Participation 
The Case 1 descriptive analysis of participation during the primaries taking place 
on and around Super Tuesday suggest that the biases toward the more advantaged groups 
(educated and affluent) continue, but at the same time, it suggests potential for the 
emergence of more non-traditional participatory groups—young adults and African 
Americans, being particularly energized. The next step in the analysis involving Logistic 
and OLS regression produced a more accurate outcome because the models of 
participation were tested with a number of statistical controls in place.  In the presence of 
controls, high education is a significant predictor only for the acts of contributing money 
to campaigns, either offline or online.  Education was not significant for any other 
activities.  The emergence of a more active African American participation group is not 
borne out by the results of the multivariate analysis, where African Americans are 
significant predictors of just two activities.   On the other hand, the models did produce 
an increase in the predictive value of age since young adults were significant predictors 
for half of the activities measured.   While the demographic variables are my primary 
focus, the political variables, including campaign interest and online campaign contact, 
emerged most often as the most robust significant predictors for many of the participation 
activities.  The significant strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and 
Hansen’s (1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political 
process. “High campaign interest” as a predictor is consistent with much of the previous 
work on participation, especially that which shows reinforcement (e.g., Johnson and 
Kaye, 1998, 2003; Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002; Bimber and Davis, 2003; Norris, 2001). 
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This pattern showing the strength and robustness of campaign interest and campaign 
contact is found throughout this study. In contrast to the consistency of interest and 
contact, the data will show a decided lack of consistency in the predictive value of the 
demographic variables from case to case.  
For the remainder of this section, I present the details of the multivariate analyses 
of the four classes of participation activities:  1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating 
without regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities 
including offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, and offline donating, 3) 
online activities including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, discussing 
politics online,  visiting campaign web sites, viewing political video on sites like 
YouTube, reading or posting to a political blog, and forwarding emails, audio or video 
related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and offline indexes.  
Within each of these classes of activities, profiles will be constructed to illustrate those 
who are more likely to engage in the participation behaviors. 
 Logistic regression was used to model the individual activities and OLS to model 
the indexes.  The logistic predictors are represented as “odds ratios” (OR).  Odds Ratios 
simply present the likelihood of an outcome occurring (e.g., visiting a campaign web site) 
for a particular independent variable (e.g., males).  Within each of the participation 
activities, the most vigorous predictors are those with the highest odds ratios estimated by 
the logistic regression models when compared within category.    A significant odds ratio 
of 2.5 for the likelihood of a male viewing a political video on YouTube means that a 
male is two and a half times more likely than a female to view an online political video, 
89 
 
controlling for other factors.   In general, if odds ratios are significant and higher among 
younger people, African-Americans, or people from lower socioeconomic status, then 
this would be evidence that the traditional biases did not emerge or disappeared after 
applying controls.   Similarly, when looking at the combined indexes, if the 
unstandardized “b” coefficients are significant and greater for the lower SES independent 
variables, then this would be evidence that the biases seen in prior elections did not 
emerge.  Furthermore, if the coefficients are significant and greater for online 
participation than offline participation then that is also evidence of the mobilizing effects 
of the Internet.    
 
4-2.1: Predictors of Participation Activities Regardless of Online or Offline Distinctions 
 The participation activities analyzed in this section are those which occur either 
offline or online. These activities, persuading, donating, and attending campaign 
meetings and rallies replicate some of the activities measured in elections before the 
advent of the Internet as a tool for political participation.  The purpose of this analysis 
was to assess whether the traditional SES biases found in prior elections were found in 
the 2008 primaries.  
4.2.1.1: Persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate. 
This activity involves persuading someone with whom one comes in contact to 
either support or oppose one of the presidential candidates. This could be in-person, face-
to-face, through writing, email, texting, blogging, by telephone, or in a meeting. 
Controlling for other demographic, attitudinal and behavioral factors, young adults, age 
18 to 29, were  twice as likely as older ones to say they persuaded someone to support or 
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oppose a presidential candidate (OR=1.985, p<.001).  No other demographic group (e.g., 
gender, education, income) showed a significant relationship with persuasion.  Of the 
non-demographic variables included in the model, high levels of campaign interest 
(OR=2.310, p<.001) and reporting having been contacted online by one of the campaigns 
(OR=1.879, p<.05) were most strongly associated with attempting to persuade someone 
how to vote. Additionally, those who engaged in this type of persuasion were more likely 
to be self-identified as Democrats (OR=1.373) (See Table 4-2).   
4-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign.  None of the SES 
variables traditionally associated with political participation significantly predicted 
volunteering for a campaign, though consistent with the findings of Verba et al. (1995) 
and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more one attends religious services the greater 
the likelihood of volunteering (OR=1.683, p<.001).   Also consistent with Rosenstone 
and Hansen’s (1993) work on recruitment, online campaign contact was an exceedingly 
strong predictor of this behavior (OR=19.299, p<.001).17  High interest in the presidential 
campaign (OR=1.916, p<.01), self-identifying as a liberal (OR=1.506, p<.05), and citing 
the Internet as a primary source for campaign information (OR=1.16, p<.05) were also 
significant predictors of volunteering regardless whether it was done online or offline 
(See Table 4-2). 
4-2.1.3:  Contributing money to a candidate or a campaign. The more educated 
the respondent, the more likely he or she was to report having donated money to one of 
the campaigns (OR=2.184, p<.001).  Those reporting online campaign contact 
(OR=2.291, p<.05), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.912, p<.001) were about 
                                                 
17 Odds ratio may be high because so few said they volunteered to work for a campaign during that period. 
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twice as likely to contribute to a campaign.  Surprisingly, according to the logistic 
regression, Obama supporters were less likely to say they contributed to a campaign in 
the week prior to being interviewed than supporters of other candidate (OR=0.665, 
p<.05). 
In sum, the demographic predictors of activities without regard to whether they 
are done offline or online are young adults for persuading others, religious attendance for 
volunteering, and education for donating to campaign.  These demographic variables are 
also found to be significant for predicting the related offline and online activities, as the 
next two sections will show.
92 
 
 
Table 4-2: Case 1--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was 
conducted offline or online 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone 
to support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
 
 
 
 
Volunteer 
for 
Candidate 
or 
Campaign  
 
 
 
 
 
Contribute 
Money to a 
candidate or 
campaign 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education (Collgrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income (100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Access (yes) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.996 
.924 
1.985*** 
1.037 
1.182 
1.081** 
1.373*** 
.972 
1.087*** 
1.088*** 
1.008 
1.016 
1.259* 
2.310*** 
1.879* 
.822* 
.009*** 
.753 
.861 
2.166 
1.051 
.893 
1.683*** 
1.319 
1.506* 
1.160* 
1.009 
1.073 
.926 
.559 
1.916* 
19.299*** 
1.312 
.000*** 
2.184*** 
.974 
1.146 
1.529 
1.422 
.963 
1.239 
1.024 
1.052 
1.073* 
1.090** 
.962 
1.056 
1.912*** 
2.291* 
.665* 
.001*** 
N 4,458 4,458 4,458 
Correctly Classified 73.7% 99.1% 96.7% 
Nagelkerke R Square .166 .226 .103 
Cox & Snell R Square .115 .022 .026 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, 
^=not asked in Case 2 
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4-2.2:  Predictors of Offline Participation Activities    
 
 In Case 1, only three offline participation activities were measured.18 
Demographically the logistic models produced no pattern of behavior that could be linked 
consistently to one or two demographic measures. Instead, each offline activity had a 
different significant demographic predictor.  Youth was a significant predictor for offline 
persuasion, high levels of education was a significant predictor for offline donations, and 
religious attendance significantly predicted volunteering for a campaign offline.  Online 
campaign contact was not a consistent predictor of offline participation. Campaign 
interest was the most consistent predictor, since it was significant for both offline 
persuasion and offline donation.  Detail follows: 
4-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to support or oppose a 
candidate.   Demographically, young adults were most active in this behavior, according 
to the Case 1 logistic model. Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were about twice as 
likely as older ones (OR=1.831, p<.001) to say they attempted to persuade someone, 
offline, to support or oppose a presidential candidate.  Those highly interested in the 
presidential campaign during this period were more than twice as likely as others less 
interested to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=2.123, p<.001).  Politically, 
self-identified Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they 
tried to persuade others offline (OR=1.401, p<.001) (See Table 4-3). 
4-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline.  Attending 
religious services (OR=1.619, p<.01) was a significant demographic predictor for offline 
                                                 
18 Beginning with Case 2, I was able to add two more—a rally/meeting attendance and wearing a 
button/displaying a bumper sticker or lawn sign. 
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campaign volunteering, but it was the only one.  Online campaign contact was an 
extremely robust predictor of volunteering offline (OR=12.809, p<.001). Additionally, 
those identifying themselves as liberal were almost one and a half times more likely to 
say they volunteered for one of the campaigns offline (OR=1.469, p<.05)(See Table 4-3). 
   4-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. 
Demographically, the more one is educated, the more likely one was to say he or she 
contributed to one of the campaigns during the primaries period covered by Case 1 
(OR=1.740, p<.01). Campaign interest was also a significant predictor, as those with a 
high level of interest in the presidential campaign were  about twice as likely as those 
with less interest to say they donated offline (OR=1.964, p<.01)   Finally, the model 
showed that Obama supporters were less likely to contribute money to a campaign, 
offline (See Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-3: Case 1-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
  
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support or 
oppose 
candidate  
OFFLINE  
Volunteer 
for 
candidate  
or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Contribute 
money to 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Education (Collgrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income (100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Access (yes) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
1.017 
.937 
1.831*** 
1.055 
1.147 
1.072* 
1.401*** 
.993 
1.030* 
1.071*** 
1.009 
1.028 
1.232* 
2.123*** 
1.033 
.825* 
.011*** 
.730 
.888 
1.628 
1.675 
.711 
1.619** 
1.414 
1.469* 
1.048 
.984 
1.088 
.969 
.602 
2.048 
12.80***9 
1.323 
.000*** 
1.740* 
.817 
1.052 
1.383 
1.297 
.997 
1.179 
1.054 
.959 
1.083* 
1.110** 
1.003 
.958 
1.964** 
.907 
.553* 
.001*** 
N 4,458 4,458 4,458 
Correctly Classified 75.5% 99.4% 97.9% 
Nagelkerke R Square .115 .158 .071 
Cox & Snell R Square .077 .011 .013 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,  
^=not asked in Case 2 
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4-2.3: Predictors of Online Participation Activities  
In this section I examine how predictors of campaign participation look when I 
separate on-line and off-line activities.  The logistic regression models using the former 
as the dependent variables produce one fairly consistent demographic predictor of online 
participation —age.  Those aged 18 to 29 years old emerge as significant predictors for 
five of the eight online activities.  In comparison, race is a significant predictor for only 
two of the eight online activities and education is a significant predictor for just one. 
Among the non-demographic variables, citing the Internet as a campaign source was a 
significant predictor for all of the on-line activities, while online campaign contact was a 
significant predictor for all but one. High level of campaign interest was also a significant 
predictor for most of the activities. In sum, during this period of the campaign, the 
strongest predictors of most online political participation activities were:  youth, Internet 
use for political purposes, campaign interest, and campaign contact were the strongest 
predictors of most online political participation activities. 
4-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. 
While very few respondents said they persuaded someone to support or oppose a 
candidate online (3% total), among those who did, young adults (age 18-29) (OR=1.821, 
p<.05) were nearly twice as likely as older ones to say they engaged in this behavior.   If 
one was contacted by a campaign online, that person was almost four times as likely as 
those who were not contacted online to  say they persuaded others online (OR=3.598, 
p<.001).   Additionally, the more one expressed interest in the campaign, the more likely 
one was to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate online 
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(OR=2.707, p<.001).  Finally, reporting that the Internet was a main source for campaign 
information was a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=1.414, p<.001) (See Table 
4-4).  
4-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate or campaign.  Religious 
attendance was the only significant demographic predictor for online volunteering for a 
campaign (OR=1.687, p<.05).  Among the political variables included in the models, the 
strongest predictor by far was online campaign contact. Those reporting such contact 
were nearly thirty times more likely than those who were not contacted online to 
volunteer to work online for a candidate.  This large ratio might be explained by the fact 
that so few people indicated they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%) or perhaps the 
campaigns were good at identifying who to contact. Using the Internet as a primary 
source for campaign information was also a significant predictor (OR=1.682, p<.01)   
(See Table 4-4).   
4-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign. 
Higher education was the only significant demographic predictor for donating to a 
campaign online (OR=4.284, p<.001), and strongest among all the demographic and 
political variables in the logistic model. Online campaign contact was about as important 
as education since those contacted online were just about four times as likely as their 
counterparts to say they made an online contribution to a presidential candidate during 
the primary and caucus period on and around Super Tuesday (OR=3.928, p<.01). The 
more often one went online for campaign information the more likely they were to report 
donating online (OR=1.266, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).   
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4-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. During this active February and early-March 
phase of the primaries and caucuses, younger adults, age 18 to 29 (OR=2.435, p<.001), 
were more than twice as likely as older adults to say they discussed politics online with 
others, even when controlling for a host of other factors.  No other demographic 
independent variable was significant.  Again, the most robust of the predictors, however, 
was online campaign contact (OR=4.358, p<.001).  Not surprisingly, those highly 
interested in the presidential campaign were twice as likely as those less interested to say 
they discussed politics online (OR=2.031, p<.001). The other significant predictor of note 
was citing the Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.358, p<.001) (See 
Table 4-4). 
4-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site.  According to the Case 1 logistic model, 
the demographic profile of those most likely to visit a presidential campaign web site 
comprised young adults (OR=2.422, p<.001), African Americans (OR=1.620, p<.01), and 
frequent attendees of religious services (OR=1.158, p<.001).  Beyond the demographic 
predictors, online campaign contact (OR=2.571, p<.001) and campaign interest 
(OR=2.351, p<.001) were the other significant predictors of visiting a campaign web site.  
Citing the Internet as a primary campaign source was another important predictor for 
going to a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.001) (See Table 4-4).   
4-2.3.6: Viewing political video on sites like YouTube. Viewing political video on 
sites like YouTube was typically done by young adults, African Americans, and males, 
according to the Case 1 logistic model.  Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were almost 
three times more likely (OR=2.698, p<.001) than older adults to say they viewed a 
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political video on YouTube.  African Americans were almost twice as likely as non-
African Americans to say they engaged in this viewing behavior (OR=1.817, p<.001).  
Males were about thirty percent more likely than females to say they viewed political 
video on sites like YouTube (OR=1.292, p<.05).  Outside of demographic variables, high 
levels of campaign interest (OR=1.633, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary 
source of campaign information (OR=1.426, p<.001) were the other significant predictors 
for this viewing behavior (See Table 4-4). 
4-2.3.7:  Reading or posting to a blog about the campaign.  Youth was the only 
significant demographic predictor for reading or posting to a blog about the campaign. 
Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were nearly two times more likely to read or post to 
a political blog than older adults (OR=1.836, p<.01).  Online campaign contact 
(OR=1.791, p<.05), high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.418, p<.01), citing the 
Internet as a source of campaign information (OR=1.413, p<.001) and support for Barack 
Obama (OR=1.325, p<.05) were the other significant indicators of this behavior (See 
Table 4-4). 
4-2.3.8: Forwarding emails, audio or videos about one of the candidates. While 
males were more likely to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube, they 
were less likely than females to say they would forward a political video, email, or audio  
to others (OR=0.690, p<.001). Economic affluence was the other significant demographic 
predictor indicating those from households with an income of one hundred thousand or 
higher were more likely than less affluent households to say they forward political 
material to others (OR=1.424, p<.01).  Perhaps because it might be the source for some 
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of the forwarded campaign material, online campaign contact was the most significant 
predictor for this behavior (OR=3.981, p<.001).  High levels of campaign interest 
(OR=1.453, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.313, 
p<.001) were also significant predictors of forwarding political emails, audio, or video 
(See Table 4-4). 
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Table 4-4: Case 1-- Predictors of Online Political Participation:  Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer 
for 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Contribute 
money to 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
^Discuss 
Politics 
Online 
Visit 
Campaign 
Website 
^Viewed 
Political 
Video on 
Sites Like 
YouTube 
^Read or 
Post to a 
blog 
about 
campaign 
Forward  
Emails, 
Audios, 
or Videos 
to Others 
about the 
candidates  
Education (Collgrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income (100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Access (yes) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.952 
.894 
1.821* 
.865 
1.235 
1.068 
.870 
.906 
1.414*** 
1.100** 
.994 
.932 
NA 
2.707*** 
3.598*** 
.920 
.000*** 
.926 
.747 
3.249 
.000 
1.353 
1.687* 
1.146 
1.487 
1.682** 
1.077 
1.011 
.841 
NA 
1.331 
29.173*** 
1.190 
.000*** 
4.284*** 
1.399 
1.324 
1.850 
1.608 
.905 
1.364 
.968 
1.266*** 
1.049 
1.040 
.894 
NA 
1.709 
3.928** 
.873 
.000*** 
1.116 
.839 
2.435*** 
.880 
1.098 
1.027 
.871 
1.108* 
1.358*** 
1.077*** 
1.022 
.971 
NA 
2.031*** 
4.358*** 
1.224 
.002*** 
1.147 
.993 
2.422*** 
1.620** 
1.212 
1.158*** 
1.055 
1.103 
1.411*** 
1.032 
1.007 
.969 
NA 
2.351*** 
2.571*** 
.965 
.001*** 
1.034 
1.292* 
2.698*** 
1.817*** 
1.112 
.969 
1.307* 
1.065 
1.426*** 
1.034 
1.027 
.937** 
NA 
1.633*** 
1.664 
1.152 
.007*** 
.965 
1.103 
1.836** 
1.478 
.926 
1.029 
1.065 
1.084 
1.413*** 
1.073** 
1.034 
.953 
NA 
1.418** 
1.791* 
1.325* 
.004*** 
.959 
.690*** 
1.215 
1.142 
1.424** 
.977 
.712** 
.895* 
1.313*** 
1.106*** 
1.002 
1.024 
NA 
1.453*** 
3.981*** 
1.035 
.027*** 
N 4,458 4,458 4,458 4,458 4,458 4,458 4,458 4,458 
Correctly Classified 96.9% 99.7% 98.8% 88.7% 87.0% 86.8% 92.3% 85.0% 
Nagelkerke R Square .230 .386 .189 .284 .313 .306 .239 .231 
Cox & Snell R Square .056 .015 .023 .146 .168 .169 .100 .133 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001,  ^=not asked in Case 2
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4-2.4: Online Index and Offline Index: Predictors 
 
The analyses thus far suggest a complex pattern of predictors of campaign 
participation that varied both by type of participation and whether that participation 
occurred online or offline. But can we say anything more general about these patterns?  
As one attempt to do this, in this section I report the results of two OLS regression 
models measuring the predictors for a combined online index and a combined offline 
index.    As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3.), the online participation index was 
created by combining the “yes” responses to the questions related directly to online 
participation. The offline index variable was created by combining the “yes” responses to 
the offline questions.  
The OLS online participation index model produced two strong demographic 
predictors: Age and race.  Age is also a significant predictor for offline participation, but 
not as strong as for online participation.  Young adults were more likely to report 
engaging in at least one of the online participation activities (b=.368, p<.001).  Being 
African American significantly predicts online participation, as well (b=.128, p<.05).  
Youth is a significant predictor for offline participation (b=.105, p<.001), but no other 
demographic variables produce strong significant effects. Religious attendance produces 
a weak, but significant positive effect for offline participation (b=.013, p<.05) (See Table 
4-5).   
Moving beyond the demographic variables, online campaign contact was a strong, 
significant predictor for online participation, more so, by far, than any other control 
variable (b=1.295, p<.001).  However, it was not a significant predictor for offline 
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participation.  High campaign interest was a significant predictor for both online (b=.196, 
p<.001) and offline participation (b=.119, p<.001). Finally, citing the Internet as a 
primary campaign information source was a significant predictor of online participation 
(b=.202, p<.001) (See Table 4-5).  
 
Table 4-5: Case 1--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline 
Political Participation: OLS Regression 
 
 
Online Participation 
Index                        
Offline 
Participation 
Index                        
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Access (Yes) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.008 
-.028 
.368*** 
.128* 
.071 
.011 
-.001 
.013 
.202*** 
.041*** 
.009 
-.018** 
NA 
.196*** 
1.295*** 
.065 
-.538*** 
.012 
-.015 
.105*** 
.025 
.028 
.013* 
.064*** 
.003 
.006* 
.016*** 
.004 
.003 
.024 
.119*** 
.084 
-.043** 
-.275*** 
N 4,457 4,457 
R Square .362 .079 
R Square Change .306*** .067*** 
     *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
4-3:  Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both 
As our final effort to assess the mobilizing and/or reinforcing effects of the 
Internet on political participation in Case 1, I replicated the logistic regression models for 
predicting online participation discussed earlier, this time adding  variables for the 
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interaction of Internet access the central demographic independent variables (age, 
income, race, gender and education).19  The purpose of these analyses is to determine if 
the combination of Internet access (used here as a proxy for general Internet use) and key 
demographic characteristics has an additional effect on offline participation beyond that 
of any main effects, and if so, are these effects more consistent with reinforcement (i.e., 
the interaction further boosts the participation of those who already participate at 
relatively greater rates) or mobilization (i.e., it reduces or erases the participation gaps 
traditionally associated with SES).  
However, the results of these tests of the mobilization and reinforcement 
hypotheses produced no significant interactions between Internet access and any of the 
significant demographic variables predicting the offline participation activities. In short, 
these tests, while limited, provided no additional support for either mobilization or 
reinforcement. 
4-4: Case 1--Summary of Findings 
In Case 1 the analysis focused on a period during the primaries and caucuses in 
which there was a great deal of activity due to the number of states holding their 
primary/caucus electoral contests at that time.  The takeaway from the Case 1 analysis is 
that age, race, online contact and campaign interest are consistently strong predictors for 
both the online index and individual activities, but individuals show more nuanced 
behavior which cannot be picked up by the index.  In summarizing Case 1 findings, the 
                                                 
19 As detailed in the methods chapter,  a test was conducted for  mobilization or reinforcement only among 
the offline participation variables.  The Internet measure during the Case 1 period was an access measure 
and not a frequency measure. 
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descriptive analysis of the Case 1 online and offline participation activities revealed that 
the traditional demographic variables associated with participation—education and 
income—produced the biases found in prior research. However, the frequencies pointed 
to some evidence that young people, a group not traditionally associated with 
participation, had become involved in a number of participation activities, both offline 
(persuasion), and online (persuasion, discussion, visiting  campaign web sites, viewing 
online political video and reading or posting to a blog).  In addition, African Americans 
were more likely to become involved in the campaign, according to the descriptive 
analysis.   
As for general participatory behavior, the descriptive analysis indicated a 
relatively low level of reported participation among the total adult population for most 
activities.  However, when extrapolating these relatively low numbers to the actual adult 
population, they do not appear to be insignificant—numbering in the millions. One 
potential explanation for the low numbers could be a result of how the questions were 
posed to the respondents.  During the Case 1 period, respondents were asked to report 
their behavior in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign.  Case 2 posed 
the participation questions to respondents in a way they could answer retrospectively over 
the entire campaign. As will be shown in the presentation of the Case 2 findings, reported 
behaviors were higher. 
As part of the descriptive analysis, correlations among the various participation 
activities were generally low, with a few exceptions for online participation where the 
relationships were moderate (r ranging between .24 and .45).  This analysis indicates that 
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since the activities were not highly correlated, then following an analytical plan whereby, 
each activity was examined, separately, makes sense. 
Predictors showed that with statistical controls in place, the effect of education and 
income disappeared or diminished for most activities. Young adults remained significant 
predictors for several activities, but the significance of African Americans as predictors 
of certain behaviors disappeared or diminished. Beyond the demographics, online 
campaign contact and campaign interest, emerged consistently as the most robust 
predictors of behavior for nearly all participation activities, both online and offline.  
Contrary to the online analysis presentation online campaign contact was not a 
consistent predictor of offline participation.  However, where the Obama campaign 
excelled—using the Internet to mobilize volunteers—online campaign contact was a 
robust, significant predictor. Campaign interest was most consistent predictor, since it 
was significant for both offline persuasion and offline donation.   
Tables 4-6 and 4-7 provide a visual summary of which variables were the top 
predictors based on both level of significance and size of the odds ratio.  A positive sign 
next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was 
greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, 
meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity. For example, if Age 
(18-29) was significant and negative, then those older than age 29 were more likely to 
perform the activity.   
107 
 
 
Table 4-6: Case 1-- Top 6 Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
(Up to 6) 
 
 
Persuade 
someone to vote 
offline  
 
Volunteer for 
candidate 
offline 
Donate to 
Presidential 
Campaign 
OFFLINE 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X- 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X- 
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Table 4-7: Case 1—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6) 
  
Persuade 
someone to 
vote online 
Volunteer 
for 
candidate 
online 
Donate to a 
Presidential 
Campaign 
Online 
Discuss 
politics 
online 
Visit 
Campaign 
Website 
Viewed 
Video 
Sites 
Like 
YouTube 
Read or 
Post  to a 
blog about 
campaign 
 
Forward 
Emails 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
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Finally, the Case 1 analysis provided no support for either mobilization or 
reinforcement during the early primaries and caucuses.  Internet access did not 
significantly interact with any of the significant demographic predictors for the offline 
activities, either individually or for the combined index.
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 CHAPTER 5: CASE 2 FINDINGS-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT 
DURING THE PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA 
COLLECTION  
This chapter presents the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement during the 
primaries and caucuses, measured retrospectively. The findings reported in the previous 
chapter were measured during a narrower period of time and respondents were asked to 
report their activities in the prior week. This retrospective analysis takes a broader look at 
the participation activities respondents reported throughout the primaries and caucuses.   
The Case 2 data were collected as part of the NAES rolling cross section 
telephone sample from July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008.  This chapter presents 
results of the following analyses 
• A descriptive analysis of political participation activities reported 
retrospectively, including a correlation analysis among participation activities; 
• Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online 
participation;  
•  Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet 
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization 
and/or reinforcement; and 
• A comparison between the data from Cases 1 and 2 
5-1:  Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities 
 In Case 1, political participation was based on self-reported behavior in the week 
prior to being interviewed during an intensive period of the primaries and caucuses 
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calendar when a strong majority of the states were holding or had just held their primaries 
or caucuses.  Despite the intensity of campaign activity across many states, the 
percentage of adults who indicated engaging in some form of participation was low.  
Perhaps this low report of activity is a consequence of the prior week recall method.  The 
data indicate a similar pattern of recall and reporting as Case 3 (which focused on the 
general election) when the participation questions were posed in a similar manner.  Not 
surprisingly, given the wider time-frame covered, respondents reported higher levels of 
participation using this method.  The relative rates of participation across different types 
were generally similar across the two cases, however, giving us confidence that the 
responses accurately reflect actual behavior.  
Consistent with the traditional SES model documented by Verba and Nie (1972) 
among others, advantaged groups--well-educated and affluent--were consistently more 
likely to say they participated in all the activities—offline or online—than were the less 
educated and less affluent (See Table 5-1).  However, once again African Americans, a 
group considered less likely to participate in prior elections, far exceeded their non-
African American counterparts in a number of reported offline activities and two of five 
of online activities.    The emergence of African Americans as more active participants in 
this and other cases reported in this dissertation suggests that the unique nature of the 
2008 presidential campaign, where for the first time in United States history an African 
American was a serious contender for a party nomination, may have disproportionately 
mobilized African American voters. In addition young adults (age 18-29) were more 
likely to say they participated in some activities, but less likely than older adults to do so 
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for things like donating money to a campaign. The data in Table 5-1, are descriptive in 
nature and there are no controls to further explain the result.  
Across the adult population, more than three in ten (31%) said they made an 
attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a presidential candidate during the 
primaries and caucuses. More than a quarter said they did so offline (27.5%), but well 
under a tenth (3.6%) said they persuaded others using online methods (See Table 5-1).  
The finding showing that persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate is done 
most often offline, rather than online, is consistent with findings from all the cases. 
About a tenth of adults (10.5%), claimed to have contributed to a campaign. The 
data reveal that contributing is more likely to be done offline (6.5%) than online (4.1%) 
during the primaries and caucuses, but the differences are slim and insignificant.  
However, it is noteworthy that there is a nearly even split between the more traditional 
offline methods and the more recent online methods (See Table 5-1). Additionally, 
despite the massive efforts campaigns make to solicit donations via their web sites, there 
is only a moderate correlation between donating to a campaign online and visiting a 
campaign web site (r=.26). 
The success of any campaign also rests partly on the size of its volunteer 
campaign organization.  According to the Case 2 data, just 2.1 percent of respondents 
indicated they performed any work for one of the candidates offline and even fewer did 
so online (less than one half of one percent) (See Table 5-1). While a relatively small 
proportion of adults said they took part in these activities, they were both moderately 
correlated with attending political rallies and meetings and wearing a presidential 
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campaign button (r=.29) or displaying a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a 
candidate (r=.24). 
About a tenth of adults also said they engaged in the two  traditional offline 
activities added to the survey during the retrospective period--wearing presidential 
campaign buttons, placing a bumper sticker or yard sign in support of a candidate (9.1%) 
and attending political meetings and rallies in support of a candidate (7.4%). These 
represent modest numbers but are slightly higher than what NAES reported in 2004 
(Romer et al., 2006).20   
Because of space limitations on the survey, I measured only five of the original 
eight online participation activities in the retrospective period.21  Among the included 
activities, the most popular related to campaign learning and passing along campaign 
information. About a quarter (23.1%) said they visited a web site of a presidential 
campaign or political party and slightly more than a fifth (20.9%) said they forward 
emails, audio, or video about the presidential campaign to others (See Table 5-1).  Their 
interest is in campaign information gathering and dissemination and as such, these 
activities are moderately correlated (r= .31). Forwarding emails was also moderately 
correlated with online persuasion (r=.28). Correlations offer support to this research 
design which asserts that analysis should focus on individual activities rather than a 
combined index.
                                                 
20In 2004 NAES showed that 4.0% reported displaying a sign, button, or bumper sticker at any time during 
the campaign, and 3.4% said they attended a rally or meeting in support of a candidate at any time during 
the campaign. 
21 The survey did not include the following activities;  discussing politics online, reading/posting to a blog, 
and viewing a political video online. 
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Table 5-1: Case 2 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls) 
Activities Regardless of Whether it 
Was Performed Offline during the 
presidential primary campaign  
All 
Adults  
%  
 
 
(n=2,217) 
College 
Graduate/ 
Higher 
% 
 
(n=906) 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
 
(n=1,311) 
Male 
% 
 
 
 
(n=906) 
Female 
% 
 
 
 
(n=1,311) 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
 
(n=175) 
Age 30 or 
older 
% 
 
 
(n=2,042) 
African 
American 
% 
 
 
(n=158) 
Not 
African 
American 
% 
 
(n=2,059) 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
(n=464) 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
(n=1,753) 
  Attempt to persuade someone to 
support or oppose a presidential 
candidate  
31.1 37.0*** 26.9 32.8 30.0 36.0 30.7 32.3 31.0 38.8*** 29.1 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential   candidates  
2.4 3.4** 
 
1.7 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 5.1* 2.2 4.3** 1.9 
 Contribute money to campaigns or 
candidates   
10.5 18.0*** 5.3 11.6 9.8 4.0** 11.1 15.8* 10.1 19.0*** 8.3 
 OFFLINE Activities during the 
presidential primary campaign 
           
  Attempt to persuade someone 
OFFLINE to support or oppose  a 
candidate  
27.5 32.0*** 28.1 27.2 36.8 32.0 27.1 30.4 27.3 33.0** 26.1 
  Done any work for one of the 
presidential  candidates OFFLINE  
2.1 2.8 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.1 4.4* 1.9 3.9** 1.6 
Contribute money to campaigns or 
candidates OFFLINE 
6.5 9.8*** 4.1 7.1 6.0 1.1** 6.9 7.6 6.4 9.7** 5.6 
Attend political meetings, rallies, 
speeches, dinners or things like that 
in support of a particular 
presidential candidate OFFLINE 
7.4 9.4** 5.9 7.3 7.4 6.9 7.4 14.6*** 6.8 10.8** 6.4 
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Wear a presidential campaign 
button, put a campaign sticker on 
your car or place a sign in your 
window or in front of your house. 
9.1 10.2 8.3 7.9 9.8 13.7* 8.7 24.1*** 7.9 12.7** 8.1 
ONLINE activities during the 
presidential primary campaign 
           
Attempt to persuade someone to 
support or oppose one of the 
presidential candidates ONLINE 
3.6 5.2** 2.5 4.7* 2.8 4.0 3.6 1.9 3.7 5.8** 3.0 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential candidates ONLINE 
+ 
+ 
0.7* + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0.6 + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Contribute money to campaigns or 
candidates ONLINE 
 
4.1 8.2*** 1.2 4.5 3.7 2.9 4.2 8.2** 3.7 9.3*** 2.7 
Visited Web site of a presidential 
campaign or political party 
23.1 33.2*** 16.2 24.0 22.6 29.7* 22.6 31.6** 22.5 37.3*** 19.4 
Forwarded emails, audio or video 
about presidential candidates or 
campaigns to friends, families, co-
workers or other people you know 
20.9 26.9*** 16.8 19.0 22.3 20.0 21.0 19.6 21.0 33.0*** 17.7 
    +=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05 
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5-2:  Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the 
Primaries 
The descriptive analysis of participation activities during the primaries 
provided some evidence that the traditional biases that favor the better educated and 
more affluent continued in 2008, with some exceptions.  However, multivariate 
analysis using logistic and OLS regression models including several statistical 
controls provide a very different picture. For instance, high levels of education 
continued to be a significant predictor for contributing campaign funds, but its 
significance disappeared for all other participation activities measured.  Income as a 
predictor of campaign participation emerged only for the acts of forwarding emails 
and offline volunteering.  On the other hand, unlike Case 1 the models did not predict 
an increase in the predictive value of age on participation. Young adults were 
significant predictors for just a handful of activities.  Like Case 1, African Americans 
and women were significant predictors of only a few activities.   
In the remainder of this section, I present the details of these multivariate 
analyses for  the following types of participation activities:  1) persuasion, 
volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the activity took place online or 
offline; 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, offline campaign 
volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or 
the wearing of campaign buttons; 3) online activities including online persuasion, 
volunteering, online donating, visiting campaign web sites, and forwarding emails, 
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audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the combined online and 
offline indexes.   
While the demographic variables are my primary focus, the political 
variables-- campaign interest and online campaign contact--generally emerged as the 
most robust significant predictors for many of the participation activities.  The 
noteworthy strength of campaign contact is consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen’s 
(1993) argument about mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process.  
 
5-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions 
 Generally, Case 2 patterns of participation in these areas were similar to those 
observed in Case 1.  Age was a significant predictor of donating to campaigns.  
Online contact and campaign interest were the most robust and significant predictors 
within all three of the activities measured, regardless of online and offline 
distinctions. 
5-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate.  
Even with controls, young adults, age 18 to 29, were nearly twice as likely as older 
respondents to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a presidential 
candidate (OR=1.921, p<.01).  African Americans were less likely than non-African 
Americans to say they engaged in this type of persuasion (OR=.636/1.57 for non-
African Americans, p<.05). High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.179, p<.001) and 
online campaign contact (OR=1.832, p<.05) also were significant predictors of 
persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, “persuaders” 
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were more likely to be Obama voters in the primaries (OR=1.553, p<.01) (See Table 
5-2).   
5-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign. Once controls 
were added there were no significant demographic predictors for volunteering to 
work for a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline.  High 
interest in the presidential campaign (OR=2.346, p<.01) and online campaign contact 
(OR=2.596, p<.05) were the strongest predictors.  They were more than twice as 
likely to volunteer for a campaign during the primaries than those not contacted and 
less interested.  This may suggest the success or necessity for an effective grassroots 
communication campaign to encourage this active form of participation (See Table 7-
2). 
5-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign.  The regression 
model indicates that better educated adults were more likely to donate to a campaign 
during the primary (OR=2.176, p<.001).  However, the likelihood of donating was 
greatest among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=4.698 
p<.001).  As in the other activities, campaign interest (OR=2.155, p<.001) was also a 
significant predictor.  The effect of Internet use was important to the act of donating 
money to a campaign, according to the model, since those more frequently online 
were nearly one and one half times more likely to say they contributed to one of the 
campaigns (OR=1.448, p<.05).  Politically, Obama support during the primaries, was 
a significant predictor. Obama voters (OR=1.7436, p<.01) were almost twice as likely 
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as those who voted for other candidates to say they donated to one of the campaigns 
(See Table 5-2). 
Table 5-2: Case 2--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of whether it was 
conducted offline or online 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support/ oppose 
candidate 
Volunteer for 
Candidate or 
Campaign 
 
 
Contribute 
Money to 
candidate or 
campaign 
 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Primary Voter 
Constant 
 1.064 
.876 
1.921** 
.636* 
1.028 
1.089* 
1.155 
.998 
1.121*** 
1.067** 
1.019 
1.032 
.794 
2.179*** 
1.832* 
1.553** 
.015*** 
.718 
.950 
1.252 
1.620 
1.924 
1.032 
1.382 
1.246 
1.092 
1.058 
1.133* 
.881* 
.825 
2.346** 
2.596* 
1.377 
.000*** 
2.176*** 
1.045 
.416 
1.316 
1.384 
.961 
1.235 
1.030 
1.003 
1.026 
1.137*** 
.997 
1.448* 
2.155*** 
4.698*** 
1.743** 
.002 
N 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Correctly Classified 71.8% 97.6% 90.0% 
Nagelkerke R Square .190 .159 .266 
Cox & Snell R Square .136 .032 .133 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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5-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities    
 
 There were no dominant demographic independent predictors of the offline 
behaviors.  Younger adults were more likely to say they persuaded someone to support or 
oppose a candidate during the primaries and caucuses. Economic affluence was a 
significant predictor of offline campaign volunteering.   African Americans, females, and 
those with less than a college degree were more likely than their counterparts to say they 
wore buttons or displayed a bumper sticker or sign during the primary and caucus season. 
Those with at least a college degree were more likely to say they donated offline to a 
presidential campaign during the primaries.  The retrospective analysis produced little 
consistency in which demographic groups would be more likely to engage in offline 
participation.  Again, there was more consistency among the political variables, 
especially high campaign interest, online campaign contact, and Obama support, with 
campaign interest being a significant predictor for all measured activities.   
These results bear some resemblance to Case 1 findings.  However, the strength 
of online campaign contact diminished, while campaign interest remained a significant 
predictor.  
5-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate.  Young 
adults were nearly twice as likely to say they persuaded others to support or oppose one 
of the presidential candidates during the primaries and caucuses (OR=1.900, p<.001).  
Those highly interested in the primary campaigns (OR=1.937, p<.001) and those 
contacted online by one of the candidates (OR=1.797, p<.05) were also nearly twice as 
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likely as their counterparts to say they engaged in this type of persuasion. Obama voters 
in the primaries were over one and a half times more likely to say they persuaded 
someone offline to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.540, p<.01).  Interestingly, the 
less time one spent online the more likely they were to report persuading someone offline 
to support or oppose a candidate (OR=1.402/ 0.713 for frequent Internet users, p<.05) 
(See Table 5-3). 
5-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Affluence and 
online campaign contact were the most robust predictors of volunteering offline.   Those 
with household incomes of $100,000 or greater (OR=2.279, p<.05) and those contacted 
by a campaign online were more than twice as likely (OR=2.354, p<.01) to say they 
volunteered to work for a candidate offline (See Table 5-3). 
5-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign.  
Those with at least a college degree were nearly twice as likely as their counterparts 
(OR=1.701, p<.05) to say they donated to a presidential campaign offline during the 
primaries.  Perhaps related to education, those who cite the newspaper as a campaign 
source (OR=1.213, p<.001) are also more likely to indicate they participated online.  
Campaign interest is the most robust predictor of offline campaign donation during the 
primary (OR=1.929, p<.001), according to the model (See Table 5-3). 
5-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate.  
According to the logistic model tested in Case 2, no significant demographic predictors 
emerged for attending a rally or meeting in support of a candidate. Those more likely to 
participate in this way were those contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.528, 
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p<.001), highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.832, p<.001), Obama voters in the 
primaries and caucuses (OR=1.700, p<.05) and liberal (OR=1.296, p<.01) (See Table 5-
3). 
5-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in 
support of a candidate. The logistic model estimates that African Americans were nearly 
three times more likely to display their support for their candidate with either a button, 
bumper sticker or sign (OR=2.767, p<.001). Additionally, the model  estimated that the 
less educated were  more than one and a half times more likely to display their support in 
this manner (OR=1.618/0.618 for higher educated, p<.05).  Again, online campaign 
contact (OR=2.221, p<.01), voting for Obama in the primaries or caucuses (OR=2.112, 
p<.001), and high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.853, p<.001) were significant 
predictors of this form of persuasion.  Ideologically, self-identified liberals were more 
likely than moderates or conservatives to say they wore a button or displayed a sign or 
bumper sticker (OR=1.328, p<.01) (See Table 5-3). 
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Table 5-3: Case 2-- Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to Persuade 
someone to support 
or oppose candidate 
OFFLINE  
Volunteer for 
candidate or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Donate to 
candidate or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Attend Rally/ 
Meeting 
Wear Campaign 
Button/Bumper 
Sticker/Lawn Sign 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Primary Voter 
Constant 
 1.048 
.866 
1.900** 
.699 
1.056 
1.081 
1.169 
.986 
1.064** 
1.056** 
1.026 
1.045* 
.713* 
1.937*** 
1.797* 
1.540** 
.021*** 
.656 
1.100 
1.436 
1.569 
2.279* 
1.000 
1.211 
1.215 
1.046 
1.055 
1.129* 
.867 
.736 
2.354** 
2.212 
1.601 
.000 
1.701* 
1.013 
.149 
1.373 
1.204 
.960 
1.023 
1.030 
.930 
1.036 
1.213*** 
.981 
1.052 
1.929*** 
1.592 
.904 
.003 
.781 
.885 
.878 
1.572 
1.329 
1.050 
1.349 
1.296** 
1.056 
1.074* 
1.073* 
.945 
.893 
1.832*** 
3.528*** 
1.700* 
.003 
.618* 
.691* 
1.685 
2.767** 
1.327 
1.029 
1.287 
1.328** 
1.119*** 
1.055 
1.048 
.969 
.900 
1.853*** 
2.221** 
2.112*** 
.003*** 
N 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Correctly Classified 728% 97.9% 93.3% 92.4% 90.8% 
Nagelkerke R Square .141 .139 .149 .171 .202 
Cox & Snell R Square .098 .026 .058 .071 .093 
  *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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5-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities  
As with the online participation behaviors measured in Case 2,  no single 
demographic independent variable dominated as the most likely to predict the online 
participation activities measured in Case 2.  A high level of education was a significant 
predictor of two of the five measured activities. However, campaign interest, online 
campaign contact, citing the Internet as a campaign information source, a high frequency 
of Internet use, and Obama support all were significant predictors of multiple online 
activities.   The models show that most of the significant predictors were for contributing 
money to a campaign online, visiting a campaign web site, and forwarding political 
emails, audio, and videos to others. 
Case 2 results differ from Case 1 possibly as a consequence of three factors.  
First, Case 2 measured fewer participation activities, excluding because of space 
limitations “reading or commenting on a political blog,” “viewing a political video 
online,” and “discussing the presidential campaign online.”  Second, the sample size was 
smaller by more than half in Case 2.  Age was not as frequently a significant predictor, 
nor was online campaign contact.  Third, the question wording differed in each case 
5-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. 
Once controls were added, there were no significant demographic predictors of online 
persuasion, according to the logistic regression model.  In fact, there were just two 
significant predictors from the model.  These predictors, high campaign interest 
(OR=3.269, p<.001) and using the Internet as a primary campaign source (OR=1.358, 
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p<.001), are more consistent with a reinforcement than a mobilization argument (See 
Table 5-4).   
5-2.3.2: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. There were no 
significant predictors for the act of volunteering online for a campaign (See Table 5-4).  
This result is also possibly due to very few respondents, retrospectively, reporting that 
they engaged in this behavior (less than 0.5%).  However, this low number does not fully 
explain the lack of significant predictors and I am uncertain of other reasons for this.   
5-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential campaign. The analysis to 
determine the predictors of donating online to a campaign, again, showed that the higher 
the education level, the more likely one is to say they contributed money to one of the 
presidential campaigns online.  Those with a college degree or higher were over three 
times more likely to indicate they made an online donation to one of the campaigns 
(OR=3.709, p<.001), a finding consistent with the reinforcement argument.  The model 
also indicates that online contact efforts to solicit donations were very successful since 
those who said they were contacted by one of the campaigns online were over six times 
more likely to say they made an online donation (OR=6.178, p<.001).  Voting for Obama 
during the primaries and caucuses was also a significant predictor of online donations 
since those claiming they voted for Obama in the primaries or caucuses were over three 
times more likely to report contributing online than were voters of the other primary 
season candidates (OR=3.394, p<.001).  High levels of campaign interest (OR=2.483, 
p<.01), spending a great deal of time online (OR=2.115, p<.01) were also significant 
predictors (See Table 5-4). 
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5-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign web site. The profile of someone visiting a 
presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses in Case 2 can be 
described generally as a young adult, with at least a college degree, highly interested in 
the campaign, generally online a great deal including time spent on the Internet for 
campaign information. They were more likely to say they voted for Obama during the 
primaries and caucuses and say they were contacted by one of the campaigns online. 
According to the logistic model, younger adults were more likely to say they 
visited a presidential campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses than older 
adults (OR=1.601, p<.05).  Those with at least a college degree were more likely than 
those with less education to say they visited a campaign web site (OR=1.411, p<.01).  
The several other significant political and behavioral predictors for going to a campaign 
web site included, online campaign contact (OR=3.191, p<.001), high campaign interest 
(OR=1.773, p<.001), high frequency of Internet use (OR=1.653, p<.001), Obama voter 
(OR=1.479, p<.05), and citing the Internet as a major campaign information source 
(OR=1.240, p<.001) (See Table 5-4).   
5-2.3.5: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about the candidates or 
campaign. A different demographic profile of those more likely to forward political 
emails emerged than the one for visiting a campaign web site.  Females (OR=1.825/.548 
for men, p<.001) and those from more affluent households (OR=1.368, p<.05) were more 
likely than their counterparts to say they forwarded political emails, audio, or video to 
others.  Politically, those more likely to forward political emails included Obama primary 
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voters (OR=1.571, p<.05) and non-Democrats (OR=1.445/0.692 for Democrats, p<.05).22  
In this case, unlike others, online campaign contact is not a significant predictor of this 
behavior, but high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001), spending a great deal 
of time online (OR=1.665, p<.001), and users of the Internet for political information 
(OR=1.240, p<.001) are significant predictors of this behavior (See Table 5-4).
                                                 
22 There was a great deal of email in support or opposition of all candidates. Some were campaign-
generated or sanctioned, some were not. This might explain why I see Obama voters and non-Democrats 
more likely to forward emails, etc…For example, there were anti-Hillary Clinton campaign emails coming 
from both the Obama campaign and its supporters as well as a loosely organized group calling itself 
“Project Chaos.” The goal of “Project Chaos” was to encourage Republicans to switch registration during 
the primaries to become Democrats in order to vote for Hillary Clinton and thus artificially extend the 
Democratic primaries and caucuses.  These groups may have been forwarding both pro-Obama/anti-
Obama, pro-Clinton/anti-Clinton electronic communications.  In addition, during January and February, the 
Republican campaign was active.  I have no way of confirming this with the available data, however. 
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Table 5-4: Case 2-- Predictors of Online Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
              (*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001) 
 
 
Attempt to Persuade 
someone to support/ 
oppose candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer for 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Contribute 
money to 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Visit 
Campaign 
Web site 
Forward  
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others about 
the candidates 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours a day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Primary Voter 
Constant 
1.146 
1.008 
1.334 
.530 
.840 
1.057 
.903 
1.073 
1.358*** 
1.039 
.966 
.934 
1.540 
3.269*** 
.973 
.968 
.000 
1.303 
.213 
.000 
2.170 
.505 
1.529 
4.362 
1.787 
1.999 
1.098 
1.161 
1.028 
1.913 
2.593 
4.322 
.390 
.000 
3.709*** 
1.159 
.839 
1.295 
1.489 
.951 
1.713 
.999 
1.161** 
.993 
.954 
1.021 
2.115** 
2.483** 
6.178*** 
3.394*** 
.000*** 
1.411** 
.869 
1.601* 
1.323 
1.304 
1.076 
1.201 
1.135* 
1.240*** 
1.033 
1.023 
.926** 
1.653*** 
1.773*** 
3.191*** 
1.479* 
.011*** 
1.015 
.548*** 
1.136 
.719 
1.368* 
1.035 
.692* 
.921 
1.240*** 
1.044 
1.023 
.991 
1.665*** 
1.614*** 
1.243 
1.571* 
.035*** 
N 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Correctly Classified 96.6% 99.7% 96.3% 80.3% 79.4% 
Nagelkerke R Square .211 .401 .387 .299 .228 
Cox & Snell R Square .055 .016 .115 .200 .147 
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5-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors 
As in Case 1, an analysis was conducted to determine the predictors of online 
political participation and offline participation, where the dependent variables are the 
combined indexes of participation. The purpose, again, is to determine whether there is a 
more general pattern underlying the findings regarding predictors of more specific forms 
of offline and online participation, and whether this pattern hints at mobilization, 
reinforcement, both, or neither.  
Among the demographic variables in the model, income is the only one which 
emerged as a significant predictor of both the online (b=.116, p<.01) and offline indexes 
(b=.095, p<.05).   That is, those affluent adults were more likely to participate in at least 
one activity.  However, the income coefficient for offline participation is weak.  
Education (b=.080. p<.05) and gender (b= -.100, p<.01) were significant predictors for 
online participation, but not offline participation.  The offline model suggests that women 
were more likely than men to say they participated in offline activities. Race was a 
significant predictor for offline participation, but not online participation.  African 
Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to participate offline (b=.143, 
p<.05). 
The variables with the strongest coefficients for predicting online or offline 
participation were online contact by the campaign Obama voters in the primary, and 
campaign interest (b= .582 for the online index and b=.597 for the offline index.  
Additionally, online frequency was not a significant predictor for offline activities, but 
was a significant predictor for online activities (b=.23, p<.001) (See Table 5-5). 
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The results differ from the analysis of individual participation variables since 
gender and income emerged from the online index model, but other significant variables 
do not.  Interest and contact are significant for both models, while race is significant for 
the offline index, only. 
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Table 5-5: Case 2--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline 
Political Participation: OLS Regression 
 
 
Online Participation 
Index 
Offline 
Participation 
Index 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
.080* 
-.100** 
.068 
.002 
.116** 
.014 
-.006 
.014 
.097*** 
.015* 
.006 
-.015* 
.218*** 
.164*** 
.582*** 
.217*** 
-.366*** 
-.015 
-.063 
.128 
.143* 
.095* 
.016 
.069 
.045* 
.021** 
.027*** 
.030*** 
-.004 
-.082 
.209*** 
.597*** 
.262*** 
-.510 
N 1,999 1,999 
R Square .326 .173 
R Square Change .252*** .149*** 
 *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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5-3:  Further Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both 
 The final step in Case 2 is the more direct test of the mobilization and 
reinforcement hypotheses.  As stated in the methods chapter (Ch 3), the logic of the 
analyses in this step is straightforward.  Consider, for example, the frequency of online 
political discussion.  Suppose, hypothetically, that in the initial logistic regression 
analyses described in “step three” I find that both frequent Internet use and being young 
(18-29) increases online political discussion.  If Internet use acts to increase discussion 
among an older population (30 or older) beyond the direct or main effects of being young 
and using the Internet frequently (i.e., has a mobilizing effect), then the interaction (b 
coefficient) between these two variables should be significant and negative.  The negative 
interaction serves to close the gap between the two age groups.  In this case the Internet 
mobilizes older people to more online political discussion.  A positive and significant 
interaction (b coefficient) in this case would widen the gap between the two age groups 
and serve to reinforce.  Beyond this, the size of the interaction (relative to the main 
effects of age and Internet use) and the specific pattern of this interaction (i.e., whether it 
is being driven by young people who use the internet frequently increasing their political 
discussion or Internet users decreasing their political discussion) provides further 
evidence in support or opposition to the mobilization hypothesis.  In order to see the 
effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to display its effect. 
  Moving from the hypothetical to the actual Case 2 data, the logistic models 
produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use and education for 
predicting contributing to a campaign offline  (OR=.801, p<.05, b=-.222) and for 
133 
 
 
predicting visiting a campaign web site (OR=.880, p<.05, b=-.127).  The negative 
coefficients indicate that the original relationships between education and these activities 
were moderated by their interaction with the frequency of general Internet use. Therefore, 
this provides support for mobilization (H1A).  Additionally, the models showed that 
relationship between high income and forwarding political emails, audios, or videos 
(OR=.851, p<.01, b=-.162) and engaging in any online activity (as measured by the 
index) (b=-.031, p<.05) was significantly moderated by interacting with online frequency 
(See Table 5-6 and 5-7).   These results provide support for hypotheses 2c and 2d—
evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement. While the coefficients presented in 
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the significant interactions, the effects are better illustrated by 
viewing the graphic presentations in Figures 5-1 to 5-4.
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      Table 5-6: Case 2: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions:   (Exp(B)(b coefficient) 
 
 
Offline Campaign 
Contributions: with 
Interaction (Internet 
Frequency X Education 
(Coll grad or higher)) 
 
 
Visiting a Campaign 
Web Site (Internet  
Frequency X 
Education (Coll grad 
or higher)) 
Forwarding Political 
Emails (Internet  
Frequency X Income 
($100K or higher)) 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher) 
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad or higher) 
Constant 
1.677* (b=0.517) 
1.012 
.147 
1.334 
1.240 
.972 
1.039 
1.032 
.929* 
1.038 
1.215*** 
.979 
1.341 
1.934*** 
1.575 
.944 
NA 
.801* (b=-0.222) 
.003*** 
1.485** (b=0.396) 
.871 
1.596* 
1.307 
1.324* 
1.082 
1.215 
1.138* 
1.239*** 
1.034 
1.023 
.927*** 
1.795*** 
1.768*** 
3.093*** 
1.519* 
NA 
.880*  (b=-0.127) 
.010*** 
1.013 
.538*** 
1.131 
.727 
1.609** (b=0.475) 
1.038 
.686* 
.922 
1.239*** 
1.041 
1.021 
.993 
1.837*** 
1.619*** 
1.277 
1.592* 
.851** (b=-0.162) 
NA 
.033*** 
N 1,999 2,000 2,000 
Correctly classified 93.3% 80.5% 78.9% 
Nagelkerke R Square .155 .303 .235 
Cox Snell R Square .060 .203 .152 
         ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table 5-7: Case 2: Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online 
Participation Index 
OLS Regression 
(Unstandardized B) 
 
 Online Participation Index 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Supporter 
Online Frequency X Income ($100K or higher) 
Constant 
. 080* 
-.101** 
.068 
.003 
.137** 
.015 
-.007 
.014 
.097*** 
.015* 
.006 
-.014* 
.231*** 
.164*** 
.588*** 
.218*** 
-.031* 
-.369*** 
N 1,999 
R Square .323 
R Square Change .249*** 
   *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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5.3.1: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting offline 
contributions to a presidential campaign during the primaries and caucuses 
Figure 5-1 illustrates that frequent general Internet use reduces the likelihood of 
offline campaign donations among the better educated, while increasing this likelihood 
among those without a college degree. That is, the result of this interaction is a clear 
narrowing of the participation gap between greater and lesser educated citizens, a finding 
that provides direct support for the mobilization thesis (H1a).  
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Figure 5-1: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Offline Donations 
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5-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting visiting a 
campaign web site 
 
The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence 
for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting visiting a campaign web site during 
the primaries and caucuses period.  Those who have earned at least a college degree and 
are frequently on the Internet are more likely to say they visited a web site during that 
time.  Similarly, the more frequently those with less education are online, the more likely 
they are to say they visited a campaign web site during the primaries and caucuses (See 
Figure 5-2).  Thus, hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data.  At the very least, 
visiting a campaign website the Internet mobilized previously disengaged citizens to 
participate online (H2c) while also reinforcing the online participation of already engaged 
citizens (H2d).  The net effect of these two impacts of the Internet is to increase the 
overall level of this form of participation while modestly reducing the participation gap 
based on education. 
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Figure 5-2: Case 2 Interaction: Education (College Grad or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Visiting a Campaign Web Site 
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5-3.3:Income (household income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting the 
likelihood of forwarding political email/audio/video 
The gap between more and less affluent adults just about completely closes in the 
interaction between income and frequency of Internet when assessing the likelihood of 
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others.  Those most frequently online are 
most likely to engage in this forwarding behavior regardless of income.  The gap is much 
wider between the two income categories ($100K or more and less than $100K) among 
those who are less frequent Internet users..  These results provide evidence for both 
mobilization and reinforcement and, thus, evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d.
141 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Case 2 Interaction: (Income Household Income $100k or higher)by High Internet Use Predicting Likelihood of 
Forwarding Email/Audio/Video about Presidential Campaign 
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 5-3.4: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by high Internet use predicting 
online participation 
Income by Internet frequency also shows evidence of both mobilization and 
reinforcement when it comes to predicting online participation, in general.  The combined 
online index is the dependent variable in this instance, and as Internet frequency increases 
among both income categories, the likelihood for online political participation also rises.  
Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by this interaction (See Figure 5-4).   
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Figure 5-4: Case 2: Income (Household Income $100k or higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation 
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5-4: Case 2--Summary of Findings 
The Case 2 findings presented a retrospective look by respondents across the 
entire primaries and caucus period, rather than a narrow one week window to report their 
participation activities.  Given that descriptive analysis covered a wider period of 
engagement—the entire primary and caucus campaign, the data revealed a higher 
frequency of reporting participation activities when compared with Case 1.  Also, in Case 
2, there were more data on offline participation with the addition of “meetings and 
rallies,” and “button wearing and bumper sticker/yard sign” display.  While Case 1 had a 
much lower level of activity reporting, the general patterns were similar. 
In the Case 2 descriptive analysis, without the presence of statistical controls, the 
data revealed that the biases of the past continued to dominate in this part of the 
campaign.  Higher education and higher income adults were more likely to participate in 
most activities than those with less education and income.  However, I also saw a 
significant participation effort by African Americans in both online and offline activities 
and a moderate effort by young adults.  Nevertheless, many of these numbers did not 
maintain any significance in the presence of controls. 
With controls in place, the effect of education as a predictor was only significant 
for contributing to campaigns, according to the model tested for the participation 
activities.  There were no consistent patterns among the demographic independent 
variables when placed in each of the models to determine significant predictors of the 
participation activities.  Younger people were more likely to say they visited campaign 
web sites and persuade others offline to support or oppose a candidate. Affluent adults 
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were more likely to say they volunteered to work for a candidate, offline, and forward 
political emails, audio, or video. Females were more likely to say they forwarded political 
emails, audio, or videos, and African Americans were more likely to say they displayed 
their support with a button, bumper sticker, or lawn sign.  
Rather, the most robust predictors were not demographic but rather political or 
behavioral—those with a great deal of campaign interest, those contacted online by one 
of the campaigns and those who voted for Obama were all significant predictors of online 
and offline participation activities during the primaries and caucuses, according to the 
results of the model.  Tables 5-8 and 5-9 summarize which variables significantly 
predicted offline and online activities. 
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Table 5-8: Case 2-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support or 
oppose 
candidate 
OFFLINE  
Volunteer for 
candidate or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Donate to 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Attend Rally/ 
Meeting 
Wear 
Campaign 
Button/Bumper 
Sticker/Lawn 
Sign 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Primary Voter 
  
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X- 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X- 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the 
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.
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Table 5-9: Case 2—Top Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6) 
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the 
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.) 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer for 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Contribute 
money to 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Visit 
Campaign 
Web site 
Forward  
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others 
about the 
candidates 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Primary Voter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 NONE 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
X- 
 
 
X+ 
 
X- 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
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The above summarized findings are just a preamble for the crux of this research—
finding evidence for mobilization and/or reinforcement.  The evidence in Case 2 
supported hypotheses H1a, H2c and H2d.  There was clear evidence of mobilization and 
reinforcement when Internet use interacts with education and income.  Lower educated 
but frequent Internet users were more likely to donate offline; which is a clear indication 
of mobilization.  Regardless of education level, the more one is online the more one is 
likely to visit a campaign web site, thus supporting mobilization and reinforcement.  
Additionally, regardless of income, higher frequency of Internet use predicts forwarding 
political emails, audio, and video and general online participation (mobilization and 
reinforcement). 
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MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT FINDINGS PART II:  
GENERAL ELECTION 
 
Part II of the “Findings” presents the mobilization and reinforcement findings 
from Case 3 (Chapter 6) and Case 4 (Chapter 7).   
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 CHAPTER 6: CASE 3-- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE 
GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-PRE-CONVENTION (AUGUST 8, 2008 TO 
OCTOBER 2, 2008)  
 
In this chapter, I present the findings from the Case 3 data collected during the 
general election period (August 8, 2008 to October 2, 2008).  Ultimately, I will test the 
hypotheses addressing mobilization and reinforcement (1a-b and 2a-d), as I detailed in 
Chapter 3 (Methods), this analysis will follow three steps:  
• A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using pre-general 
election data, including a correlation analysis among participation activities 
and between those activities and demographic independent variables; 
• Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online 
participation; and,  
•  Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet 
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization 
and/or reinforcement. 
6-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities 
In prior research on political participation during general elections, the more 
advantaged demographic elements, higher educated and more affluent adults, primarily 
engaged in most participation activities.   The descriptive data I presented in Part I from 
the primaries and caucuses affirmed the prior biases, but showed some evidence of 
increased participation by younger adults and African Americans.  While more complex 
multivariate analysis decreased the strength of education and income for some activities, 
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there was evidence, also, that younger adults and African Americans were more likely to 
participate in some activities.  Similar to the research I conducted during the primaries, 
presented in Part 1, the expectation is that the same pattern will emerge in the analysis of 
the general election data.  As the descriptive analysis of the Case 3 data shows, this 
pattern does emerge. 
In the Case 3 data, without the presence of controls, the traditional demographic 
groups, such as the better educated and more affluent were consistently more likely to say 
they participated in the political activities I measured during this period of the general 
election.  However, for several of the activities, my research reveals that African 
Americans were significantly more likely than non-African Americans to say they 
participated in the political process.   The participation activity of young adults, age 18 to 
29 years old, is consistent with past biases for the more traditional offline activities, but 
they are more likely to say they participated in the online activities.   
As Table 6-1 shows, those with at least a college degree are significantly more 
likely than their less educated counterparts to engage in all the measured activities, except 
for working for a campaign online where the numbers were extremely low and the 
differences were not significant.  Those with higher incomes also reported a greater 
likelihood to engage in just about all of the activities, with the exception of wearing a 
button and performing online work for a candidate.   
On the other hand, African Americans were more likely than non-African 
Americans to say they participated in many of the measured activities (See Table 6-1).  
This is a departure from previous general elections where participation by African 
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Americans in measurable activities was either significantly less than non-African 
Americans, or not significantly different.  For example, in the 2004 National Annenberg 
Election Survey, African Americans were less likely to participate in the activities 
measured during the 2004 general election period.  According to the NAES data, this 
election (primaries and general elections) compared to the past election, demonstrates a 
clear increase in political participation among African Americans.23    
While Case 3 provides initial evidence that most of the biases found in prior 
elections emerged in 2008, NAES data show the overall level of participation among the 
voting age population was low during the general election.  As in Case 1 (Chapter 4), 
relatively few adults participated in the various political activities I measured (See Table 
6-1).24  Without regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online, 
persuading someone to support a candidate was the activity reportedly done most 
frequently (24.4%).  The other activities, volunteering for a candidate or donating money 
to a candidate were performed by few adults, (1.3% and 4.3%, respectively).  Examining 
offline activities, specifically, the descriptive data yields a similar result.  In the week 
prior to being interviewed, persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate 
was reportedly performed by a little more than one fifth of adults, according to the survey 
data.  Other offline activities measured during this period, including wearing a button, 
placing a bumper sticker on one’s vehicle, or placing a lawn sign (7%), attending a 
                                                 
23 According to the 2004 NAES, during the general election campaign, Non-African Americans were more 
likely to try to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate (22.9% vs. 17.0%), and donate money to 
a presidential candidate (5.6% to 1.3%).  Further there was no significant difference between African 
Americans and Non-African Americans in attending campaign rallies. 
24 These low numbers may be an artifact of how the question was asked. That is, the survey asked for 
behavior performed in the prior week rather than over the course of the general election period.  It is 
difficult to assert with certainty that this accounts for the low numbers, since the survey did not ask a 
comparison question measuring behavior over the course of the campaign during the same period. 
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meeting or rally in support of a candidate (1.7%), or volunteering for a candidate offline 
(1.0%) were all reported at significantly lower levels than persuading someone directly.  
In contrast to offline participation behavior, very few adults (3%) said they engaged in 
online persuasion by trying to convince others to support or oppose a candidate.  Instead, 
persuasion took on a more indirect form.  Among the variety of online participation 
activities measured by the NAES survey, more adults said they viewed video about the 
presidential campaign on sites like YouTube (14.4%)  or forwarded emails, audio, or 
video about the candidates to friends and family members than the other participation 
activities (14.3%).  Yet, the proportion who said they took part in these activities 
represented less than a fifth of the adult respondents.  As for the other online activities, 
about one in ten said they performed other online activities that serve as a means of 
learning about the campaign and discussing the campaign online with others.  These 
activities include visiting a campaign web site (10.1%), discussing politics online 
(10.0%), and reading or posting to a political blog (8.9%).  Online work for a campaign is 
an activity that was performed by just about no adults. 
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     Table 6-1: Case 3-- Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls) 
Activities Regardless of 
Whether it Was Performed 
Offline in the prior week  
All Adults 
%  
 
 
 
(n=6,832) 
College 
Graduate 
Or  
Higher 
% 
(n=2,778) 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
 
(n=4,054) 
Male 
% 
 
 
 
(n=2,936) 
Female 
% 
 
 
 
(n=3,896) 
 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
 
(n=480) 
Age 30 or 
older 
% 
 
 
(n=6,352) 
African-
American 
% 
 
 
(n=520) 
Not 
African-
American 
% 
 
(n=6,312) 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
(n=1,427) 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
(n=5,405) 
  Attempt to persuade someone 
to support or oppose a 
presidential candidate  
24.4  28.2*** 21.7 27.1*** 22.3 28.3* 24.1 28.5* 24.0 31.1*** 22.6 
  Done any work for one of the 
presidential   candidates  
1.3 1.9*** 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 5.0*** 1.0 2.1** 1.1 
  Contribute money to 
campaigns or candidates   
4.3 6.3*** 2.9 4.3 4.3 1.7** 4.5 9.0*** 3.9 6.1*** 3.8 
  OFFLINE Activities in the 
prior week  
 
            
  Attempt to persuade someone 
OFFLINE to support or 
oppose 
  a candidate  
21.3  23.8*** 19.6 23.6*** 19.6 24.4 21.1 25.6* 21.0 26.7*** 19.9 
  Done any work for one of the 
presidential  
  candidates OFFLINE  
1.0 1.4** 0.7 0.7* 1.2 0.8 1.0 4.2*** 0.7 1.5* 0.9 
Attend political meetings, 
rallies, speeches, dinners or 
things like that in support of a 
particular presidential 
candidate OFFLINE 
1.7 2.1* 1.4 1.6 1.7 3.1* 1.6 5.6*** 1.4 2.6** 1.4 
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Wear a presidential campaign 
button, put a campaign sticker 
on your car or place a sign in 
your window or in front of 
your house. 
7.0 8.4*** 6.0 6.8 7.1 10.2** 6.7 20.6*** 5.8 7.9 6.7 
ONLINE activities in the prior 
week  
 
            
Attempt to persuade someone 
to support or oppose one of the 
presidential candidates 
ONLINE 
3.0  4.4*** 2.1 3.6* 2.6 4.0 3.0 2.9 3.1 4.4** 2.7 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential candidates 
ONLINE 
+  0.06 + + + 0.06 + 0.08 + 0.06 + 
Discuss politics online 
 
10.0  14.2*** 7.1 10.7 9.4 15.8*** 9.5 8.3 10.1 14.3*** 8.9 
Visited Website of a 
presidential campaign or 
political party 
10.1  14.1*** 7.4 10.9 9.5 17.1*** 9.6 21.0*** 9.2 14.6*** 8.9 
Viewed video on sites like 
YouTube about the 
presidential candidates or 
campaign 
14.4  18.9*** 11.2 17.2*** 12.2 28.8*** 13.3 21.0*** 13.8 22.5*** 12.2 
Read or posted a comment on 
a blog having to do with 
politics or a campaign 
8.9  11.9*** 6.8 11.4*** 6.9 16.0*** 8.3 13.1*** 8.5 13.5*** 7.6 
Forwarded emails, audio or 
video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to 
friends, families, co-workers 
or other people you know 
14.3  18.9*** 11.1 14.2 14.4 16.0 14.2 17.3* 14.1 16.0*** 8.3 
+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05
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   Assessing the relationship among the participation variables is an important 
means of determining whether it was correct or not to analyze each activity separately, 
rather than combine them into an index.  The results from this Case, as in previous cases, 
affirm this analytical decision.  In general, many of the correlations among the variety of 
participation variables were statistically significant; however, they were very low. This 
outcome is likely due to the large sample size of Case 3 (n=6,832), which can uncover 
substantively small but statistically significant relationships.  The full correlation 
matrices can be found in Appendix E.   
Among online activities, the highest correlations were for discussing politics 
online and forwarding campaign-related emails to others (r=.41, p<.001), online 
persuasion to encourage support or opposition to a candidate (r=.34, p<.001), viewing 
political videos about the campaign (r=.29, p<.001), reading or posting to a blog about 
the campaign (r=.28, p<.001), and visiting campaign web sites (r=.24, p<.001).  Further, 
there was a clearly positive relationship between viewing a video about the presidential 
campaign on a site like YouTube and forwarding an email, audio or video related to the 
presidential campaign to others (r=0.32, p<.001).  Additionally, viewing video about the 
presidential campaign on a site like YouTube was positively related to visiting a 
campaign website (r=.31, p<.001), and reading or posting to a blog (r=.26, p>.001) two 
places where links to videos are often found.    Forwarding emails, audio, or video was 
also correlated with online persuasion to support or oppose a candidate (r=.31, p<.001) 
and with visiting a campaign’s web site (r=.24, p<.001).   
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Among offline activities, most associations were low.  The only relationship 
above the threshold was the correlation between attending campaign rallies or meetings 
and volunteering for a campaign offline (r=.32, p<.001).    Correlations between offline 
and online activities were also generally very low, also.  The strongest correlation was 
between the offline activity of showing ones support by wearing a button or placing a 
lawn sign and the online activity of visiting a campaign web site (r=.20, p<.001) (See 
Appendix for the full correlation matrix table).   
6-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation during the 
General Election Period: Pre-Convention through October 2, 2008 
In the previous section, I established two important trends regarding participation 
in the 2008 election. First, the frequency of political participation among respondents was 
generally low.   Second, without applying statistical controls, the biases found in prior 
research emerged again in the 2008 data, but there was some evidence that previously 
marginalized electoral groups were participating at greater levels relative to their more 
advantaged counterparts.   
As stated before, much of this study is predicated on the idea that the Internet will 
diminish the importance of demographic groups such as higher educated and more 
affluent while increasing the importance of  demographic groups such as the young and 
African Americans.  As stated in chapter 4, when controlling demographic, political and 
behavioral variables, odds ratios and OLS “b” coefficients can flip the results from 
univariate analysis.  For example, the effect of education as a predictor for a particular 
activity could disappear in such models with the application of controls. 
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Therefore, I present the results of the regression models for all participation 
activities with the inclusion of statistical controls. Participation activities are presented in 
four subsections:  1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without regard to whether the 
activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including offline persuasion, 
offline campaign volunteering, attending presidential campaign meetings or rallies, or the 
wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities including online persuasion, 
volunteering, political discussion, visiting campaign websites, viewing political 
campaign-related videos  on sites like YouTube, reading or posting on a blog, and 
forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) combined 
online index and combined offline index.   
Generally, across all the analytic subsections in Case 3, age and race emerged 
most frequently as significant demographic predictors of several of the participation 
activities.  Specifically, younger people and African Americans were more likely than 
their counterparts to engage in activities such as discussing politics online, visiting 
campaign web sites, reading or posting to a political blog, attending rallies and displaying 
a button, bumper sticker or sign.  As I will describe in the following pages, after adding 
controls to the regression models, the significance of education disappears and high 
income is a significant predictor for just two of the activities. 
The most robust predictors for all the activities were two political variables.  For 
most activities, being contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns and  
indicating a high level of campaign interest were more likely to predict engagement with 
the activities than age, race, gender, education or income.   As in the prior cases, the 
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importance of campaign contact and campaign interest, are consistent with prior research 
on participation.  
 
6-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions 
The analysis in this section focuses on three dependent variables performed 
regardless of method:  persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate, 
volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign, and contributing money to a campaign.  
According to the data, race was a significant predictor of volunteering and contributing 
money, without regard to whether they were done offline or online. African Americans 
were more likely to say they engaged in those activities.  No other demographic 
independent variable stood out as predictors of more than a single activity within this 
section.  Among the non-demographic variables, campaign interest and online campaign 
contact were significant predictors for each of these participation activities. 
6-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate. Using 
a logistic regression model, with controls,25 I constructed a profile of voters who 
generally reported engaging in persuading others to support or oppose a presidential 
candidate consisting of younger (OR=1.602, p<.001), more affluent (OR=1.171, p<.05) 
adults, who tended to be male (OR=1.144, p<.05).  Politically they were highly interested 
in the campaign (OR=2.127, p<.001), and they tended to identify themselves as 
Democrats (OR=1.276, p<.01).    This profile of persuaders were more likely to be 
                                                 
25 Without the presence of controls in the logistic regression model, education, a traditional predictor of 
political participation also was a significant  predictor in this election for persuading someone to support a 
candidate (OR=1.263, p<.001), volunteer on a campaign (OR=1.927, p<.001), or  donate  money 
(OR=2.012, p<.001).  However, education, as a significant predictor disappears when the controls are 
applied to the models for participation activities without regard to whether they are performed online or 
offline.  
160 
 
 
contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=1.342, p<.05), and were more likely to be 
Obama supporters (OR=1.210, p<.05) (See Table 6-2). 
6-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign.  Those more inclined 
to say they volunteered for a presidential candidate in the 2008 general election, 
according to the logistic regression model, were African Americans (OR=2.868, p<.001) 
and females (OR =1.65/0.605 for males, p<.05).  Volunteers were more likely to say they 
were contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.816, p<.001) and perhaps as a 
result, they were more likely to indicate a high interest in the presidential campaign 
(OR=2.690, p<.001).  Finally, the more they relied on newspapers for campaign 
information, the more likely they were to say they volunteered for one of the campaigns 
(OR=1.177, p<.001) (See Table 6-2). 
6-2.1.3: Contributing money to candidate or campaign.  During the general 
election period measured by Case 3, African Americans were more likely to say they 
donated to a presidential candidate than non-African Americans (OR=1.711, p<.01).  
Further, those saying they donated to a campaign were more likely to be a Democrat 
(OR=1.415, p<.05).  The model also showed that those with more education were also 
more likely to say they contributed to a presidential campaign (OR=1.334, p<.05). Those 
who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were three times more likely to 
report donating than those who were not (OR=3.148, p<.001).  While it is unclear 
whether this contact increased campaign interest or whether campaign interest inspired 
contact, the odds of contributing to a campaign were greater for those with higher 
campaign interest than those with less interest (OR=2.714, p<.001)  (See Table 6-2). 
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Table 6-2: Case 3--Predictors of Political Participation Without Regard to Online/Offline 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to Persuade 
someone to support 
or oppose a 
candidate 
 
 
 
Volunteer 
for 
Candidate 
or 
campaign 
 
 
Contribute 
Money to 
campaign or 
candidate 
 
 
 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.977 
1.144* 
1.602*** 
.840 
1.171* 
1.056* 
1.276** 
.902** 
1.057*** 
1.097*** 
1.033** 
1.035* 
1.021 
2.127*** 
1.342* 
1.210* 
.012*** 
.990 
.605* 
1.101 
2.868*** 
1.244 
1.203 
1.124 
1.034 
1.108* 
1.041 
1.177*** 
.916 
.976 
2.690*** 
3.816*** 
1.897 
.000*** 
1.334* 
.906 
.481* 
1.711** 
.994 
1.018 
1.415* 
.963 
1.044 
1.072** 
1.084*** 
1.011 
1.009 
2.714*** 
3.148*** 
1.285 
.000*** 
N 6,251 6,251 6,251 
Correctly Classified 75.4% 98.7% 95.5% 
Nagelkerke R Square .151 .201 .158 
Cox & Snell R Square .102 .027 .048 
  *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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6-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities    
 Perhaps it was because Obama was the first African American to be nominated 
for president or perhaps it was due to the efforts of the Obama \campaign, but during the 
period prior to the general election, when these Case 3 data were collected, African 
Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to report they engaged in 
offline participation activities for three out of the four measured—volunteering offline, 
attending a campaign rally or meeting, and wearing a button, placing a bumpers sticker or 
lawn sign in support of a presidential campaign.  Younger adults, like African Americans, 
were more likely than older ones to say they engaged in three of the four offline 
activities—persuasion, rally attendance, and displaying a button, bumper sticker or lawn 
sign.  Campaign interest, online contact, and support for Obama each significantly 
predicted offline behavior.   
6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate. 
Significant demographic predictors of offline persuasion were age, gender, and income, 
though neither of these variables were significant predictors of online persuasion.  More 
specifically, being younger (OR=1.539,p<.001), male (OR=1.159, p<.05) and more 
affluent (OR=1.220, p<.05) were significant predictors of offline persuasion. Politically, 
those engaged in offline persuasion tended to identify themselves as Democrats 
(OR=1.308, p<.01), highly interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.933, p<.001) 
and said they supported Obama (OR=1.265, p<.01) (See Table 6-3).    
6-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. Three 
variables significantly stood out above the others as predictors of volunteering to work 
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for a candidate offline: race, online campaign contact, and campaign interest.  According 
to the logistic regression model, African Americans were nearly three and a half  times 
more likely than non-African Americans to say they volunteered to work for a candidate 
(OR=3.420, p<.001).  Further, those who reported receiving an online campaign 
communication were four times more likely to say they volunteered to work for one of 
the candidates, offline (OR=3.966, p<.001).  Campaign interest would seem to naturally 
lead to campaign voluntarism and those with the highest levels of campaign awareness 
were nearly three times more likely to report volunteering for a campaign than those with 
lower interest (OR=2.949, p<.001)  (See Table 6-3). 
6-2.2.3: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. Race 
and age were the significant demographic predictors for attending a campaign event or 
meeting during the general phase of the campaign through October 2, 2008.  African 
Americans (OR=2.488, p<.01) and younger adults (OR=1.993, p<.05) were most likely to 
say they participated in this activity.  However, religious service attendance (OR=1.206, 
p<.05) also served as a significant predictor.  Campaign interest was once again a 
powerfully significant predictor of attending a campaign rally or meeting.  By about a 
four and a half to one ratio, those with a high level of campaign interest said they were 
more likely to attend an event than those with lesser levels of interest (OR=4.440, 
p<.001). Consistent with other offline and online activities, online campaign contact was 
also a significant predictor of this behavior (OR=2.170, p<.01) (See Table 6-3). 
6-2.2.4: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in 
support of a candidate. Similar to rally attendance, being African-American (OR=2.212, 
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p<.001), young (OR=1.824, p<.01), or a regular attendee of religious services (OR=1.146 
p<.01) were reliable predictors of wearing a button, or placing a sign or bumper sticker in 
support of a candidate.  Additionally, the odds of this type of display of support were 
significantly higher for those who were contacted online by a campaign (OR=3.210, 
p<.001) than those who were not contacted.  Other significant predictors include 
campaign interest (OR=2.096, p<.001) support for Obama (OR=1.695, p<.001), and self-
identified Democrats (OR=1.545, p<.01) (See Table 6-3). 
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Table 6-3: Case 3--Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support or 
oppose 
candidate 
OFFLINE  
Volunteer 
for 
candidate or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
Attend 
Rally/ 
Meeting 
Wear 
Campaign 
Button/ 
Bumper 
Sticker/Lawn 
Sign 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.959 
1.159* 
1.539** 
.857 
1.220* 
1.050 
1.308** 
.930* 
1.011 
1.094*** 
1.040*** 
1.049** 
.953 
1.933*** 
1.048 
1.265** 
.013*** 
.886 
.602 
.821 
3.420*** 
1.124 
1.214 
1.190 
1.111 
1.033 
1.049 
1.176** 
.899 
1.068 
2.949*** 
3.966*** 
1.647 
.000*** 
.810 
.857 
1.993* 
2.488** 
1.416 
1.206* 
1.091 
1.243* 
1.066 
1.010 
1.046 
.948 
1.129 
4.440*** 
2.170** 
1.370 
.000*** 
.900 
.987 
1.824** 
2.212*** 
.903 
1.146** 
1.545** 
1.037 
1.047* 
1.057** 
1.061** 
1.004 
1.040 
2.096*** 
3.210*** 
1.695*** 
.001*** 
N 6,251 6,251 6,251 6,251 
Correctly Classified 78.0% 98.9% 98.3% 92.9% 
Nagelkerke R Square .115 .190 .153 .170 
Cox & Snell R Square .075 .021 .024 .069 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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6-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities  
Age and race were significant predictors of more online activities than any other 
demographic variable. Young adults were more likely than older ones to say they 
participated in four of the seven activities measured during this general election period.  
African Americans were more likely than non-African Americans to say they engaged in 
visiting a campaign web site, viewing a political video on a site like YouTube, and 
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others.  Men and women split on several 
activities.  In some instances, the logistic model showed that women were more likely 
than men to say they performed an activity, and in some cases men were more likely than 
women to engage in an activity.  The model also showed that citing the Internet as a 
primary source of campaign information, online campaign contact, and high levels of 
campaign interest, were significant predictors of nearly all the activities measured. 
6-2.2.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a candidate. 
Demographically, there were no significant predictors of online persuasion, according to 
the logistic regression model.  However, those who persuaded online tended to be highly 
interested in the campaign (OR=2.982, p<.001), frequent users of the Internet for general 
purposes (OR=1.402, p<.05), and as a source for political information (OR=1.311, 
p<.001).  Online contact from one of the campaigns was also a significant predictor of 
this behavior of persuading (OR=2.233, p<.001) (See Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.2: Volunteering online to work for a candidate or campaign.  As with online 
persuasion, the model reveals that demographic variables were not significant predictors 
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of volunteering online for a candidate. The only significant predictors of online 
volunteering were typically contacted online by one of the campaigns (OR=3.171, p<.05) 
and using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.604, p<.01)  (See 
Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.3: Discussing politics online. Those who reported engaging in online 
political discussion were more likely to be younger (OR=1.881, p<.001), and less likely 
to be African-American (OR=0.557, p<.01),  and less likely to be male (OR=.831, 
p<.05).  Online political discussion typically occurred among those who said they were 
frequently online (OR=1.740, p<.001)  and cited the Internet as a major source for 
campaign information (OR=1.287, p<.001). High campaign interest (OR=1.75, p<.001), 
and online contact by one of the campaigns (OR=1.718, p<.001) were also among the 
predictors with the highest odds ratios (See Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.4: Visiting a campaign website. The significant demographic predictors of 
visiting a campaign website, according to the model, were age and race. For example, 
young people age 18 to 29 (OR=1.999, p<.001), were twice as likely as older adults to 
say they visited a campaign website.  African Americans (OR=1.806, p<.001) were also 
about twice as likely as non-African Americans to say they participated in visiting a 
campaign website.  Frequent Internet users (OR=1.308, p<.001) tended to say they 
visited campaign websites more so than less frequent Internet users.  Again, online 
campaign contact was a strong predictor: those contacted were nearly three times more 
likely than others to say they visited a campaign website (OR=2.909, p<.001).  Those 
who were highly interested in the campaign were twice as likely as those less interested 
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to report visiting a campaign website (OR=2.011, p<.001), and Obama supporters were 
one and a half times more likely than non-supporters to visit a campaign website 
(OR=1.493, p<.01)  (See Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.5: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube.  Consistent with other online 
activities, the model demonstrated that younger people were more likely than older 
people to say they viewed a political video on a site like YouTube.  In fact, they were 
nearly three times more likely than those ages thirty or older to report this behavior 
(OR=2.687, p<.001), suggesting that YouTube is generally a medium for the young.  
However, African Americans were more likely to report viewing political video online 
than non-African Americans (OR=1.365, p<.05), despite their age.  Perhaps an 
explanation for the findings related can be attributed to the popularity of the pro-Obama 
videos, including the Will.I.Am’s “Yes We Can” video (14.4 million views on YouTube) 
and “Wassup 2008” video (5.3 million views on YouTube) (ShiftingtheDebate.com, 
2008) .   
Those who used the Internet as a campaign source (OR=1.338, p<.001) were 
more likely to report viewing political videos online than those who were less likely to 
rely on the Internet for campaign information. Online contact from one of the campaigns 
(OR=1.842, p<.001) and campaign interest (OR=1.614, p<.001) were significant 
predictors of viewing political videos as well (See Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.6: Reading or posting to a blog about the presidential campaign. Younger 
people (OR=2.015, p<.001) and males (OR=1.366, p<.01) were characteristically more 
likely to say the read or posted to a blog about the presidential campaign.  Other 
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significant characteristics predicting this behavior included online frequency (OR=1.457, 
p<.001), using the Internet as a source for campaign information (OR=1.282, p<.001), 
high levels of campaign interest (OR=1.399, p<.001), and being contacted online by one 
of the campaigns (OR=1.535, p<.01) (See Table 6-4). 
6-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the candidates 
or campaigns.  Forwarding emails, audio or videos about the presidential campaign to 
others was an activity primarily reported by females (OR=0.694 for males, p<.001) and 
African Americans (OR=1.480, p<.05), according to these data. Those who did not 
support Obama were more likely to say they did this than Obama supporters 
(OR=1.44/0.647, p<.001).  Other significant predictors include:  frequent use of the 
Internet (OR=1.55/0.644 for Obama supporters, p<.001) and high levels of campaign 
interest (OR=1.539, p<.001). Further, as seen with other activities, online forwarders 
were more likely than non-forwarders to have been contacted online by one of the 
campaigns (OR=2.514, p<.001) (See Table 6-4).
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Table 6-4: Case 3--Predictors of Online Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
persuade 
someone to 
support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer for 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Discuss 
Politics 
Online 
Visit 
Campaign 
Website 
Viewed 
Political 
Video on 
Sites Like 
YouTube 
Read or 
Post to a 
blog about 
campaign 
Forward  
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others 
about the 
candidates  
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
1.132 
.964 
1.536 
.834 
.897 
1.044 
.935 
.829* 
1.311*** 
1.040 
.970 
.938 
1.402* 
2.982*** 
2.233*** 
.824 
.000*** 
1.674 
.647 
2.465 
1.100 
1.595 
1.130 
.930 
.783 
1.604** 
1.002 
1.165 
.987 
.728 
1.799 
3.171* 
3.220 
.000*** 
1.205 
.831* 
1.881*** 
.557** 
.887 
1.033 
.895 
.956 
1.287*** 
1.055** 
1.011 
.974 
1.740*** 
1.750*** 
1.718*** 
1.168 
.005*** 
1.063 
.959 
1.999*** 
1.806*** 
.971 
1.039 
1.095 
1.071 
1.288*** 
1.040* 
1.004 
1.024 
1.308** 
2.011*** 
2.909*** 
1.493** 
.001*** 
.968 
1.192* 
2.687*** 
1.365* 
1.247* 
1.012 
.965 
1.106* 
1.338*** 
1.065*** 
.987 
.946** 
1.363*** 
1.614*** 
1.842*** 
1.009 
.008*** 
1.006 
1.366** 
2.015*** 
1.356 
1.069 
1.060 
.852 
.963 
1.282*** 
1.056** 
1.043* 
.940** 
1.457*** 
1.399*** 
1.535** 
1.200 
.009*** 
1.037 
.694*** 
1.126 
1.418* 
1.106 
.992 
.925 
.905* 
1.267*** 
1.074*** 
1.009 
1.009 
1.628*** 
1.539*** 
2.514*** 
.644*** 
.020*** 
N 6,251 6,251 6,251 6,251 6,251 6,251 6,251 
Correctly Classified 96.8% 99.7% 89.6% 89.7% 85.3% 90.8% 85.7 % 
Nagelkerke R Square .192 .231 0.226 0.270 .277 .193 .237 
Cox & Snell R Square .047 .009 0.110 0.132 .157 .088 .135 
  *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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6-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors 
 
The previous sections of Case 3 concentrated on the significant predictors of 
individual participation activities. Different attributes were more predictive of different 
behaviors, with some attributes like campaign interest, online campaign contact, race, and 
age emerging most often as predictors with the highest odds ratios.  Turning to the 
combined indexes of online and offline behaviors and using OLS regression, results show 
a similar pattern for online and offline participation behavior.  As stated in the methods 
chapter, the offline index variable was created by combining the “yes” responses to the 
offline questions. The online participation index was created by combining the “yes” 
responses to the questions related directly to online participation. According to the data, 
younger adults and African Americans were more likely to perform either one of the 
online or offline participation activities.  However, the coefficients are stronger for 
younger adults for the online index than the offline index (See Table 6-5).  As in the 
analyses of the individual participation activities, online campaign contact is a key 
influence of any participation. Being online frequently and using the Internet as a source 
for campaign information are other important influences for online participation behavior 
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Table 6-5: Case 3—Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online 
and the Combined Offline Participation Index 
OLS Regression 
(Unstandardized B) 
 
 
Online Participation 
Index 
Offline Participation 
Index 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Supporter 
Constant 
.008 
-.019 
.321*** 
.131** 
.026 
.014 
-.025 
-.006 
.148*** 
.033*** 
.005 
-.012* 
.219*** 
.185*** 
.716*** 
.013 
-.474*** 
-.016 
.013 
.108*** 
.138*** 
.035 
.020*** 
.076*** 
.001 
.008** 
.022*** 
.013*** 
.004 
-.002 
.131*** 
.247*** 
.067*** 
-.377*** 
N 6,250 6,250 
R Square .312 .116 
R Square Change .261*** .092*** 
    *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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6-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both  
 Thus far, the Case 3 data have shown that with statistical controls in place, some 
of the traditional demographic biases predicting participation have diminished or 
disappeared for some activities, but remained for others.  Additionally, the findings point 
to an emergence of young adults and African Americans as reliable predictors of several 
participation activities. Yet, while these results are potentially suggestive of mobilization, 
none of the analysis provides firm support for either mobilization or reinforcement.  
The purpose of step 4 of the analytical process is to establish evidence for 
mobilization, reinforcement, or both by testing interactions between a high frequency of 
Internet use and the significant demographic predictor variables across the various types 
of participation.   As the final and most direct test of the mobilization versus 
reinforcement hypotheses, I added interaction terms (between frequency of internet use 
and age, gender, race income and education) into the logistic regression analyses.  In 
order to see the effect of the interaction visually, I plotted each significant interaction to 
display its effect.  
While there were many instances of statistically significant predictor variables in 
the analyses, only a small number of those variables were moderated by the interaction 
with Internet frequency.   During the general election data collection phase represented 
by Case 3, I found evidence of mobilization in two very similar areas—1) persuading 
someone to support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done offline or 
online, and 2) persuading someone offline to support or oppose a candidate.  
Additionally, I found evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in two areas of 
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activity: First, the online participation activity of viewing a campaign video online by 
age.  Second, when looking at the combined index of online participation, there was 
evidence of both mobilization and reinforcement in the likelihood of participating online 
by race.   
6-3.1: Case 3 interactions represented in the model 
In Table 6-6, one can see the results of the models including the interaction terms.  
In each, the model produced a significant and positive main effect for age, represented by 
18 to 29 year olds. However, as hypothesized, age interacting with frequency of Internet 
use, produced a negative b coefficient and diminished the effect of age on each of the 
predictions: attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate without 
regard to it being performed online (OR=0.945, p<.05, b=-.057), attempting to persuade 
someone to support or oppose a candidate, offline (OR=0.944, p<.05. b=-.057), and 
viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=0.931, p<.05,b=-.071).  The 
conclusion one can reach is that an age by Internet frequency interaction moderates the 
effect of age, and thereby shows evidence of mobilization.  However, to obtain a clearer 
picture of what that mobilization effect looks like, I have plotted the interaction as a 
graph (Figure 6-1) showing the closing of the gap between the young adults, age 18 to 29, 
and the adults age 30 or older, as a result of the interaction.    
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Table 6-6: Case 3--Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions   
(Exp(B)(b coefficient) 
 
 
Persuade Someone to 
Support or Oppose a 
Candidate with 
Interaction (Internet 
Frequency X Age(18-29)) 
Offline: Persuade Someone 
to Support or Oppose a 
Candidate with Interaction 
(Internet Frequency X 
Age(18-29)) 
Viewing A Political Video on 
a Site Like YouTube 
(Internet Frequency X 
Age(18-29)) 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Supporter 
Online Frequency X Age (18-29) 
Constant 
.974 
1.143* 
1.686***  (b=0.523) 
.842 
1.169* 
1.056* 
1.277** 
.902** 
1.056*** 
1.097*** 
1.033** 
1.036* 
1.030 
2.139*** 
1.353* 
1.209* 
.945*  (b= -.057) 
.011 
.956 
1.158* 
1.609*** (b=0.476) 
.859 
1.218* 
1.051 
1.308** 
.930* 
1.010 
1.094*** 
1.040*** 
1.050** 
.962 
1.943*** 
1.056 
1.264** 
.944* (b=-.057) 
.013*** 
.964 
1.190* 
2.963*** (b=1.086) 
1.367* 
1.245* 
1.012 
.967 
1.106* 
1.336*** 
1.064*** 
.986 
.948** 
1.406*** 
1.630*** 
1.858*** 
1.006 
.931* (b=-.071) 
.007*** 
N 6,251 6,251 6,251 
Correctly classified 75.5% 77.9% 85.4% 
Nagelkerke R Square .103 .117 .279 
Cox Snell R Square .153 .076 .158 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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6.3.2.1: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with Internet 
frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate 
without regard to it being performed online or offline.  In Figure 6-1, the graph shows 
that as Internet frequency increases there is a greater likelihood of engaging in persuasion 
by those over age 30, beyond the main effects of both age and Internet use.  The more 
often older Americans use the Internet, the more likely they were to engage in persuading 
others to support one of the candidates.  This closing of the gap between old and young, 
albeit small, is clear evidence of mobilization, but not in the way originally hypothesized.  
The expectation was that the Internet would mobilize previously disengaged voters, thus 
closing the anticipated participation gap between young and old by increasing the 
involvement of the former at a greater rate than the latter.  Rather, frequent use of the 
Internet increased the likelihood of persuasion among a group more associated with 
engagement, older people.  It is important to note that the technology may have served to 
motivate older adults, though it is difficult to illustrate this using survey data, it is entirely 
possible.    The interaction between the Internet and age was not significant in predicting 
persuasion to support or oppose a candidate.  With or without the technology, younger 
adults persuaded at the same rate.   This analysis illustrated by Figure 6-1 provides 
support for Hypothesis 1b—the Internet reinforces participation of already engaged 
citizens.
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Figure 6-1: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or 
Oppose a Candidate Without Regard to Performing it Offline or Online 
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6.3.2.2: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29 )interacting with Internet 
frequency predicting attempting to persuade someone to support or oppose a candidate 
offline.  Similarly, the interaction between age and Internet frequency produces a negative 
coefficient and significantly diminishes the effect of age, graphically represented in 
Figure 6-2. The illustrated analysis provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2b---using 
the Internet reinforces the offline participation of already engaged citizens by showing 
that older adults are more likely to attempt offline persuasion, the more they are online.  
The expected group, older adults increase their likelihood when they get online. 
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Figure 6-2: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting the Likelihood of Persuading Someone to Support or 
Oppose a Candidate Offline 
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6-3.2.3: Graphical representation—age (18 to 29) interacting with internet 
frequency predicting viewing a political video on a site like YouTube. Finally, the third 
significant interaction also involves age and Internet frequency as a predictor for viewing 
a political video on a site like YouTube.  The main effect of age is strong and in a 
positive direction. Young adults are nearly three times more likely than older ones 
(OR=2.963, p<.001) to say they viewed online political video.  Interacting age and 
Internet frequency causes this effect to disappear (OR=.931, p<.05).  Figure 6-3 shows 
the graphic plot of this interaction.  Figure 6-3 shows evidence of both mobilization and 
reinforcement occurring. Regardless of age, the greater the frequency of Internet use, the 
more likely one is to view a political video online.  However, it is clear from the graph 
that the gap between young and old is closing with more Internet usage.  This provides 
support for both Hypotheses 2c and 2d.
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Figure 6-3: Case 3 Interaction--Age (18-29) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing A Political Video on a Site Like YouTube  
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6-3.2.4: Race (African American) interacting with internet frequency predicting 
online participation (combined index). Not only is there some evidence of mobilization 
and reinforcement for some individual participation activities, the Case 3 data also 
produced evidence of mobilization for race in predicting general online participation 
(represented by the combined index).  Using OLS regression, the model produced a 
significant main effect for race (African American) as a predictor of online participation. 
The effect is significantly moderated by the interaction between race and Internet 
frequency (b=.027, p<.05). While not negative, the main effect is moderated by Internet 
frequency (See Table 6-7). 
Table 6-7: Case 3--Testing Mobilization and Reinforcement on the Combined Online 
Participation Index: OLS Regression (Unstandardized B) 
 
 
Online Participation 
Index 
Standard Error 
(SE) 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Supporter 
Online Frequency X Race (African American) 
Constant 
.007 
-.019 
.318*** 
.130** 
.027 
.014 
-.024 
-.006 
.148*** 
.033*** 
.005 
-.013* 
.219*** 
.185*** 
.712*** 
.013 
.027* 
-.472 
.026 
.025 
.047 
.047 
.031 
.010 
.030 
.013 
.005 
.005 
.004 
.005 
.029 
.017 
.053 
.031 
.012 
.072 
N 6,250  
R Square .313  
R Square Change .262  
    *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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The evidence for mobilization and reinforcement is more obvious in Figure 6-4.  
As Internet frequency increases, there is a greater likelihood that the voter will engage in 
any of the online participatory activities among both African American and non-African 
American populations.  This small but significant increase provides support for the 
mobilization hypothesis 2c and the reinforcement hypothesis 2d.   With all the controls in 
place, including support for Obama, campaign interest, and online campaign contact, the 
Internet mobilized a previously less engaged group, African Americans, to a greater level 
of participation.  However, the gap between African Americans and non-African 
Americans is widening rather than narrowing, suggesting that while the Internet 
mobilizes people of all races to participate online, the rate of increase is greater among 
African Americans. 
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Figure 6-4: Case 3 Interaction--Race (Black) by High Internet Use Predicting Online Participation 
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6-4: Case 3--Summary of Findings 
The Case 3 findings represent participation activity in the relatively early part of 
the general election campaign—before the party conventions through the first presidential 
debate (September 29).  Analyzing the raw frequencies, participation activities were 
relatively low, with many of the activities reported only in the single digits.  This may be 
as a result of the question wording where respondents were asked to report their behavior 
in the prior week only rather than over the entire campaign.  Still, when extrapolating 
behavior even as low as one percent to all U.S. households, those numbers translate into 
millions of participants.    
Without statistical controls, traditional demographic variables—education and 
income resulted in the expected modes they have in prior election studies.  However, 
there were some variables which did not—race and age.  Investigating the raw data, those 
with higher education and income were more likely to say they performed most of the 
participation activities measured in this study.  However, African Americans were more 
likely than non-African Americans to say they participated in most activities. Younger 
adults, were more likely to engage in online activities than older adults.  The greater 
likelihood to participate by these groups might be the result of a number of factors 
surrounding the uniqueness of this general election campaign, including the greater role 
of technology, the nomination of the first African American candidate for president by a 
major political party, and the Obama campaign’s ability to mobilize support. 
Predictors showed that with controls in place, the effect of education and income 
disappeared or diminished for most activities. However, young people and African 
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Americans emerged as significant predictors of participation.  As in the primaries, online 
campaign contact and campaign interest, more often than not, produced the highest odds 
ratios. If one was contacted online by one of the presidential campaigns or was strongly 
interested in the presidential campaign, then there was a greater likelihood to participate 
in one of the activities. Tables 6-8 and 6-9 summarize the significant predictors with the 
highest odds ratios.  
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Table 6-8: Case 3-- Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
(Up to 6) 
 
 
Persuade 
someone to vote 
offline  
Volunteer for 
candidate 
offline 
Attend 
Rally/Meeting 
Wear 
Campaign 
Button 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
            (A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign 
            indicates that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.) 
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Table 6-9: Case 3—Top  Significant Predictors of Online Participation (Up to 6) 
  
Persuade 
someone 
to vote 
online 
Volunteer 
for 
candidate 
online 
Discuss 
politics 
online 
Visit 
Campaign 
Website 
Viewed 
Video Sites 
Like 
YouTube 
Read or 
Post  to a 
blog about 
campaign 
 
Forward 
Emails 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African-American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X- 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X- 
X+ 
X- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X- 
      (A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates 
      that the odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.) 
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The analysis testing for mobilization and reinforcement provided some support 
for H1a-b and H2a-d, but only for a limited number of activities.  The data show 
mobilization towards participation as a result of using the Internet among groups more 
likely to be engaged anyhow.  Use of the technology led to both offline and online 
participation.  The Internet mobilized older people to become more active, but at the 
same time increasing the likelihood of younger people to participate in viewing political 
videos.  The OLS model testing interactions between race and Internet frequency as 
predictors for online participation (combined index) showed that African Americans were 
more likely to participate online the more they were online, more so than non-African 
Americans.  
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CHAPTER 7: CASE 4 -- MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT DURING THE 
GENERAL ELECTION PERIOD-RETROSPECTIVE DATA COLLECTION AMONG 
POST-GENERAL ELECTION PANEL 
 
In the prior chapter, I presented the analysis of mobilization and reinforcement 
reported as close to “real time” as possible by asking about participation behaviors in the 
week prior to the interview.  This results I present in this chapter provide a different 
view:  retrospective analysis of mobilization and reinforcement.  The findings in this 
chapter are reported from the Case 4 data collected among a telephone panel who 
participated in the rolling cross-section survey.  The post-election panel was conducted in 
the seven days following the general election (November 5, 2008 through November, 12, 
2008).  I present the following analyses:  
• A descriptive analysis of political participation activities using post-general  
election panel data, including a correlation Analysis among participation 
activities; 
• Logistic and OLS regression to determine predictors of offline and online 
participation; and,  
•  Logistic and OLS Regression testing interactions between levels of Internet 
use and demographic independent variables to assess support for mobilization 
and/or reinforcement. 
• A comparison between the data from Cases 3 and 4  
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7-1: Descriptive Analysis of Political Participation Activities 
Perhaps as a result of the different data collection methods, the frequency of 
reporting participation activities in Case 4 was higher than for Case 3.  However, the 
patterns of participation were generally similar, and, like Case 3, the descriptive analysis 
of the Case 4 post-election panel data affirms some of the past demographic biases about 
participation, while countering them in other instances.  
The raw frequencies in Case 4, without any controls, reveal that better educated 
and more affluent respondents continue to be advantaged since they are significantly 
more likely to report participating in most of the measured behaviors than less educated 
and less affluent (See Table 7-1).   Young adults age 18 to 29 years old report 
participating in fewer offline activities than older adults. This is consistent with past 
research showing older adults were more likely to participate in traditional activities. 
Countering past biases, African Americans were significantly more likely than non-
African Americans to say they participated in several political activities.   These include, 
working for a presidential candidate offline, contributing to a presidential campaign 
regardless if the method was offline or online, attending political meetings or rallies, and 
wearing a campaign button or displaying a sign in support of a candidate.  Unlike Case 3, 
where results show younger adults more likely to say they participated in most of the 
measured online activities, the Case 4 descriptive data reveal they are more likely than 
older adults to say they participated in less than half of the measured online activities.   
Not surprisingly, reported participation behavior was demonstrably higher in Case 
4, undoubtedly the result of the expanded time frame in which respondents considered 
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performing the participation behaviors.  However, the patterns of behavior, i.e., which 
activities respondents reported doing most often, were generally the same between cases, 
but there were exceptions.  
Nearly half of all adults (46.1%) said they attempted to persuade others to support 
or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was performed offline or online.  Nearly a 
fifth (19.2%) said they contributed money to one of the presidential campaigns without 
regard to whether the activity was performed offline or online, and under a tenth (7.5%) 
said they performed work from one of the presidential candidates without specification of 
whether it was done offline or online (See Table 7.1).   
Among the offline activities, more adults engaged in in-person persuasion either 
by directly speaking with someone (38.5%) or by the more passive method of wearing a 
campaign button or displaying a sign or bumper sticker (21.1%).  An equal number 
reported attending political meetings or rallies (11.5%) and contributing to a campaign or 
candidate through traditional offline methods (11.2%).  Few said they actually did any 
work offline for one of the candidates (6.3%) (See Table 7.1).  Respondents were more 
likely to report rally attendance in Case 4 than in Case 3, relative to other activities. 
In the descriptive analysis of online activities, three activities stood out. A roughly 
equal proportion of adults said they visited a campaign web site (30.1%), viewed a 
political video on a site like YouTube (29.1%) or forwarded campaign-related emails, 
audio, or video to others (28.8%). All three were top activities in Case 3, also.   These 
activities are moderately correlated. The correlation between visiting a campaign web site 
and viewing a political video is r= .41 and between forwarding a campaign-related email 
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is r=.37.  The correlation between viewing a political video and forwarding a campaign-
related email is r=.42.26     About one in five said they discussed politics online during the 
general election campaign.  The data suggest that direct persuasion online, person-to-
person, is less popular than offline persuasion with just 7.6 percent adults saying they 
tried to persuade others to support or oppose a candidate during the general election.  
Finally, while much has been written and spoken about online donations, fewer adults 
said they gave online (7.9%) than offline (11.2%).  However, the proportion of online 
donors represents a significant number of adults, well into the millions (See Table 7.1). 
                                                 
26 While these correlations are moderate, they are not so high to warrant abandoning an analysis of the 
individual activities in favor of combined online and offline indexes. 
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Table 7-1: Case 4 Participation Activity by Total Population and by Demographic Subgroups (without controls) 
Activities Regardless of 
Whether it Was Performed 
Offline during the presidential 
campaign  
All 
Adults  
%  
 
 
(n=2,026 
College 
Graduate 
Or  
Higher 
% 
(n=944) 
Not  
College 
Graduate 
% 
 
(n=1,082) 
Male 
% 
 
 
 
(n=898) 
Female 
% 
 
 
 
(n=1,128) 
Age 18-
29 
% 
 
 
(n=93) 
Age 30 or 
older 
% 
 
 
(n=1,933) 
African 
American 
% 
 
 
(n=137) 
Not 
African 
American 
% 
 
(n=1,889) 
Household 
Income: 
$100K 
Or more 
% 
(n=514) 
Household 
Income: 
Less than 
$100K 
% 
(n=1,512) 
  Attempt to persuade someone 
to support or oppose a 
presidential candidate  
46.1 51.0*** 41.9 49.0* 43.8 40.9 46.4 43.8 46.3 55.6*** 42.9 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential   candidates  
7.5 
 
10.1*** 
 
5.3 5.9* 8.9 6.5 7.6 20.4*** 6.6 9.3 6.9 
 Contribute money to campaigns 
or candidates   
19.2 26.3*** 12.9 18.5 19.7 12.9 19.5 26.3* 18.6 28.2*** 16.1 
 OFFLINE Activities during the 
presidential campaign 
            
  Attempt to persuade someone 
OFFLINE to support or oppose  
a candidate  
38.5 39.9 37.2 40.6 36.8 32.3 38.8 37.2 38.6 43.0* 37.0 
  Done any work for one of the 
presidential  candidates 
OFFLINE  
6.3 8.4*** 4.5 4.7* 7.6 5.4 6.4 18.2*** 5.5 7.4 6.0 
Contribute money to campaigns 
or candidates OFFLINE 
11.2 13.3** 9.3 11.7 10.8 2.2** 11.6 16.1 10.9 14.6** 10.1 
Attend political meetings, 
rallies, speeches, dinners or 
things like that in support of a 
particular presidential candidate 
11.5 16.1*** 7.4 9.8* 12.8 14.0 11.3 27.7*** 10.3 13.0 10.9 
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OFFLINE 
Wear a presidential campaign 
button, put a campaign sticker 
on car/place sign in your 
window/ in front of your house. 
21.1 23.7* 19.0 19.4 22.7 26.9 21.1 43.8*** 19.6 23.0 20.6 
ONLINE activities during the 
presidential campaign 
           
Attempt to persuade someone to 
support or oppose one of the 
presidential candidates ONLINE 
7.6 11.0*** 4.6 8.4 7.0 8.6 7.6 6.6 7.7 12.6*** 5.9 
Done any work for one of the 
presidential candidates ONLINE 
1.2 1.7* 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 2.2 1.1 1.9 0.9 
Contribute money to campaigns 
or candidates ONLINE 
7.9 12.9*** 3.6 6.8 8.9 10.8 7.8 10.2 7.8 13.6*** 6.0 
Discuss politics online 19.6 28.6*** 11.7 21.3 18.3 33.3** 18.9 23.4 19.3 29.2*** 16.3 
Visited Web site of a 
presidential campaign or 
political party 
30.1 41.0*** 20.5 31.1 29.3 41.9* 29.5 35.0 29.7 42.8*** 25.7 
Viewed video on sites like 
YouTube about the presidential 
candidates or campaign 
29.1 40.0*** 19.5 31.2 27.4 45.2*** 28.3 28.5 29.1 43.2*** 24.3 
Forwarded emails, audio or 
video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to 
friends, families, co-workers or 
other people you know 
28.8 39.0*** 20.0 28.8 30.4 24.7 29.0 33.6 28.5 40.9*** 24.7 
+=less than 0.5%, ***Chi Square is significant p<.001, **Chi Square is significant p<.01, *Chi Square is significant p<.05 
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7-2: Determining Predictors of Online and Offline Political Participation 
With the presence of statistical controls in the regression models, the data provide 
a more accurate picture of which variables are more effectively predicting political 
participation activities. In this section, I present results of the multivariate analyses of the 
four classes of participation activities:  1) persuasion, volunteering, and donating without 
regard to whether the activity took place online or offline, 2) offline activities including 
offline persuasion, offline campaign volunteering, offline donating, attending presidential 
campaign meetings or rallies, or the wearing of campaign buttons, 3) online activities 
including online persuasion, volunteering, online donating, political discussion, visiting 
campaign web sites, viewing political campaign-related videos  on sites like YouTube, 
and forwarding emails, audio or video related to the presidential campaign, and 4) the 
combined online and offline indexes.   
In contrast to what the data showed in Case 3, higher education was a significant 
predictor for a variety of activities, more so than any other demographic variable.  This is 
especially true of the online participation variables.  More consistent with Case 3, 
however, is the outcome that young adults are significant predictors of several online 
activities, but still fewer than in Case 3, and was not at all significant for any offline 
activities.  Females turned out to be a significant predictor for a majority of offline 
activities, and those activities measured without regard to whether they were performed 
offline or online.  Female was also a significant predictor for two of the seven online 
activities.  
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As in all three of the prior cases, online campaign contact and campaign interest 
were the most robust predictors for all the activities.  In addition, voting for Obama was a 
significant predictor for a number of activities. 
 
7-2.1: Predictors of participation activities regardless of online or offline distinctions 
 Affluence was a consistent predictor for two of the three activities not taking into 
account whether they were performed offline or online, while education was a significant 
predictor for one of them.  The meaning one could take away from this is that, in Case 4 
for these activities, the traditional biases were affirmed.  Yet again, gender, specifically, 
being female, was a significant predictor for volunteering and donating—two critical 
needs for any successful campaign.  Campaign interest, online campaign contact, and 
support for Obama, were significant predictor for all three. 
7-2.1.1: Attempting to persuade someone to vote for a candidate. 
Demographically, the predictors for persuading someone to support or oppose a candidate 
differ from the Case 3 predictors, but the non-demographic variables in the model 
generally are consistent with Case 3. Based on the results of the logistic regression 
model, with statistical controls, those from more affluent households were 1.3 times more 
likely to say they persuaded someone to support or oppose a candidate than those from 
less affluent households (OR=1.338, p<.05). Politically those more likely to say they 
persuaded others to support or oppose a candidate tended to be highly interested in the 
campaign (OR=1.873 p<.001), likely to be contacted by one of the campaigns online 
(OR=1.455, p<.01), and more likely to be an Obama voter (OR=1.299, p<.05) (See Table 
7-2).   
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7-2.1.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign.  The Case 4 
demographic predictors for volunteering for a candidate are somewhat similar to Case 3.  
Consistent with Verba et al. (1995) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the more 
frequent one attends religious services, the more likely they were to say they volunteered 
to work for a campaign (OR=1.231, p<.01).  Females (OR=1.664/.601 for males, p>.05) 
were more likely than males to say they volunteered to work for a campaign.  Also 
consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen, those contacted by a campaign online were 
nearly five times more likely to say they volunteered to work for a campaign (OR=4.829, 
p<.001) than those who had no such contact.  Obama voters were nearly two and a half 
times more likely (OR=2.334, p<.01) than McCain voters to say they worked for one of 
the candidates, and those with a higher level of campaign interest were more than one and 
a half times more likely (OR=1.584, p<.05) to say they volunteered for a campaign either 
offline or online (See Table 7-2). 
7-2.1.3: Contributing money to a candidate or campaign. According to the results 
of the regression, those most likely to say they donated to one of the campaign during the 
general election campaign were the more affluent (OR=1.594, p<.01), the better educated 
(OR=1.352, p<.05) and females (OR=1.328/.753 (male), p<.05).  Unlike in Case 3, race 
was not a significant predictor for making a campaign contribution in Case 4.  Politically, 
those saying they donated to a campaign typically were more likely to be Democratic 
(OR=1.515, p<.05). Again, online campaign contact was a significant predictor since 
those who were contacted by one of the campaigns online were four times more likely to 
say they donated than those who were not (OR=4.206, p<.001).  Presumably, one would 
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have to have a certain amount of interest in a campaign to want to donate, thus high 
campaign interest was a significant predictor of donating (OR=2.278, p<.001). Finally, 
the model revealed that Obama voters were more likely to say they donated money to a 
campaign during the general election period (OR=1.605, p<.05), though this might have 
more to do with the fact that the McCain campaign accepted public campaign financing 
which barred it from accepting direct campaign donations once McCain accepted the 
nomination at the party convention in early September.  Obama had no such restriction, 
since his campaign chose not to accept public financing (See Table 7-2).
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Table 7-2: Case 4--Predictors of Political Participation Regardless of Online or 
Offline 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
persuade 
someone to 
support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
Volunteer 
for 
candidate or 
campaign 
 
 
Contribute 
Money to a 
candidate or 
campaign 
 
 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
.868   
1.136 
1.004 
.680 
1.338* 
.952 
1.091 
.905 
1.077*** 
1.087*** 
1.038* 
1.025 
.960 
1.873*** 
1.455** 
1.299* 
.056*** 
1.204 
.601* 
.883 
1.738 
1.126 
1.231** 
1.494 
1.220 
1.051 
1.100** 
1.021 
.982 
1.257 
1.584* 
4.829*** 
2.334** 
.001*** 
1.352* 
.753* 
.839 
.815 
1.594** 
.995 
1.515* 
.966 
1.024 
1.120*** 
1.107*** 
1.013 
.946 
2.278*** 
4.206*** 
1.605* 
.002*** 
N 1,925 1,925 1,925 
Correctly Classified 64.9% 93.0% 83.1% 
Nagelkerke R Square .160 .279 .308 
Cox & Snell R Square .120 .114 .193 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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7-2.2: Predictors of offline participation activities    
 The demographic analysis of offline participation activities reveals that women 
and African Americans are more likely to say they took part in these traditional behaviors 
of political participation.  This is particularly true for offline volunteering, attending 
rallies, and displaying support for a candidate among women, and attending rallies and 
displaying support for African Americans.  Consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993) and Verba et al. (1995) regarding the importance of religious attendance and 
volunteering, the Case 4 logistic model shows that the more one attends religious services 
the more likely that person was to volunteer to work for a campaign online and to attend 
a rally or meeting in support of a candidate.  Politically, online campaign contact appears 
to have made a difference for offline activities as well as online activities.  Online contact 
significantly predicted, volunteering offline, attending rallies or meeting, displaying 
campaign support, and donating money offline.  Similarly, high campaign interest was a 
significant predictor of offline donating, rally attendance, and displaying support.  
Additionally, more than predicting online activities, Obama voters were more likely than 
non-voters to say they persuade offline, attend rallies or meetings, and display candidate 
support. The remainder of this section details the significant predictors for the offline 
participation activities. 
7-2.2.1:  Attempting to persuade someone offline to vote for a candidate.  Case 3 
data indicated that youth, gender, and income were significant predictors of offline 
persuasion, however, in Case 4, there were no significant demographic predictors of 
offline persuasion.  Those saying they engaged in offline persuasion tended to be highly 
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interested in the presidential campaign (OR=1.560, p<.001) and were more likely to be 
Obama voters (OR=1.34, p<.05) (See Table 7-3).    
7-2.2.2: Volunteering to work for a candidate or campaign offline. According to 
the logistic regression model, women (OR=1.72/.582 for men, p<.05) and frequent 
religious service attendees (OR=1.288, p<.01) were the only significant demographic 
predictors of offline volunteering.  Those contacted by a campaign online were nearly 
five times as likely as others (OR=4.949, p<.001) to say they volunteered offline.  Obama 
voters (OR=2.863, p<.01) were almost three times more likely than McCain voters to say 
they volunteered offline (See Table 7-3). 
7-2.2.3: Contributing money offline to a presidential candidate or campaign. In 
the presence of controls, no demographic variables significantly predicted donating to a 
presidential campaign through an offline mechanism. The Case 4 model shows that self-
identified Democrats (OR=1.478, p<.05) were more likely to say they donated than 
Republicans or Independents during the general election campaign. Again, this might be 
a result of the McCain campaign accepting matching Federal funds and therefore unable 
to collect donations after McCain accepted his party’s nomination in early-September.  
The strongest predictors were high campaign interest (OR=1.990, p<.001) and online 
campaign contact (OR=1.869, p<.001) (See Table 7.3). 
7-2.2.4: Attending a rally, meeting, or other event in support of a candidate. 
African Americans (OR=2.199, p<.001) were more than twice as likely to say they 
attended a rally meeting or some other event in support of a candidate.  Higher educated 
adults (OR=1.764, p<.01) and women (OR= 1.464/0.683 for males, p<.05) were also 
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significant predictors of attending rallies. More frequent religious service attendees 
(OR=1.145, p<.05) were also significantly more likely than less frequent ones to say they 
attended campaign rallies or meetings.  The most robust predictor of this offline activity, 
again, is online campaign contact (OR=3.092, p<.001). This is further evidence of the 
impact of online campaign communications with voter mobilization. Other significant 
predictors are highly campaign interested adults (OR=2.172, p<.001), and being an 
Obama voter (OR=1.573, p<.05) (See Table 7.3).  
7-2.2.5: Wearing a campaign button, placing a bumper sticker or lawn sign in 
support of a candidate. African Americans are about twice as likely as non-African 
Americans to say they wore a button, displayed a bumper sticker or lawn sign in support 
of a candidate (OR=1.923, p<.01).  Women were significantly more likely than men to 
display their support in this manner (OR=1.285/0.778 for men, p<.05).  Politically, 
Democrats were more likely than Republicans or Independents to say they wore a button 
(OR=1.362, p<.05). The effect of online campaign contact was also the predictor with the 
highest probability (OR=3.180, p<.001). And, as I found for most of the other offline and 
online activities, high campaign interest was a significant predictor (OR=1.763, p<.001)  
(See Table 7-3). 
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Table 7-3: Case 4--Predictors of Offline Political Participation 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade someone 
to support or 
oppose a 
candidate 
OFFLINE  
Volunteer for 
candidate 
OFFLINE 
^Contribute 
Money to a 
Candidate or 
Campaign 
OFFLINE 
Attend 
Rally/ 
Meeting 
Wear Campaign 
Button/ 
Display Bumper 
Sticker/Lawn 
Sign 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
.839 
1.154 
.924 
.788 
1.196 
.939 
1.071 
.896* 
1.036 
1.064** 
1.041 
1.027 
.809 
1.560*** 
.902 
1.340* 
.119*** 
1.309 
.582* 
.923 
1.612 
1.135 
1.288** 
1.609 
1.224 
1.002 
1.103** 
1.014 
.989 
1.162 
1.469 
4.949*** 
2.863** 
.001*** 
1.102 
1.019 
.269 
1.194 
1.365 
1.069 
1.478* 
.864 
.948 
1.047 
1.147*** 
1.038 
.915 
1.990*** 
1.869*** 
1.001 
.004*** 
1.764** 
.683* 
1.486 
2.199** 
.851 
1.145* 
1.315 
1.050 
1.078* 
1.078** 
1.041 
.909* 
.971 
2.172*** 
3.092*** 
1.573* 
.001*** 
.903 
.778* 
1.673 
1.923** 
.965 
1.052 
1.362* 
1.016 
1.056* 
1.113*** 
1.042* 
1.018 
.829 
1.763*** 
3.180*** 
1.332 
.008*** 
N 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 
Correctly Classified 62.1% 94.1% 88.7% 89.1% 80.6% 
Nagelkerke R Square .074 .268 .128 .241 .218 
Cox & Snell R Square .055 .100 .065 .123 .141 
*=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, shaded means predictor is also significant in Case 3; ^=Not asked in Case 3
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7-2.3: Predictors of online participation activities  
Those most likely to say they engaged in the online participation activities 
tended to be better educated, younger, more affluent, and female.  Politically, they 
benefitted from online campaign contact and were very interested in the presidential 
campaign. Online participants’ Internet behavior suggests they spend a lot of time 
online, in general, and relied on the Internet as an important campaign source.  Better 
educated adults were significant predictors for online political discussion, visiting a 
campaign web site, viewing a political video online, and forwarding a political email, 
audio or video. Younger adults were more likely to say they discussed politics online, 
visited a campaign web site, and viewed a political video online.  Females were more 
likely to say they donated online and forwarded a political email. More affluent adults 
were more likely to say they donated online and viewed an online political video.   
Online contact significantly predicted all of the measured online activities except 
volunteering online. High campaign interest was a significant predictor of online 
persuasion, discussing politics online, visiting a campaign web site, viewing an online 
political video, and forwarding a political email, audio or video.  The more one was 
online, the more likely one was to say they performed one of the measured online 
activities except for volunteering online and donating online. The remainder of this 
section details the significant predictors for the online participation activities. 
7-2.3.1: Attempting to persuade someone online to support or oppose a 
candidate. 
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Consistent with the Case 3 data, there were no significant demographic predictors of 
online persuasion, according to the logistic regression model.  Rather, those who were 
contacted by one of the campaigns online (OR=3.850, p<.001) and those highly 
interested in the campaign (OR=3.501, p<.001) were most likely to say they tried to 
persuade others via an online method to support or oppose a presidential candidate.   
Additionally, being online frequently (OR=1.718, p<.01) was also a significant 
predictor of this online persuasive behavior (See Table 7-4). 
7-2.3.1: Volunteering online to do work for a candidate. The descriptive 
analysis shows that better educated adults were most likely to say they worked online 
for one of the candidates.   With controls, the influence of education on this behavior 
disappears.  In fact, like online persuasion, there were no significant demographic 
predictors for this behavior.  Online campaign contact (OR=3.509, p<.05) and using 
the Internet as a source for campaign information in the prior seven days (OR=1.447, 
p<.01) were significant predictors (See Table 7.4). 
7-2.3.3: Contributing money online to a presidential candidate or campaign. 
The Case 4 model shows that the demographic profile of those most likely to donate 
to a candidate online differs little from prior research on general election campaign 
donations.  While the Obama campaign promoted the notion (New York Times, July 
17, 2008) that its donor base was made up of many small donors, those who say they 
made those contributions in the general election, according to the model, tended to be 
better off financially than those who did not donate (OR=1.811, p<.01).  These 
findings appear to conform to the post-election study, noted earlier in this dissertation 
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but bears repeating. The Campaign Finance Institute, a non-partisan, non-profit 
institute affiliated with The George Washington University, conducted an analysis of 
the data from the FEC showing that Obama raised 80 percent more from large donors 
than small donors, a much higher rate than his opponents and any prior presidential 
candidate. Additionally, the CFI analysis concluded that Obama raised about the 
same percentage from small donors (amounts of less than $200) in 2008, than George 
W. Bush did in 2004 (Malbin, 2008).   
The model also indicates that women (OR=1.845/.524 (men), p<.01) and 
those who were better educated (OR=1.794, p<.05) were almost twice as likely as 
their counterparts to say they made an online donation. However, it bears restating, 
and perhaps it is obvious, but online efforts by the campaigns were truly the primary 
driver in choosing to make an online donation.  Getting a campaign email made one 
eleven times more likely to say they made an online donation than those who did not 
get one (OR=11.365, p<.001).  Obama voters, again, perhaps because McCain was 
barred from accepting donations once he became the party’s nominee, were nearly 
four times more likely to say they made an online donation than McCain voters 
(OR=3.731, p<.001).  Related to contact and support, high campaign interest 
(OR=2.468, p<.001) was another significant predictor (See Table 7.4). 
7-2.3.4: Discussing politics online. The demographic profile of those who say 
they went online to discuss politics and the campaign turned out to be younger and  
better educated.  Those between the ages of 18 and 29 were two and a half times more 
likely than older adults to say they went online to discuss politics and the presidential 
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campaign (OR=2.462, p<.001).  Highly educated adults, a group more traditionally 
involved in campaigns, were nearly twice as likely as less educated to say they 
discussed politics and the campaign online (OR=1.826, p<.001).   Those who say they 
discussed politics and the campaign online were more likely to be contacted by one of 
the campaigns online (OR=2.431, p<.001), frequently online (OR=1.962, p<.001), 
and highly interested in the campaign (OR=1.396, p<.01) (See Table 7.4).  
7-2.3.5: Visiting a campaign web site. Youth, education and online campaign 
contact also defined who were more likely to say they visited a campaign web site.  
Younger people were twice as likely to say they visited a campaign web site, 
according to the Case 4 model (OR=2.062, p<.001).  The odds of a college educated 
adult to say they visited a campaign web site was 1.503 (p<.01).  Those who got an 
email from one of the campaigns were four times more likely than those who did not 
receive a campaign email to visit a campaign web site (OR=4.029, p<.001). Frequent 
Internet users were more likely than less frequent ones (OR=1.316, p<.001) to visit 
campaign web sites and high campaign interest was a significant predictor 
(OR=1.617, p<.001) (See Table 7-4). 
7-2.3.6: Viewing a political video on a site like YouTube.  Youth is the most 
robust predictor, both demographically and behaviorally, of viewing online political 
videos, with odds ratios higher than online campaign contact.  18 to 29 year olds are 
just about three times more likely than older adults (OR=2.808, p<.001) to say they 
viewed a political video on a site like YouTube during the general election campaign.  
Those contacted online by one of the campaigns were just about twice as likely as 
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non-contacts to say they viewed online political video (OR=1.854, p<.001).  
Demographically, in addition to younger adults, those with higher income 
(OR=1.444, p<.01), and more education (OR=1.427, p<.01) were typically more 
likely to say they viewed online political video.  Other political predictors for going 
online to view political videos were high campaign interest (OR=1.488, p<.001), 
frequent use of the Internet (OR=1.495, p<.01), and citing Internet as a campaign 
source (OR=1.231, p<.001) (See Table 7-4) 
7-2.3.7: Forwarding emails, audio or videos to others about one of the 
candidates. Demographically, forwarding emails, audio or videos about the 
presidential campaign to others was an activity more likely to be reported by females 
(OR=1.84/0.543 for males, p<.001) and the more highly educated (OR=1.552, 
p<.001). Again, however, this activity is most driven by online campaign contact 
(OR=3.193, p<.001), campaign interest (OR=1.739, p<.001), and frequency of being 
on the Internet (OR=2.068, p<.001) (See Tables 7-4 and 7-4a).
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Table 7-4: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 1) 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
              
  *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
               
 
 
Attempt to 
Persuade someone 
to support/ oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer for 
Candidate or 
Campaign 
ONLINE 
 
Contribute Money 
to a candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
1.277 
.896 
1.284 
.648 
1.289 
1.045 
.958 
1.029 
1.177*** 
1.065 
.990 
.976 
1.718** 
3.501*** 
3.850*** 
.858 
.000*** 
.868 
.786 
.818 
1.861 
1.029 
.928 
.945 
1.125 
1.447** 
1.048 
1.043 
.953 
1.629 
2.286 
3.509* 
.914 
.000 
1.794* 
.524** 
1.884 
.542 
1.811** 
.871 
1.111 
1.114 
1.161** 
1.182*** 
.988 
.951 
1.085 
2.468*** 
11.365*** 
3.731*** 
.000*** 
N 1,925 1,925 1,925 
Correctly Classified 92.3% 98.8% 92.3% 
Nagelkerke R Square .270   .200 .450 
Cox & Snell R Square .113 .024 .194 
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Table 7-4a: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation (Part 2) 
Logistic Regression EXP(B) 
 
 Discuss 
politics 
ONLINE 
Visit 
Campaign 
Web site 
 
 
Viewed 
Political 
Video on 
Sites Like 
YouTube 
Forward  
Political 
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
1.826*** 
.952 
2.462** 
1.042 
1.216 
1.012 
1.038 
1.055 
1.156*** 
1.074** 
.975 
1.033 
1.962*** 
1.396** 
2.431*** 
.871 
.010*** 
1.503** 
.925 
2.062** 
.908 
1.275 
1.013 
.870 
1.058 
1.245*** 
1.033 
.950* 
1.023 
1.316* 
1.617*** 
4.029*** 
1.316 
.011*** 
1.427** 
.982 
2.808*** 
.687 
1.444** 
1.058 
.784 
1.150* 
1.231*** 
1.054* 
.996 
.960 
1.495** 
1.488*** 
1.854*** 
1.280 
.016*** 
1.552*** 
.543*** 
.857 
1.094 
1.262 
1.022 
.942 
.907 
1.155*** 
1.076** 
1.003 
.997 
2.068*** 
1.739*** 
3.193*** 
.809 
.020*** 
N 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 
Correctly Classified 81.4% 78.7% 75.5% 77.4% 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.271 .379 .300 .327 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.172 .268 .211 .230 
               *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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7-2.4: Online index and offline index: predictors 
 
Combining the measured participation activities into online and offline 
participation indexes yield a set of results fairly consistent with many of the individual 
participation activities.   Even with controls in place, education continues to be a 
significant predictor for online participation (b=.287, p<.01), but not for offline 
participation. Similarly, gender and age are significant only as predictors of online 
behavior as reflected by the index.  Being female is a significant predictor (b=-.152, 
p<.01).   Somewhat consistent with the models for the individual online activities, those 
age 18 to 29 are more likely than older adults to say they engaged in at least one of the 
online activities (b=.479, p<.001). The other significant demographic variable predicting 
online participation was income. More affluent adults (b=.241, p<.01) were more likely 
to say they performed an online activity.  Race is the only significant demographic 
predictor for the offline index according to the OLS model. African Americans were 
more likely than non-African Americans to say they performed at least one of the offline 
activities (b=.298, p<.001).    
Among the political control variables, online campaign contact (b=1.057, p<.001 
was a robust significant predictor of online participation.  Heavy use of the Internet 
(b=.402, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.296, p<.001) were significant predictors of 
online participation as was using the Internet as a source of campaign information 
(b=.142, p<.001). 
Online campaign contact (b=.474, p<.001) and campaign interest (b=.247, 
p<.001) were also strong predictors of offline participation.  Other significant predictors 
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of offline participation among the political controls were, being an Obama voter (b=.179, 
p<.01), and being a Democrat (b=.166, p<.001) (See Table 7-5). 
 
Table 7-5: Case 4--Predictors of Online Political Participation and Offline 
Political Participation: OLS Regression 
 
 Online Participation 
Index 
Offline Participation Index 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Voter 
Constant 
.287*** 
-.152** 
.479*** 
-.108 
.241** 
.014 
-.016 
.056 
.142*** 
.053*** 
-.013 
-.004 
.402*** 
.296*** 
1.057*** 
.066 
-1.056*** 
.005 
-.063 
.055 
.298** 
.060 
.024 
.166** 
-.009 
.022* 
.051*** 
.033*** 
-.001 
-.086 
.247*** 
.474*** 
.179** 
-.552*** 
N 1,924 1,924 
R Square .423 .196 
R Square Change .311*** .161*** 
 *=p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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7-3: Evidence for Mobilization, Reinforcement or Both  
 Thus far, this study has detailed the frequency of participation across activities 
and found that the reporting frequency was much higher in Case 4 than in Case 3.  The 
data also showed that, like in other cases, the biases of the past were reinforced but there 
was also evidence that  groups marginalized in the past became more active and 
participatory than in prior elections.  While there has been no direct linkage to the 
effectiveness of the Internet in this regard, the role co online campaign contact cannot be 
discounted.  However, a better test of mobilization and reinforcement involves testing the 
logistic models with interactions between Internet frequency and the significant 
demographic variables produced by the initial logistic and OLS regression models. 
The logistic models produced a significant interaction between frequent Internet 
use and gender for predicting volunteering to work for a presidential campaign 
(OR=.824, p<.05, b= -.188), thus providing evidence for H1a (mobilization).  
Additionally, the model produced significant interactions between frequent Internet use 
and education for predicting online political discussion (OR=.875, p<.05, b=-.136), 
viewing a political video on a site like YouTube (OR=.876, p<.05, b= -.137), and 
forwarding political emails, audio, or video to others (OR=.876, p<.05, b= -.136).  These 
interactions provided support for hypotheses 2c and 2d (See Table 7-6).  
In order to see the effects of the interactions more clearly, one must observe the 
graphical figures.  In one instance where the interaction was significant, the graphical 
figure (7-1) points to evidence of mobilization, while the other figures provide evidence 
for both mobilization and reinforcement (See Figures 7-2 through 7-4). 
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Table 7-6: Case 4: Testing for Mobilization and Reinforcement--Significant Interactions:  (Exp(B)(b coefficient) 
 
 Volunteering to work for 
a presidential campaign 
with Interaction (Internet 
Frequency X Gender 
(Male)) 
Online Political 
Discussion: with 
Interaction (Internet 
Frequency X 
Education (Coll grad 
or higher)) 
Viewing A Political 
Video on a Site Like 
YouTube (Internet  
Frequency X 
Education (Coll grad 
or higher)) 
Forwarding Political 
Emails (Internet  
Frequency X 
Education (Coll grad 
or higher)) 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
Political Knowledge (Delli Carpini/Keeter) 
Online Frequency X Gender (Male) 
Online Frequency X Education (Col Grad/ higher) 
Constant 
1.122 
.663 (b=-0.374) 
.886 
1.817* 
1.097 
1.244* 
1.472 
1.212 
1.051 
1.101** 
1.020 
.981 
1.177 
1.554* 
4.772*** 
2.409** 
1.164 
.824* (b=-0.188) 
NA 
.000 
1.911*** 
.914 
2.575** 
1.094 
1.219 
1.014 
1.051 
1.060 
1.150*** 
1.073** 
.974 
1.036 
2.172*** 
1.379** 
2.383*** 
.867 
1.125 
NA 
.875* (b=-0.136) 
.008 
1.363* 
.906 
3.064*** 
.739 
1.434** 
1.065 
.787 
1.164* 
1.225*** 
1.053* 
.991 
.961 
1.609*** 
1.453*** 
1.816*** 
1.283 
1.268** 
NA 
.876* (b= -0137) 
.011 
1.490** 
.500*** 
.899 
1.180 
1.253 
1.027 
.956 
.912 
1.149*** 
1.075** 
.998 
.998 
2.227*** 
1.710*** 
3.136*** 
.810 
1.251** 
NA 
.876* (b=-0.136) 
.014 
N 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 
Correctly classified 93.0% 80.8% 76.5% 77.2% 
Nagelkerke R Square .285 .276 .310 .336 
Cox Snell R Square .117 .175 .218 .236 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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7-3.1: Gender by high internet use predicting volunteering to work for a presidential 
campaign without regard to online or offline work 
Figure 7-1 shows greater evidence for mobilization than for reinforcement in the 
interaction between gender and Internet use predicting volunteering to work for a 
presidential campaign.  The more frequently females were online the more likely they 
were to say they volunteered to work for a presidential campaign.  Males who were 
online frequently were only slightly more likely to say they volunteered to work for a 
presidential campaign (See Figure 7-1).  Therefore this provides support for Hypothesis 
1a—using the Internet will mobilize previously disengaged citizens.  Research by 
Converse et al.’s in their landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al. 
(1995) pointed to a slight gender gap in participation.  These findings suggest that the 
Internet mobilized women to become more participatory during the general election 
period.
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Figure 7-1 Case 4 Interaction-Gender (Male) by High Internet Use Predicting Volunteering to Work for a Campaign 
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7-3.2: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting online political 
discussion 
 
The interaction between frequent Internet use and education produced evidence 
for both mobilization and reinforcement in predicting online political discussion.  Those 
who have earned at least a college degree but frequently on the Internet are more likely to 
say they discussed politics online than those who reported being online less frequently.  
A similar pattern exists for those with less education, but the starting point is at a lower 
point (See Figure 7-2).  Hypotheses 2c and 2d are supported by these data.  The Internet 
will mobilize previously disengaged citizens to participate online (H2c) and using the 
Internet will reinforce the online participation of already engaged citizens (H2d). 
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Figure 7-2: Case 4 Interaction-Education (College Grad or higher)  by High Internet Use Predicting Online Political 
Discussion 
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7-3.3: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting viewing 
political video on sites like YouTube 
Interacting education and frequency of Internet use produces significant outcomes 
for predicting viewing political video on sites like YouTube in much the same way it 
predicts online discussion and as I will present below, forwarding emails.  The more 
frequently one is online, the more likely they are to say they viewed view political 
videos.  The patterns are similar for both those with and without college degrees (See 
Figure 7-3), thus, this is more evidence in support of Hypotheses 2c and 2d. 
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Figure 7-3:  Case 4 Interaction-- Education (College Grad or Higher) by High Internet Use Predicting Viewing Political Video on 
Sites Like YouTube 
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7-3.4: Education (college grad or higher) by high internet use predicting forwarding 
political emails, audio, or video to others 
While the interactions between education and frequency of Internet use are 
significant, and the figure points to instances of mobilization and reinforcement, the gap 
between college graduates and non-college graduates nearly intersects. This closing of 
the gap is evidence of a mobilizing effect whereby, less educated citizens who are 
frequently online are more likely than less online active ones to participate in this 
activity, but they are almost as likely as higher educated citizens to do so (See Figure 7-
4).  While not clear-cut, the evidence weighs more heavily toward mobilization (H2c) 
than reinforcement (H2d). 
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Figure 7-4: Case 4 Interaction--High Education by High Internet Use Predicting Forwarding Political Emails/Audio/Video 
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7-4:  Case 4--Summary of Findings 
Case 4 examined the general election period retrospectively during the week 
following the presidential election. Those sampled were part of a panel that completed 
the survey in the two months prior to the election, but they had no exposure to 
participation questions before the post-election wave.   
Descriptive analysis of Case 4 shows a significantly greater level of engaging in 
participation activities, as compared to Case 3.  Yet, despite this difference, the patterns 
are generally the same for total participation.  Again, this is likely an artifact of question 
wording.   
Similar to the Case 3 descriptive analysis, without statistical controls, those with a 
higher level of education and more income were more likely to engage in most of the 
measured participation activities.  Younger adults were more likely to engage in several 
online activities, and African Americans were more likely engage in most offline 
activities than non-African Americans. 
Different demographic variables were more predictive of participation behavior 
depending on whether the activity was performed online or offline.  Those advantaged in 
the past (higher educated and more affluent) were more likely to continue to be 
advantaged in the logistic models.  However, young adults were significant predictors of 
several online activities. Race (African American) and gender (female) were significant 
predictors for most offline activities.   As seen in prior cases, online campaign contact 
and campaign interest were consistently significant predictors for nearly all activities.  
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Multivariate analysis also affirmed that biases were present in some of the online 
and offline activities. Those with greater levels of education were more likely to engage 
in online discussion, visiting campaign web sites, and viewing video. They were also 
more likely to attend campaign rallies.  Age (18 to 29 year olds) continued to be a good 
predictor of several online activities, but African Americans did not emerge as a predictor 
group in Case 4, whereas in Case 3 African Americans were often seen as significant 
predictors.  Politically, campaign contact, interest, and frequent internet use were reliable 
predictors of online behaviors.  Interest and online contact were also significant 
predictors of offline behavior—these were consistent with Case 3.  It is unclear what 
explains the disparity between the two cases—question wording, time-frame of data 
collection, or rolling cross-section versus panel designs.  More research needs to be done 
to determine the cause of the differences.   Tables 7-7 and 7-8 provide a summary of the 
significant predictors for each activity.
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Table 7-7: Case 4  Top Significant Predictors of Offline Political Participation (Up to 6) 
 
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the 
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.) 
 
 
Persuade 
someone to vote 
offline  
 
Volunteer for 
candidate 
offline 
Donate Money 
Offline 
Attend 
Rally/ 
Meeting 
Wear 
Campaign 
Button 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Voter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
X- 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
X- 
 
X+ 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
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Table 7-8: Case 4—Top Significant Predictors of Online Political Participation (Up to 6) 
 
 Attempt to 
Persuade 
 someone to 
support/ oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
Volunteer 
for 
Candidate or 
Campaign 
ONLINE 
Contribute 
Money to a 
candidate or 
campaign 
ONLINE 
Discuss 
politics 
online 
Visit 
Campaign 
Web site 
Viewed 
Political 
Video on 
Sites Like 
YouTube 
Forward  
Political 
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day/ more) 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama Voter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X- 
 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
  X+ 
 
X+ 
 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
 
X+ 
X+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X+ 
X+ 
X+ 
(A positive sign next to the “X” indicates that the base variable was significant and the odds ratio was greater than one, while a negative sign indicates that the 
odds ratio was less than one, meaning that it was unlikely for the variable to predict the activity.) 
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The models with interactions showed evidence of mobilization, and mobilization 
and reinforcement.  High levels of education interacting with frequency of Internet use 
provided evidence for mobilization for online political discussion, viewing political video 
on sites like YouTube, and forwarding emails, audio, or video about the campaign to 
others.  The Internet also appears to mobilize women to engage in volunteering to work 
for one of the campaigns. 
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CHAPTER 8: MOBILIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP 
TO CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT 
In the previous four chapters, one of the constants in the findings on mobilization 
and reinforcement has been the strong predictive quality of online campaign contact for 
nearly all of the measured participation activities.  Online campaign contact consistently 
produced the most robust odds ratios and highest coefficients, meaning that those who 
were contacted online by any campaign were most often more likely to say they 
participated in some way.  Certainly, one of the limitations of survey research is the 
difficulty in determining the causal direction between participation and contact, but it is 
clear that contact is an important element of participation, and worthy of further review.   
As part of the original research plan, I sought to measure the impact of campaign contact 
on participation. Campaign contact is stated throughout this dissertation and has long 
been theoretically important. It is through direct and indirect methods of recruitment and 
activation, which campaigns build up their organization and base of support (Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995).  A more effective activation effort leads to greater 
success in the electoral outcome. Social networks help get the word out, therefore 
multiplying the effects of mobilization. Campaigns use the Internet in an attempt to 
maximize voter outreach in terms of monetary contributions and support. Online 
recruitment gets the message out to the strongest supporters, with the hope of spurring 
them into action and helping them to expand this message to those who may be interested 
but up until the point of contact were uncertain how to act.  The final research question to 
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be addressed is the extent to which mobilization or reinforcement is dependent on the 
effectiveness in how the candidates and their campaigns utilize the Internet.   
Results of three related hypotheses are presented in this chapter: 
H3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized to participate than 
those contacted offline  
The popular perception (supported by some evidence) that in the 2008 
presidential primaries Barack Obama was more effective than Hillary Clinton in using the 
Internet as a mobilizing tool, the Obama campaign may have been more likely to send out 
online messages to potential supporters, than the Clinton campaign was to their potential 
supporters.  Given this perception, I further hypothesize 
H3b:  Voters for Obama in the primaries were more likely to have been contacted 
online by the Obama campaign than were voters for Clinton by the Clinton 
campaign in the primaries.  
H3c:  The Obama campaign online contact would more likely lead to political 
participation than the Clinton campaign online contact.  
8-1: Methods:  Hypotheses 3a-c 
I purposely designed sections of the NAES survey during the period covered by 
Case 2, July 2, 2008 through August 4, 2008, to address hypotheses 3a-c.   The 
instrument included a series of retrospective questions about the campaign contact 
activities of the Obama and Clinton campaigns during the primaries and caucuses: 
• Whether either campaign contacted respondent 
• Whether the respondent was contacted online or offline 
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• Frequency of contact by either Clinton or Obama (Online or Offline) 
• Whether either campaign asked in the contact to contact others 
• Whether respondent acted on that contact 
• Frequency of contributing to either Clinton or Obama during primaries 
and caucuses and the general amount donated. 
The analysis followed two steps. First, in order to test hypotheses 3a and 3c, I 
constructed several OLS regression models to determine if campaign contact activated 
political participation.   I ran several regression models addressing this hypothetical claim 
that those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted offline. 
I then ran several more regression models addressing the claim of hypothesis 3b, that 
those contacted online by Obama were more likely to be mobilized than those contacted 
online by Clinton. The key dependent variables for both hypotheses 3a and 3c were 
political participation (without specifying offline or online), offline political 
participation, and online political participation.  There would be support for H3a if the 
positive coefficients are greater for online contact variables than for offline contact.  
Support for H3c would exist if the positive coefficients are greater for the Obama contact 
variables than for the Clinton contact variables. 
Second, to test H3b, I conducted a straightforward descriptive analysis showing 
the types of offline and online participation activities respondents performed during the 
primaries. In addition, I ran bivariate analyses showing the frequency of campaign 
contact by the Clinton and Obama campaign and analyses tying campaign contact with 
the participation activities (See Chapter 3 for the complete details of the methodology).  
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8-2: Testing Hypotheses 3a –c 
8-2.1: Testing Hypotheses 3a: Those contacted online were more likely to be mobilized 
than those contacted offline 
 I found support for hypothesis 3a when examining the coefficients of the contact 
type variables without distinguishing from the candidate source of the contact.  
Regardless of the source of the message, either from Obama or Clinton, if that message 
was sent online, then it was significantly more likely to lead to either online or offline 
political participation than a message sent offline (See Table 8-1). 
Table 8-1: Case 2--Hypothesis 3a Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Online Contact 
on Political Participation 
 
 Offline Political 
Participation 
(N=1,998) 
Online Political 
Participation 
(N=1,999) 
Combined Political 
participation 
(N=1,999) 
Online 
Contact By 
Either 
Obama or 
Clinton 
(B)(SE) 
.529***^ 
(.075) 
.532***+ 
(.066) 
1.062***+ 
(.108) 
Offline 
Contact By 
Either 
(B)(SE) 
.339*** 
(.045) 
.170*** 
(.040) 
.509*** 
(.066) 
Combined 
offline/online 
Contact by 
Either 
(B)(SE) 
.360*** 
(.044) 
.248*** 
(.039) 
.609*** 
(.064) 
***B coefficient is significant 
+Online contact is significantly greater than Offline Contact and Combined Offline/Online Contact at the 
.05 level 
^ Online Type of contact  is significantly greater than Offline Contact at the .10 level 
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8-2.2: Testing for hypothesis 3b:  Voters for Obama in the primaries were more 
likely to have been contacted online by the Obama campaign than were voters for 
Clinton by the Clinton campaign in the primaries.  
Relative to the population, very few respondents reported receiving any contact from 
either campaign during the primaries and caucuses.  However, data show that the Obama 
campaign (15%) contacted significantly more respondents than the Clinton campaign 
(12%) during the primaries and caucuses. The difference, though, is small, but 
significant, nevertheless.  Despite the media emphasis on online communication, the vast 
majority of those contacted by either Obama or Clinton were done so offline (mostly by 
telephone) rather than online.  While the Obama (12.7%) and Clinton campaigns (11.2%) 
contacted respondents offline at roughly the same rate during the primaries, the Obama 
campaign was slightly more likely to do so than the Clinton campaign via online methods 
(3.7% vs. 1.5%) (See Table 8-2).  Since the difference is significant, then the data support 
hypothesis 3b, since more people stated they were contacted by the Obama campaign, 
online, than by the Clinton campaign, online. 
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Table 8-2: Case 2--Obama and Clinton Campaign Contact Activities during the 
Presidential Primaries 
(Among All) 
 
 Contacted 
(n=2,217) 
Contacted 
Online 
(n=2,217) 
 Contacted Offline 
(n=2,217) 
 Total 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Telephone 
(%) 
In-Person 
(%) 
Regular Mail 
(%) 
  Hillary 
Clinton 
12.0 1.5 11.2 9.6 1.0 2.9 
  Barack 
Obama 
15.0* 3.7* 12.7 9.6 2.0* 3.7 
  John McCain 10.1 NA^ NA^ 
  Other 4.1 NA^ NA^ 
  Not Sure 3.2 NA^ NA^ 
 Not 
Contacted 
66.7 NA^ NA^ 
*p<.05; ^Survey only measured type of contact from Obama and Clinton 
 
 Taking this analysis one step further, it becomes more evident that the Obama 
campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton campaign was 
to contact its supporters online.  Table 8-3 displays the mode of campaign contacts 
among those who said they voted for either Obama or Clinton during the primaries.  
While the number of Obama voters and Clinton voters contacted by each of the 
campaigns is about equal, the proportion of Obama supporters who were contacted online 
exceeds the proportion of Clinton supporters contacted online by a ratio greater than 2 to 
1.   The Clinton campaign was much more likely to rely on direct mail than the Obama 
campaign. 
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Table 8-3: Case 2—Type of Campaign Contact by the Obama and Clinton Campaign 
Contact during the Presidential Primaries 
(Among those who were contacted by one of the campaigns and voted for either Clinton 
or Obama) 
 
Contact Method Clinton Voters who were 
contacted by Clinton 
Campaign (N=103) 
% 
Obama Voters who were 
contacted by Obama 
Campaign (N=95) 
% 
Telephone 74.0** 62.9 
In-person 6.7** 17.5 
Mail  31.7* 20.6 
Email or other online 
method 
 17.3* 40.2 
Other/ 1.0 2.0 
*p<.05, **p<.10 
The frequency of contact by each of the campaigns was moderately high.  
Respondents contacted by the Obama campaign reported slightly more frequent contacts 
than those contacted by the Clinton campaign. However, the differences are not 
statistically significant.  A plurality of those contacted either by the Clinton (43.3%) or 
Obama campaigns (41.6%) said they were contacted less often than one time per month 
(see Table 8-4).  Among eventual Obama and Clinton primary voters, the differences are 
stark and significant.  Those who said they voted for Obama in the primaries were twice 
as likely to be contacted several times a week as those who said they voted for Clinton 
(37.9% compared with 16.5%) (See Table 8-5). 
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Table 8-4: Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaigns 
during the Primaries and Caucuses 
(Among those who said they were contacted either by the Clinton or Obama campaigns) 
 
Table 8-5: Case 2--Frequency of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton Campaign 
during the Primaries and Caucuses 
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the 
Clinton or Obama campaigns) 
 
  
Frequency of Contact Clinton Contact 
(n=263) 
(%) 
Obama Contact 
(n=329) 
(%) 
Once a week or more often 22.1 27.4 
Every other week 10.3 7.9 
One or two times a month 19.4 18.8 
Less than once a month 43.3 41.6 
 
Don’t know 4.9 4.3 
Frequency of Contact Clinton voters 
contacted by 
Clinton 
Campaign 
(n=103) 
(%) 
Obama voters 
contacted by Obama 
Campaign 
 
(n=95) 
(%) 
Once a week or more often 16.5 37.9 
Every other week 10.7 9.5 
One or two times a month 24.3 14.7 
Less than once a month 42.7 34.7 
 
Don’t know 5.8 3.2 
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Frequency of contact was much greater for online contacts than offline contacts 
by both campaigns. This is likely due to the ease and cost of sending online messages as 
opposed to making more expensive and time consuming telephone calls and direct mail 
pieces. Despite the very small sample size, differences were statistically significant.  The 
Obama campaign more frequently sent out online contact messages than the Clinton 
campaign, thus providing more support for H3b (See Tables 8-6 and 8-7). 
 
Table 8-6: Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton 
Campaigns 
(Among those who said they were contacted by either the Clinton or Obama campaigns) 
 
**Small Sample Size,  *p<.05 
 
 
Frequency of Contact Clinton Contact 
(n=263) 
(%) 
Obama Contact 
(n=329) 
(%) 
 Online 
Contact 
(N=33)** 
Offline 
Contact 
(N=248) 
Online 
Contact 
(N=82)** 
Offline 
Contact 
(N=282) 
Once a week or more often 60.6* 21.0 73.2* 18.8 
Every other week 9.1 9.7 8.5 8.5 
One or two times a month 9.1 19.8 9.8 20.2 
Less than once a month 15.2 45.2 6.1 48.2 
Don’t know 6.1 4.4 2.4 4.3 
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Table 8-7: Case 2--Frequency and Type of Contact by Either the Obama or Clinton 
Campaigns 
(Among Clinton and Obama primary voters who said they were contacted by either the 
Clinton or Obama campaigns) 
  
**Small Sample Size,  *p<.05 
 
 
 
8-2.4: Testing hypotheses 3c: Those contacted online by the Obama campaign were more 
likely to be mobilized than those contacted by the Clinton campaign  
The test of the hypothesis 3c, that the Obama online contact would be more likely 
to lead to political participation than Clinton contact was not supported by the results of 
the OLS models.  Examining the coefficients produced by the models for Obama online 
contact, Obama offline contact, and Obama contact without distinguishing between 
online and offline were not statistically different from the coefficients produced from the 
models with Clinton contact (See Table 8-9).  The Clinton coefficients were slightly 
higher in all cases, but not significantly so.  This suggests that contact by Obama was just 
Frequency of Contact Clinton voters 
contacted by 
Clinton Campaign 
(n=103) 
(%) 
Obama voters 
contacted by Obama 
Campaign 
(n=95) 
(%) 
 Online 
Contact 
(N=18)** 
Offline 
Contact 
(N=95) 
Online 
Contact 
(N=39)** 
Offline 
Contact 
(N=71)** 
Once a week or more often 66.7 13.7 76.9 21.1 
Every other week 5.6 10.5 7.7 11.1 
One or two times a month 11.1 25.3 10.3 18.3 
Less than once a month 5.6 46.3 0 47.9 
Don’t know 11.1 4.2 5.1 1.4 
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as likely to lead to political participation as contact by Clinton.  More specifically, 
although fewer respondents reported online contact from the Clinton campaign, those 
who were contacted were just as likely to participate as those contacted online by the 
Obama campaign.  In the previous section, I noted support for the hypothesis that the 
Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters online than the Clinton 
campaign was.  This finding about the equal effectiveness of each campaign’s online 
contact suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential 
supporter online, then, perhaps the race would have been closer.  On the flip side, the 
Clinton campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it 
concentrated more on its offline techniques—telephone and direct mail. 
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Table 8-8: Case 2--Hypothesis 3c Test Using OLS Regression—Impact of Obama Online 
Contact versus Clinton Contact on Political Participation 
 
 Offline Political 
Participation 
(N=1,998) 
Online Political 
Participation 
(N=1,999) 
Combined Political 
participation 
(N=1,999) 
Obama  
Online Contact 
(B) (SE) 
.569*** 
(.097) 
.600*** 
(.085) 
1.169*** 
(.139) 
Clinton 
Online Contact 
 (B)(SE) 
.689*** 
(.146) 
.629*** 
(.128) 
1.318*** 
(.21) 
Obama 
Offline Contact 
 (B)(SE) 
.354*** 
(.053) 
.102* 
(.047) 
.456*** 
(.077) 
Clinton 
Offline Contact 
 (B)(SE) 
.299*** 
(.057) 
.215*** 
(.050) 
.514*** 
(.082) 
    
Obama  
Contact 
Either offline or 
online 
 (B)(SE)  
.353*** 
(.051) 
.197*** 
 (.045) 
.550*** 
(.074) 
Clinton 
Contact 
Either offline or 
online 
(B)(SE) 
.307*** 
(.055) 
.230*** 
(.049) 
.537*** 
(.079) 
***B coefficient is significant 
  
 
8-3: Summary 
 
The data from this analysis found support to hypotheses 3a and 3b.  Online 
contact was more likely to lead to political participation than offline contact generally.   
The Obama campaign was more likely to contact its supporters and potential supporters 
using online methods than was the Clinton campaign.  Yet, online contact from the 
Clinton campaign to its supporters was just as likely to lead to political participation as 
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online contact from the Obama campaign. The question remains open whether the 
Clinton campaign’s greater use of offline methods hurt or helped her chances to win the 
nomination since self-identified Clinton primary voters were just as likely as self-
identified Obama primary voters to get any type of campaign contact.  However, because 
causal direction cannot be clearly determined, it might also be that those contacted online 
were already engaged in the campaign. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
9-1:  Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has been an attempt to clarify the role of the Internet as a mobilizing or 
reinforcing mechanism for political participation.  As I stated in the introduction, the 
research has set out to go beyond the extant literature on the impact of the Internet on 
mobilization and reinforcement adding to the general debate by doing the following: 
a.  testing the reinforcement versus mobilization  theories related to the impact 
of the Internet on political participation;  
b.  refining these theories by testing whether mobilization or reinforcement 
occurs differently online versus offline;  
c. testing whether  mobilization  and/or reinforcement effects are different for  
particular demographic groups  such as young adults, women, and minorities;  
d. and exploring the extent to which mobilization and reinforcement are 
contingent on the activities of individual campaigns.  
In this dissertation, I have provided evidence to support each of the mobilization 
and reinforcement hypotheses using data from the 2008 NAES.  While one could argue 
that the strongest case for the Internet as a mobilizing mechanism would be made if a 
clear pattern of mobilized groups emerged across the four cases for similar activities, 
evidence from this dissertation does point to a pattern of the Internet mobilizing less 
educated groups and reinforcing better educated groups in Cases 2 through 4 (See Tables 
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9-1 and 9-1a).  The evidence suggests that increased Internet usage raises the probability 
of participation for less educated people and at the same time provides reinforcement for 
those who are better educated.  Among the instances of mobilization, reinforcement, or 
both as displayed in Tables 9-1 and 9-1a,  most demonstrated a positive interaction 
between Internet frequency and education or income.   The net effect shown by the 
graphic presentations in the prior chapters indicates that the disadvantaged are closing the 
gap, slightly.  The evidence of mobilization and reinforcement involving both education 
and income suggests that improved access to the Internet will continue to  increase 
political participation for all citizens.  As long as the digital divide remains wide, 
however, then mobilization effects of the Internet will remain limited.   As the results  
presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate, the digital divide undoubtedly remains, therefore the 
challenge  of increased mobilization continues to be substantial.   Where the Internet is 
closing the gap in participation, is by age. As the evidence in Case 3 suggests, increased 
Internet usage nearly erases any gap between younger and older users. 
By and large, the Internet both mobilizes and reinforces political participation, 
which truly fulfills the promise of hope for any technology.  Yet, while the evidence 
points to somewhat of a pattern of interaction between   educational attainment levels and 
the Internet, the data do not demonstrate consistency across the cases by activity. This 
lack of consistency could be due to the methodology, question wording, or time of 
interview.  The activities measured varied from case to case, the time periods were 
different , and the measurements moved from a contemporaneous prior seven day 
measure to a retrospective the campaign measure.  Each of these factors might have 
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contributed to the lack of a consistent pattern of mobilization and reinforcement.  While 
this raises additional questions which cannot be easily resolved with the available data, 
the findings do illustrate that Internet use in certain instances is more likely to motivate 
certain groups to engage in participation activities, especially by education and income.  
The Internet has changed the nature of participation in the sense that much of 
what traditionally occurred offline, now takes place online.   The levels of traditional 
participation continue to be low, but the absolute amount has increased with the inclusion 
of such activities as viewing political videos on YouTube, engaging in online discussion, 
visiting campaign web sites, donating money online and forwarding emails, videos, and 
audios to those in ones social network as a means of persuasion.  
 The matrices in Tables 9.1 and 9.1a summarize where mobilization, 
reinforcement or both took place among which groups and within each case.  Across the 
cases, reinforcement, mobilization, or both occurred most often with Internet frequency 
interacting with education and income.  Age interacted with Internet use in Case 3, but 
rather than increasing the participation activity of younger people, the Internet mobilized 
older people to engage in activities.  As this research has noted in prior sections, African 
Americans were more likely to participate in activities in greater proportions than in prior 
elections.  However, the Internet did not act as a mobilizing mechanism for particular 
activities, among this group.  Rather, in Case 3, results showed that the African-
Americans were mobilized to participate when the dependent variable in the model was 
the combined participation index.   
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In Case 1, there was no evidence of mobilization or reinforcement.  This case was 
the weakest of the four because it lacked an Internet measure which differentiated 
respondents by frequency or type of use and because the number of offline activities 
measured were limited to just three.   
In Case 2, the evidence reveals that the more frequently the less educated were 
using the Internet, the more likely they were to say they donated offline (but not online), 
and visited a campaign website.  While better educated adults also were more likely to 
say they visited a campaign website the more often they were online, they were less 
likely to say they donated offline the more frequently they were online.  This is not a 
surprising result for those with higher education, because the expectation is that they will 
likely contribute online while they are online.  For the less educated however, being 
online frequently is associated with the act of giving offline.  The data does not provide 
me with a means to further explain this positive interaction.    
The Case 2 analysis shows, also, that the more frequently one is online the more 
likely they are to engage in forwarding campaign related emails, audio, or video to 
others.  Without the Internet, this and other online activities are impossible.  Data show 
the greater frequency of Internet use, this activity narrows the gap between more and less 
affluent people regarding this behavior.  It is a behavior that requires relatively little 
effort—reading, listening or viewing an online piece and forwarding it to others.  This 
behavior is a way of influencing other people, not by talking to them directly, but 
providing them with evidence that may support their position.  In addition, the activity 
affirms the idea of utilizing social networks to engage in this influence.  An email or 
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video clip generated by a campaign or interest group supporting a candidate is sent to the 
strongest level of supporters with the hope that forwarding will take place. The evidence 
suggests that the campaigns or their supporting organizations have been somewhat 
successful in expanding the types of people who are engaged to include people across all 
income groups.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) write about utilizing social networks, 
“the basic idea is simple: to give weight to requests for assistance by presenting them 
through people to whom it is difficult to say ‘no’” (p. 176).    
Case 2 also provided evidence that the Internet mobilized those with lower 
income to participate online, in general, while also acting as a reinforcing mechanism for 
the more affluent.  The combined online index result implies that the Internet acts as a 
mobilizing and reinforcement income for all online activities, but the results of the 
analysis of each individual activity reveal that this is not the case.  In fact, it is more 
telling that the Internet mobilizes and reinforces for some activities and not all.  This 
argues, therefore, for continuing with a model that tests for mobilization and 
reinforcement for individual activities in addition for a model which tests for an 
aggregate index of participation. 
In Case 3, age played a significant role when interacting with frequency of 
Internet use for activities involving persuasion and information gathering.  Studies have 
shown that younger people online are more likely to utilize online tools to participate 
(e.g., Pew, 2009) and our research has borne this out.  However, there is little evidence to 
show that young people involved are not formerly inactive, uninterested actors.  Evidence 
from Case 3 suggests that the Internet motivates older people to persuade someone to 
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support or oppose a candidate regardless of whether it was done online or offline, and to 
persuade someone offline to support or oppose a candidate. In both these instances, 
therefore, I have concluded that the Internet is a reinforcing tool.  The Internet both 
mobilizes and reinforces people to view a political video on a site like YouTube since 
both younger and older groups increase their likelihood, the more they are online. 
In Case 4, the Internet mobilized those with less education and reinforced those 
with higher education for online political discussion, viewing political videos online, and 
forwarding political materials online.  However, there was no evidence to support the 
Internet mobilizing lower educated and reinforcing higher educated groups to participate 
online using the combined model.  Further, there was no evidence of the Internet 
mobilizing or reinforcing these groups to engage in these activities in Case 3 which 
measured participation during a segment of the general election.   
The Internet, in Case 4, also mobilized women to volunteer for a political 
campaign. Internet use had no effect on mobilizing males, but clearly increased the 
likelihood of females volunteering for a campaign.  Research by Converse et al.’s in their 
landmark voting study (1960) and others including Verba et al. (1995) pointed to a slight 
gender gap in participation.  These findings suggest that the Internet mobilized women to 
become more participatory during the general election period. 
The evidence I presented in support of the mobilization hypotheses affirms 
DiGennaro and Dutton (2006).  The Internet did have a significant impact on “broadening 
political participation by lowering the cost of involvement, creating new mechanisms of 
organizing groups and opening new channels of information that bypass traditional media 
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gatekeepers” (p. 209).  However, at the same time, the Internet continued to reinforce the 
demographic groups which most enjoyed an advantage in the past. The participation gap 
between the advantaged and disadvantaged is narrowing and will likely continue to do so 
in future elections as the Internet becomes even more central to the campaign process.  
As the digital divide narrows, increased participation will occur thus narrowing the gap 
between the advantaged and disadvantaged more rapidly.  
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Table 9-1: Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for 
Each Participation Activity—Offline and Online Activities 
 
 OFFLINE Activities during the campaign Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
 Attempt to persuade someone OFFLINE to support or 
oppose  a candidate  
  Internet 
Freq 
X  Age (R) 
 
 Done any work for one of the presidential  candidates 
OFFLINE  
    
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates OFFLINE 
 Internet 
Freq 
X  Educ 
(M) 
  
Attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or 
things like that in support of a particular presidential 
candidate OFFLINE 
    
Wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign 
sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in 
front of your house. 
    
ONLINE activities during the campaign     
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose one of 
the presidential candidates ONLINE 
    
Done any work for one of the presidential candidates 
ONLINE 
    
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates ONLINE 
    
Discuss politics online 
 
 
   Internet Freq 
X  Educ 
(B) 
Visited Web site of a presidential campaign or political 
party 
 Internet 
Freq 
X  Educ 
(B) 
  
Viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential 
candidates or campaign 
  Internet 
Freq 
X  Age 
(B) 
Internet Freq 
X  Educ 
(B) 
Forwarded emails, audio or video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers 
or other people you know 
 Internet 
Freq 
X  
Income 
(B) 
 Internet Freq 
X  Education 
(B) 
M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement 
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Table 9-1a: Interaction Matrix Displaying Significant Interactions Within Each Case for 
Each Participation Activity—Without Regard to Offline or Online and for Combined 
Indexes 
 
Participation Activities Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Attempt to persuade someone to support or oppose a 
presidential candidate  
  Internet 
Freq 
X  Age (R) 
 
Done any work for one of the presidential   candidates  
 
 
   Internet Freq 
X  Gender 
(female) 
(M) 
Contribute money to campaigns or candidates       
Combined Online and Combined Offline Index     
Online Index 
 
 
 Internet 
Freq 
X  
Income 
(B) 
 
Internet 
Freq 
X  Race (B) 
 
M=Mobilization, R=Reinforcement, B=Both Mobilization and Reinforcement 
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The analyses I presented to determine the demographic predictors of participation 
partly refute Margolis and Resnick’s (2003) claim that the Internet will not empower the 
powerless because those who are powerful outside of cyberspace are taking those 
advantages with them in the Internet.  The results from the 2008 NAES survey showed 
that these biases to the advantaged were diminished but did not disappear once the 
analysis controlled these variables for other factors.  There will always be a high level of 
political participation by better educated, better informed, and more affluent voters.   
However, with controls, the strength of the education and income predictors diminished 
and can be explained by many factors including Internet use, campaign contact, and level 
of campaign interest. 
Further, findings showing that African Americans were more likely to participate 
online are evidence of the refutation, but the advantaged and powerful still benefit from 
the role the Internet plays.  The uniqueness of this election with the presence of the first 
African American party nominee and the first woman as front-runner in the primaries 
likely energized certain segments of the population such as African Americans and young 
adults, more so than other groups.  The evidence supported this claim in 2008.  However, 
the data also show that the Internet and other ICTs aided in this level of participation in 
several instances. 
Demographic predictors were not consistent throughout the four cases analyzed, 
but it is clear that young adults are more likely than others to engage in online activities 
and offline activities.  Religious service attendance was a significant predictor of 
volunteering to work on a campaign, offline, in three of the four cases.  This result 
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affirms Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and Verba et al. (1995), also (See Tables 9-2 and 
9-3).  
Looking further at the predictors of political participation, either online or offline, 
the analysis revealed a clear and consistent pattern for online campaign contact and high 
levels of campaign interest as significant predictors of participation in all cases and for 
nearly all measured activities.   This pattern supports much of the prior research on 
reinforcement, but especially, it is entirely consistent with Verba et al (1995) and 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).  Campaigns are most likely to contact their strongest 
supporters and those most likely to come out to vote. Therefore, the finding that those 
who are most likely to participate in many activities are those with the greatest level of 
campaign interest is not very surprising.  However, there are two important points to be 
made about the effect of campaign interest and online campaign contact.  First, in 
Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis, she asserts that when political interest is combined 
with Internet use in models predicting engagement, the effect of Internet use “does not 
have a substantial impact on engagement” (p. 193) since only 35 percent of studies 
analyzed significantly predicted engagement when controlling for political interest. Our 
research would fall within those 35 percent of studies.  Second, those who have been 
contacted online by one of the campaigns, while controlling for level of campaign 
interest, are also significant predictors.  Online campaign contact is not just significant as 
a predictor for online participation activities, but also significant for some offline 
activities.   
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Only one media variable emerged as a consistent predictor of online 
participation—using the Internet as a source for campaign information. The more 
frequently one used the Internet for that purpose, the more likely one would be to 
participate in several online activities in nearly every case.  Perhaps their Internet use for 
campaign information is just one element in their general participation behavior and 
using the Internet for this purpose in and of itself may be a participation behavior.  To a 
certain extent, this finding is consistent with Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis which 
found that using the Internet for information about public affairs produces positive and 
significant effects on participation or engagement. 
As I have stated before in this dissertation, the 2008 campaign was one the most 
unique in history. Media reported that Obama supporters were energized during the 
campaign causing me to account for candidate support in my model.  As a control 
variable, Obama support/vote was a significant predictor for a few participation activities 
across several cases.  Even though the campaigns were important factors in encouraging 
participation, campaign support did not lead to the disappearance of other variables 
disappearing as predictors.  Youth and Obama support can both significantly predict 
online political discussion, for example. 
254 
 
 
Table 9-2: Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Offline Political Participation with an Odds Ratio of 
1.15 or Greater 
 
 Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support or 
oppose 
candidate 
OFFLINE 
 
(Cases 1-4) 
Volunteer 
for 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
 
 
(Cases 1-4) 
Donate to 
candidate or 
campaign 
OFFLINE 
 
 
 
 
(Cases 1,2,4) 
Attend Rally/ 
Meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cases 2,3,4) 
Wear Campaign 
Button/Bumper 
Sticker/Lawn Sign 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cases 2,3,4) 
Education (CollGrad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income (100K +) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info in past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign in past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign in past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info in past 7 days 
Internet Frequency (Several hours/day)* 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign Online 
Obama Supporter/Voter** 
 
3 
1,2,3 
 
3 
 
1,3 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
1,2,3,4 
2 
1-,2,3,4 
 
 
3 
 
1,2,4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
 
2,3 
1,3,4 
4 
1,2 
4- 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
1,2,4 
4 
4 
4- 
3,4 
3 
 
3 
   
2,3 
 
 
 
 
 
2,3,4 
2,3,4 
2,4 
2- 
2-,4- 
3,4 
2,3 
 
 
3,4 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
2,3,4 
2,3,4 
2,3 
*Internet Access in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4 
 
Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR>1.15/<0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates 
the Odds Ratio is less than.87.  For example, “Gender (male)” for “Donate to candidate OFFLINE…” shows 4-, meaning that females were more likely 
than men to engage in this behavior for case 
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Table 9-3: Summary of Cases in Which Variable was a Significant Predictor of Online Political Participation with an Odds 
Ratio of 1.15 or Greater 
 
 Attempt to 
Persuade 
someone to 
support/ 
oppose 
candidate 
ONLINE 
 
 (Cases 1-4) 
Volunteer 
for 
Candidate 
or 
Campaign 
ONLINE 
 
 
 (Cases 1-
4) 
Contribute  
Money 
 to 
candidate 
or 
campaign 
ONLINE  
 
(Cases   
1,2,4) 
Discuss 
politics 
ONLINE 
 
 
 
 
  
(Cases 
1,3,4) 
Visit 
Campaign 
Web site 
 
 
 
 
 
 (Cases  
1-4) 
Viewed 
Political 
Video on 
Sites 
Like 
YouTube  
 
 
(Cases 
1,3,4) 
Read or 
post to a 
blog about 
campaign 
 
 
 
 
(Cases  1,3) 
Forward  
Political 
Emails, 
Audios, or 
Videos to 
Others  
 
 
(Cases  
1-4) 
Education (College Grad+) 
Gender (male) 
Age (18-29) 
Race (African American) 
Income ($100K plus) 
Religiosity 
Party (Democrat) 
Ideology (liberal) 
Internet for campaign info past 7 days  
Talk Radio for Campaign past 7 days  
Newspaper for campaign past 7 days 
TV News for campaign info past 7 days 
Online Frequency (Several hours/day)* 
Campaign Interest 
Contacted by Campaign ONLINE 
Obama  Supporter/ Voter** 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
3 
1,2,3,4 
 
 
 
4 
1,2,3,4 
1,3,4 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1,3,4 
  
 
 
 
 
1,3,4 
1,2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,2,4 
 
 
 
2 
2,4 
1,2,4 
2,4 
4 
3-,4- 
1,3 
3- 
4 
 
 
 
1,3,4 
4 
 
 
3,4 
1,3,4 
1,3,4 
2 
 
1,2,3 
1,3 
 
1 
 
 
1,2,3,4 
 
 
 
2,3,4 
1,2,3,4 
1,2,3,4 
2,3 
4 
1,3 
1,3,4 
1,3 
3 
 
1 
 
1,3,4 
 
 
 
3,4 
1,3,4 
3,4 
 
 
3 
1,3 
 
 
 
 
 
1,3 
 
 
 
3 
1,3 
1,3 
1 
4 
1-,2-,3-,4- 
 
3 
1,2 
 
2 
 
1,2,3,4 
 
 
 
2,3,4 
1,2,3,4 
1,3,4 
2,3- 
*Frequency not measured in Case 1, **Obama supporter in Cases 1 and 3, Obama Primary Voter in Case 2, Obama general election voter in Case 4 
Key: Each number represents Case where variable was significant predictor (OR>1.15/<0.87). A negative symbol following the Case number indicates 
the Odds Ratio is less than.87.  For example, “Gender (male)” for “Forward political emails…” shows 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, meaning that females were more 
likely than males to engage in this behavior for cases 1-4.
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The study design examines participation from two perspectives.  First, the 
analysis focused on measuring the impact of the Internet of individual participation 
activities.  The theoretical rationale for this approach was that predictors of participation 
and the impact of the Internet on mobilizing disadvantaged demographic groups would 
vary from activity to activity.  However, in general, prior research has examined 
participation as an aggregate model with all disparate activities combined into a single 
participation index.  My research did not completely depart from this method and is 
useful in drawing comparisons to the extant research. Determining predictors of 
individual participation activities turned out to be the proper decision since the data 
showed that there were different influences to various predictors.  However, the best 
predictors for the aggregated online and offline indexes in each case were generally 
consistent within each case, but not perfectly consistent.  This suggests that future 
research should follow a disaggregated model, but it would not harm the study to also use 
an aggregated index.  I do not recommend employing only an aggregated model since the 
nuance in determining predictors of online and offline participation and finding evidence 
of mobilization will be lost. 
The multivariate analysis determining the predictors of participation pointed to 
online campaign contact as a significant predictor for many types of participation 
activities. Hypotheses 3a-c was a specifically targeted systematic test of the impact of 
campaign contact on political participation.  Most important, regardless of candidate, 
online contact was more likely to predict participation than offline campaign contact.  
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However, causal direction is unclear. Were those contacted online more likely to 
participate because of the contact or because they were already interested? 
As predicted Obama was more likely to contact supporters online than the Clinton 
campaign was to contact its supporters. However, it was more common for both 
campaigns to contact supporters and potential supporters using offline methods. 
Perhaps more surprising was that H3c was not supported.  Contrary to what was 
hypothesized, those contacted online by Obama were not more likely to participate than 
those contacted online by Clinton. Looking back to the 2008 campaign, this conclusion 
suggests that if the Clinton campaign was able to reach more of its potential supporters 
online, then, perhaps the election would have been closer.  Conversely, the Clinton 
campaign may have known that its supporters were less connected online so it 
concentrated more on its offline techniques.  Going forward, the implication is that online 
campaign contact is the direction which all campaigns must move in order to succeed, but 
to not abandon offline techniques, which as senior Obama campaign staffers discussed in 
the 2008 Annenberg Election Debriefing, was still the most effective organizing tool. 
However, it was the initial online contact that served as the “net” that brought them into 
the campaign in the first place (Jamieson, 2009). 
The implication for communications scholars, political scientists, and political 
campaigns is that online communication is indispensible tool for motivation and 
engagement.  In the future, political campaigns will be developing more sophisticated 
methods of reaching potential supporters online and communication and political scholars 
must closely follow these methods in order to measure their impact in future studies. 
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9-2: Limitations 
This study has gone beyond the extant research by recognizing that the Internet 
serves as a mechanism for both mobilization and reinforcement, particularly in 
motivating previously uninvolved actors into political engagement, in addition to 
reinforcing those who the political system has favored.   The art of offline political 
persuasion continues to thrive and survive, but it is further enhanced by online 
communication methods from the campaigns, its supporters, and the social networks that 
exist or emerge around a candidate or campaign.  These methods will continue to grow 
and researchers must design methods which capture these new methods or if at all 
possible, anticipate new methods as they happen.  This study was designed before the 
beginning of the 2008 campaign and much of the focus has been on more established 
online methods focusing on the Internet.  Specific attention was not paid to such methods 
as texting or Twitter (though that method was barely used in the campaign). Further, due 
to space limitations, there were no measures of social network use such as Facebook or 
MySpace.  This section details the limitations of this study, including fast changing 
technologies, but also other issues to consider. 
First, the 2008 election was unique in the sense there was a convergence of 
several factors hitherto not seen in any national election—extensive use of online tools, 
an African American nominee for president, a female presidential candidate who was 
considered the front-runner going into the early primaries, a female vice presidential 
nominee, and a collapsing national economy.  The question remains to be answered about 
whether these findings can be replicated in future elections. Every election is different 
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and as stated above, technologies progress and campaigns find different approaches to 
mobilize and engage supporters.  Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the 2008 election may 
have drawn new participants, but the Internet helped provide the tools for participation—
not just for those already interested but those who may not have done so otherwise.        
Second, there is the issue of indeterminate causal direction.  This is a problem for 
all surveys. For example, it is not entirely clear whether online campaign contact 
contributed to more engagement, or were those already engaged more likely to sign up to 
receive online campaign messages and requests.  The data show a very strong 
relationship between online contact and participation.  While more study is needed on the 
specifics of how the Internet affects participation, and on the impact of unique aspects of 
each campaign, my research, overall, suggests that the Internet is a new driver of political 
participation. 
Third, related to the design of the instrument are several limitations.  Question 
wording varied from case to case for some items thereby preventing a systematic 
comparison across the cases.  However, the variation in the wording was beneficial in 
showing the impact of the Internet in four nearly distinct studies.  Some items were 
excluded from the cases because of space limitations and human error. In Case 3, due to 
an oversight, there was an error in the wording related to method of campaign donations. 
As a result, I could not present findings comparing means of donating during the general 
election period.  I was able to do so retrospectively in Case 4, however. 
The nature of the campaign season was a limitation, as well.  During the primary 
campaign period, measured by Case 1, and the general election period, measured by Case 
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3, participation behavior was asked in a contemporaneous fashion, albeit with a past 
seven day recall.  In the post-primary and post-general election cases, which measured 
behavior retrospectively, extemporaneous wording was used, asking respondents to recall 
behavior carried out up to four months before.  The use of contemporaneous and 
extemporaneous measures may have produced variant results.  Yet, these methods are 
instructive about how people respond to contemporaneous and extemporaneous 
questions. For example, reported participation behavior was much lower during the 
contemporaneous periods asking only about the prior week’s behavior when compared 
with the post-primary and post-general election behaviors.     
The measure of Internet frequency was very useful in this study, allowing me to 
draw conclusions about the mobilizing effects of the Internet.  However, there are a 
number of ways that Internet use can be effectively measured.  Eszter Hargittai believes 
that Internet frequency as employed in this study is a poor proxy for Internet use.  Instead 
she recommended a nuanced measure of Internet efficacy as a more accurate proxy.  I 
had a private conversation with Hargittai after my data collection was completed, but did 
consider Internet literacy and efficacy in my original design. Unfortunately, space 
constraints prevented me from placing it on the survey.   Future studies will employ both 
an Internet literacy/efficacy question as Hargittai recommends in her work (2005 and 
2009) and the self-reported Internet frequency measure utilized in this research.   
9-3:  Future Directions 
Rapid changes in technology will likely alter both the design and direction of 
future research. Just since the election, the growth of Twitter, the messaging social 
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networking tool has far exceeded the level of use during the election.  It is impossible to 
predict which online techniques will be the new effective mechanisms for campaign 
contact, communication, and learning.  Television and the Internet are converging.  In 
this election, the NAES did not disaggregate TV viewing or newspaper reading online 
compared with offline.  In 2012, the distinctions may become entirely blurred or vanish 
completely.  Despite these fast-moving changes, I believe this research is structured in 
such a way as to serve as a useful foundation for future research.   
Future research would continue to measure changing patterns of participation, but 
not rely solely on rolling cross sectional studies.  A greater reliance on panel studies, for 
example, could lead to a more clearly defined assessment of changes in participation over 
the course of the election at the individual level.  I recommend continuing tracking 
aggregate participation behaviors through a cross-sectional survey, to complement panel 
studies.  Additionally, land line surveys may become a less effective data collection 
method, especially as we track the activities of youth and minorities.  The growth in 
mobile phone use, especially among these segments, calls for significant changes in how 
researchers collect data (Blumberg and Luke, 2007).  Therefore, survey researchers must 
design future studies to include this segment in a representative way.  Scholars and 
industry professionals are developing such methods and those which prove most valid 
and reliable must be part of any future study.  Future research also should extend beyond 
reliance of self-report to measure participation behavior. Technologies exist or are 
currently being developed to do this, but currently the expense prevents most from 
practically including such technologies in large-scale studies. Perhaps, an experimental 
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component should be part of a future research plan, where a randomly recruited panel 
agrees to allow researchers to track their behaviors but be unaware that researchers are 
primarily interested in participatory behavior. Nevertheless, self-report has its flaws and 
drawbacks but, perhaps can be utilized with some confirmatory data collected using tools 
which monitor online navigation.  
Given that my findings demonstrated that online campaign contact was extremely 
influential in predicting participation, I think future studies should endeavor to examine   
message content and the delivery mechanism by  which it is communicated to the 
receiver.  Online campaign contact not only comes directly from  the campaign itself  but 
also from independent actors working to support and defeat another candidate.  For 
example, how does a message incorrectly suggesting that Barack Obama is a Muslim 
become so quickly diffused throughout the population?  Katz writes that diffusion, unlike 
persuasion, takes time making its way through the normal channels and networks of a 
community (Katz, Levin and Hamilton, 1963; Katz, 2001).  The Internet, however, has 
changed that calculus by significantly reducing the time a message makes its way through 
a community or social network.—  The “Obama is a Muslim” email message along with 
others, suggesting Obama was not born in the United States,  provide excellent example 
for future research with regard to short term message diffusion.    
In the future, researchers could address the same hypotheses in an election not as 
unique as the 2008 presidential election. Perhaps, the focus could be on a mid-term 
election in off presidential years such as 2010 or 2014.  With the expanded role of the 
Internet and other ICTs, it may be more difficult to isolate the effect of the Internet on 
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mobilization, yet, one could use similar techniques to what I employed in this 
dissertation, namely interactions, along with similar controls.   
One must consider, though, that as long as participation levels are low, 
researchers will continue to face challenges in measuring, in great detail, how campaign 
contact works to mobilize participation, but whatever surveys researchers create could 
measure behavior in a multi-step way, how people react to campaign contact. Finally, 
future research could distinguish which online methods are most effective in mobilizing 
new voters and reinforcing those already interested. 
The rapidly changing technological environment calls for nearly continuous 
research on the effects of these technologies on participation. As this dissertation has 
shown, the technologies are having some impact, and the extent of that impact will likely 
expand even further as these technologies become more diffuse and an integral part of 
potential voters’ everyday lives. 
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APPENDIX A: CASE 1--PRIMARY PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS 
I2.  In the past week, has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns talked to you 
about the presidential election? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
I3. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or 
other online method? 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online method 
 7 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
ASK I5-I8 and I10-I15 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER  
 
In the past week ,(READ FOR EACH ITEM) 
 
I5 have you talked to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or 
against one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
265 
 
 
I5a. (IF YES-I2(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or 
other online method? (ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08) 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
            
 
I6 have you done any work for one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
I6a. (IF YES-I6(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email 
or other online method?  (ADDED—OR OTHER ONLINE METHOD 2/25/08) 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
 
I7. have you given money to any of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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I8 IF YES TO I7 You said that you have given money to one of the presidential 
candidates.  Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the 
candidate, in the past week.  READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES   
  
1 Through the mail 
 2 Online donation through the Internet 
 3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event 
 DO NOT READ 
4 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9 Refused 
 
 
I16A.  During the presidential campaign, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies, 
speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
I17A.  During the presidential campaign, have you worn a presidential campaign button, 
put a campaign sticker on your car or placed a sign in your window or in front of your 
house 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
 
ASK ALL 
I9 On another subject, do you have access to the Internet at home, at work or someplace 
else?   
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 (Don’t know) 
9 (Refused) 
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(ASK I10-I15 only if I9=1) I’m going to read you a list of some things people can do 
online.  For each one, please tell me if that is something you have done (in the past 
week)(During the presidential campaign). (READ ITEMS)  
In the past week, (READ FOR EACH ITEM IF NECESSARY) 
 
I10  Did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using message 
boards, forums or instant messaging services? 
 
I11. Have you visited a website of a presidential campaign or political party? 
 
NO I12 
 
I13. Have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential candidates or 
campaign? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
I14. Have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or a 
campaign? 
 
I15. Have you forwarded any emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or 
campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know? 
 
1 Yes  
2 No 
8  don’t know 
9  Refused 
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APPENDIX B: CASE 2 QUESTIONS--RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
 
ADDED 7/2/08  IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE 
IF I9=1 
I9A.  On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the 
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per 
month, every month or so, rarely, never 
 
1 Several hours per day 
2 Almost every day 
3 At least once per week 
4     A few times per month 
5 Every month or so 
6 Rarely 
7 Never 
8     Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
U.  RETROSPECTIVE PRIMARY QUESTIONS 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U1. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, DID anyone from one of the presidential 
campaigns or a group supporting one of the presidential candidates contact you about the 
presidential election? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U2. IF YES—U1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign, or group that contacted you support? 
(DO NOT READ) 
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
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6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN U2, ASK U3-4 INSERTING OBAMA. IF 
RESPONDENT SAID CLINTON IN U2, ASK U3a-4b INSERTING CLINTON. 
ELSE SKIP TO U7-U22 
 
U3. How did THE Obama campaign or group supporting the Obama campaign contact you? 
Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?  
 (READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
1  Telephone 
 2  in-person 
 3  regular mail 
 4   Email or other online method 
 7  (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8  Don’t know 
 9   Refused 
 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U4. How often did you hear from the Obama campaign or group supporting the Obama 
campaign during the presidential primary campaign  
 
(READ LIST) 
 
a. by telephone (if U3 = 1) 
b. in-person (if U3 = 2) 
c. by regular mail (if U3 = 3) 
d. by email or other online method (if U3 = 4) 
 
1   Once a week or more often 
2   Every other week 
3   One or two times a month 
4    Less than once a month 
8    Don’t know 
9    Refused 
 
 
DELETED 8/5/08 
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U3a. How did THE Clinton campaign or group supporting the Clinton campaign contact you? 
Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other online method?  
 (READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
1  Telephone 
 2  in-person 
 3  regular mail 
 4   Email or other online method 
 7  (VOL)Other (SPECIFY) 
 8  Don’t know 
 9   Refused 
 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U4a. How often did you hear from the Clinton campaign or group supporting the Clinton 
campaign during the presidential primary campaign  
 
a. by telephone (if U3a = 1) 
b. in-person (if U3a = 2) 
c. by regular mail (if U3a = 3) 
d. by email or other online method (if U3a = 4) 
 
(READ LIST) 
 
1   Once a week or more often 
2   Every other week 
3   One or two times a month 
4    Less than once a month 
8    Don’t know 
9    Refused 
 
DELETED 8/5/08 
ROTATE SETS U23-25 WITH SETS U26-28 
IF U3=4 
U23[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to 
support their candidate.]  During the presidential primaries, did the Obama campaign email you to 
contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Obama, or didn’t the Obama campaign do 
this?  
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
DELETED 8/5/08 
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U24. IF YES U23(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did  
you contact people you know, people you did not know,  or both to ask them to vote for Senator 
Obama, or did you not contact anyone at all?   
 
1 People you know 
2 People you did not know 
3 Both 
4 Did not contact anyone at all 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U25. IF U24(1-3)  [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many people 
did you contact on behalf of the Obama campaign as a result of their emails asking you to do so? 
(DO NOT READ) 
 
1 1  
2 between 2 and 5 
3 Between 6 and 10 
4 between 11 and 20 
5 between 21 and 50 
6 More than 50 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
IF U3a=4 
U26[Campaigns sometimes email supporters to ask them to contact other people to urge them to 
support their candidate.]  During the presidential primaries, did the Clinton campaign email you 
to contact other people to ask them to vote for Senator Clinton, or didn’t the Clinton campaign do 
this?  
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U27. IF YES U26(1) [During the presidential primary campaign,] as a result of these emails, did  
you contact people you know, people you did not know,  or both to ask them to vote for Senator 
Clinton, or did you not contact anyone at all?   
 
1 People you know 
2 People you did not know 
3 Both 
4 Did not contact anyone at all 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U28. IF U27(1,2,3)  [During the presidential primary campaign,] approximately how many 
people did you contact on behalf of the Clinton campaign as a result of their emails asking you to 
do so? (DO NOT READ) 
 
1 1  
2 between 2 and 5 
3 Between 6 and 10 
4 between 11 and 20 
5 between 21 and 50 
6 More than 50 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
Participation 
 
 
ASK U7-U22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER  
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
ASK ALL 
During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, (READ FOR EACH ITEM) 
 
U7 DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one 
of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U8. (IF YES-U7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or other 
online method?  
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U9. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did you do any work for one of the 
presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U10. (IF YES-U9(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other 
online method? 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U11. (IF YES-U9(1)) For which Candidate did you do work? 
 [MUTLIPLE RESPONSES 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U12. During the presidential PRIMARY campaign did  you give money to any of the 
presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U13. IF YES TO U12. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money to the 
candidate, during the presidential primary campaign.  READ. ACCEPT MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES   
  
1 Through the mail 
 2 Online donation through the Internet 
 3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event 
 DO NOT READ 
4 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9 Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U14. IF YES TO U12 Which Candidate did you contribute to? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES] 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
ROTATE U29-30 WITH U31-32 
U29. IF U14(1) (CLINTON) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Hillary 
Clinton during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ) 
 
1 once 
2 two times 
3 3-4 times 
4 5 or more times 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U30 IF U14(1) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Hillary Clinton during the 
primary campaign?  
(DO NOT READ LIST) 
 
1 Fifty dollars or less 
2 $51 to $100 
3 $101 to $500 
4 $501 to $1,000 
5 $1,001 to $1,500 
6 $1,501 to $2,000 
7 $2,001 to $2,300 
8 More than $2,300 
98 Don’t know 
99  Refused 
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ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U31. IF U14(2) (OBAMA) Approximately, how often did you contribute money to Barack 
Obama during the primary campaign? (DO NOT READ) 
 
1 once 
2 two times 
3 3-4 times 
4 5 or more times 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/8/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U32 IF U14(2) Approximately how much money did you contribute to Barack Obama during the 
primary campaign? (DO NOT READ LIST) 
 
1 Fifty dollars or less 
2 $51 to $100 
3 $101 to $500 
4 $501 to $1,000 
5 $1,001 to $1,500 
6 $1,501 to $2,000 
7 $2,001 to $2,300 
8 More than $2,300 
98 Don’t know 
99  Refused 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U15.  During the presidential primary campaign, did you go to any political meetings, rallies, 
speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U16. (IF YES-U15(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally? [MULTIPLE 
RESPONSES?] 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U17  During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you wear a presidential campaign button, 
put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U18. (IF YES-U17(1)) For which candidate did you do that? 
 [MULTIPLE RESPONSES] 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U19.  During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you visit a website of a presidential 
campaign? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U20. (IF YES-U19(1))  Which candidate’s web site did you visit during the presidential 
primary campaign? [MULTIPLE RESPONSE] 
 
1 Hillary Clinton 
2 Barack Obama  
3 John Edwards 
4 Mike Huckabee 
5 John McCain 
6 Mitt Romney 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U21. .  During the presidential PRIMARY campaign, did you forward any emails, audio or 
video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people 
you know? 
 
1 Yes  
2 No 
8   don’t know 
9  Refused 
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ADDED 7/2/08 
DELETED 8/5/08 
U22. (IF YES-21(1)) How often did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know during the 
presidential primary campaign? (DO NOT READ) 
 
1 Once 
2 2-3 times 
3 4-5 times 
4 5-6 times 
5 7 or more times  
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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APPENDIX C: CASE 3--GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION QUESTIONS  
 
IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE 
IF I9=1 
I9A.  On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the 
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per 
month, every month or so, rarely, never 
 
1 Several hours per day 
2 Almost every day 
3 At least once per week 
4     A few times per month 
5 Every month or so 
6 Rarely 
7 Never 
8     Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
Political Participation Questions to be asked during the general election period 
beginning in August, 2008 
 
ASKED FULL SAMPLE 8/8-8/20 
ASKED OF HALF-SAMPLE (A1) BEGINNING 8/21/08 
ASKED OF ONE-THIRD SAMPLE (B1) BEGINNING 8/26/08 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J1. In the past week has anyone from one of the presidential campaigns contacted you about the 
presidential election? 
(IF CONTACTED BY GROUP SUPPORTING CANDIDATE CODE YES, ALSO) 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J2. IF YES—J1(1) : Which candidate did the campaign that contacted you support? (DO NOT 
READ) 
ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
3 Ralph Nader 
4 Bob Barr 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 8/8/08 
IF RESPONDENT SAID OBAMA IN J2, ASK J3 INSERTING OBAMA. IF 
RESPONDENT SAID MCCAIN IN J2, ASK J4 INSERTING MCCAIN. 
ELSE SKIP TO J5-J22 
 
J3. How did THE Obama campaign contact you? Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by 
regular mail, email or other online method?  
 (READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
1  Telephone 
 2  in-person 
 3  regular mail 
 4   Email or other online method 
 7  (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8  Don’t know 
 9   Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J4. How did THE McCain campaign contact you? Was it (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by 
regular mail, email or other online method?  
 (READ LIST;ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
1  Telephone 
 2  in-person 
 3  regular mail 
 4   Email or other online method 
 7  (VOL)Other (SPECIFY) 
 8  Don’t know 
 9   Refused 
 
Participation 
 
ASK J5-J22 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER  
ADDED 8/8/08 
ASK ALL 
In the past week, (READ FOR EACH ITEM) 
 
FORM A1 
J5 have you talked to any people and tried to show them why they should vote for or against 
one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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FORM A2 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J5A.  In the past week, have you tried to convince anyone why they should vote for or against 
one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J6. (IF YES-J5(1) OR J5A(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email 
or other online method?  
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
ASK ALL 
J7. In the past week, did you do any work for one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 8/8/08 
J8. (IF YES-J7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email or other 
online method? 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J9. (IF YES-J7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work? 
 [MUTLIPLE RESPONSES 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
3 Ralph Nader 
4 Bob Barr 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J10. In the past week, did you give money to any of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J12. IF YES TO J10 Which Candidate did you contribute to? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES] 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
3 Ralph Nader 
4 Bob Barr 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 8/8/08 
J13.  In the past week, have you gone to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or 
things like that in support of a particular presidential candidate. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J14. (IF YES-J13(1)) For which candidate did you attend a rally, in the past week? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES?] 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
3 Ralph Nader 
4 Bob Barr 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J15  In the past week, did you wear a presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on 
your car or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
J16. (IF YES-J15(1)) For which candidate did you do that? 
 [MULTIPLE RESPONSES] 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
3 Ralph Nader 
4 Bob Barr 
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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ADDED 8/8/08;  ASK IF I9=1 
J17.  In the past week, did you visit a website of a presidential campaign? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
ASK IF I9=1 
J19. .  In the past week, did you forward any emails, audio or video about presidential 
candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-workers or other people you know? 
 
1 Yes  
2 No 
8   don’t know 
9  Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
ASK IF I9=1 
J20. In the past week, have you viewed video on sites like YouTube about the presidential 
candidates or campaign? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/8/08 
ASK IF I9=1 
J21.  In the past week, have you read or posted a comment on a blog having to do with politics or 
a campaign? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
ADDED 8/11/08 
ASK IF 19=1 
J22.  In the past wee, did you discuss politics online with people over email, in chat rooms, using 
message boards, forums or instant messaging services? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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APPENDIX D: CASE 4—POST-GENERAL ELECTION PARTICIPATION 
QUESTIONS 
IN ORDER TO DIFFERENTIATE INTERNET USE 
IF I9=1 
I9A.  On average, which of the following best describes how often you are on the 
Internet?...Several hours per day, almost every day, at least once per week, a few times per 
month, every month or so, rarely, never 
 
1 Several hours per day 
2 Almost every day 
3 At least once per week 
4     A few times per month 
5 Every month or so 
6 Rarely 
7 Never 
8     Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
V1. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you receive email 
from either the Obama or McCain campaigns? IF YES Which campaign? 
 
1 Yes, from Obama campaign 
2 Yes, from McCain campaign 
3 Both, campaigns 
4 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
Participation 
 
ASK V5-V18 AS A SET IN RANDOM ORDER  
 
During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, (READ FOR EACH ITEM) 
 
V5. DID you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or 
against one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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V6. (IF YES-V5(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, email or 
other online method?  
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
 
V7. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you do any work 
for one of the presidential candidates? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
V8. (IF YES-V7(1)) Was that (rotate) by telephone, in-person, by regular mail, or email 
or other online method? 
(ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES) 
 
 1 Telephone 
 2 in-person 
 3 regular mail 
 4  Email or other online 
 7 (VOL) Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9  Refused 
 
 
V9. (IF YES-V7(1)) For which Candidate did you do work? 
 [MUTLIPLE RESPONSES 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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V10. During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign did you give money to 
any of the presidential candidates?  
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
V11. IF YES TO V10. Please tell me which of the following ways you donated money 
to the candidate, during the presidential General Election campaign.  READ. ACCEPT 
MULTIPLE RESPONSES   
  
1 Through the mail 
 2 Online donation through the Internet 
 3 In person at a fundraiser or other campaign event 
 DO NOT READ 
4 Other (SPECIFY) 
 8 Don’t know 
 9 Refused 
 
 
 
V12 IF YES TO V10 Which Candidate did you contribute to? 
[MULTIPLE RESPONSES] 
 
1 John McCain 
2 Barack Obama  
7 Other (SPECIFY) 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
 
 
V13.  During the presidential General Election campaign, did you go to any political 
meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular 
presidential candidate. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
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V14  During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you wear a 
presidential campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car or place a sign in your 
window or in front of your house?. 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
V15  During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you visit a website 
of a presidential campaign? 
 
1 Yes 
2 No 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
V16. .  During the presidential GENERAL ELECTION campaign, did you forward any 
emails, audio or video about presidential candidates or campaigns to friends, families, co-
workers or other people you know? 
 
1 Yes  
2 No 
8   don’t know 
9  Refused 
 
V17. During the presidential General Election campaign, did you view video on sites 
like YouTube about the presidential candidates or campaign? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused 
 
V18.  During the presidential General Election campaign, did you discuss politics online 
with people over email, in chat rooms, using message boards, forums or instant 
messaging services? 
 
1 yes 
2 no 
8 Don’t know 
9 Refused
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APPENDIX E:  CORRELATIONS BY CASE 
 
 
Table-E1: Case 1Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate  1.00           
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign  0.15 1.00          
(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign 0.10 0.18 1.00         
(4) Discuss politics online  0.35 0.14 0.10 1.00        
5) Visited website of campaign  0.21 0.11 0.20 0.30 1.00       
(6) Viewed video about campaign  0.16 0.08 0.11 0.30 0.36 1.00      
(7) Read or post about campaign online  0.15 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.24 0.32 1.00     
(8) Forwarded political email/audio/video 0.32 0.11 0.10 0.45 0.29 0.29 0.20 1.00    
(9) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand. -0.10 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.08 1.00   
(10) Offline vol. to work on campaign 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 1.00  
(11)  Offline donation to a candidate/campaign 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 1.00 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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 Table-E2: Case 2 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate  1.00          
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign  0.16** 1.00         
(3) Online donation to a campaign/candidate 0.13** 0.23** 1.00        
(4) Visited website of campaign 0.17** 0.10** 0.26** 1.00       
(5)  Forwarded political email/audio/video 0.28** 0.11** 0.15** 0.31** 1.00      
(6) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand 0.12** 0.02 
   
0.10** 0.20** 0.13** 1.00    
 
(7). Offline vol. to work on campaign 0.09** -0.01 0.10** 0.12** 0.05* 0.09** 1.00    
(8) Offline donation to a campaign/candidate 0.03   -0.01 
-
0.05** 0.09** 0.08** 0.14** 0.09** 1.00  
 
(9) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate  0.08**  0.17** 0.20** 0.18** 0.15** 0.18** 0.29** 0.20** 1.00  
(10) Wear button/Place sign to support 
      candidate  0.12** 
 
0.09** 0.23** 0.21** 0.14** 0.16** 0.24** 0.17** 0.36** 
 
1.00 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table-E3: Case 3 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate  1.00           
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign  0.08** 1.00          
(3) Discuss politics online 0.34** 0.08** 1.00         
(4) Visited website of campaign 0.17** 0.10** 0.24** 1.00        
5) Viewed video about campaign  0.18** 0.10** 0.29** 0.31** 1.00       
(6) Read or post about campaign online 0.14** 0.07** 0.28** 0.19** 0.26** 1.00      
(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video  0.31** 0.11** 0.41** 0.24** 0.32** 0.19** 1.00     
(8) Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand. 0.09** 0.02 0.08** 0.13** 0.10** 0.07** 0.10** 1.00    
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign  0.04** -0.01 0.06** 0.08** 0.06** 0.06** 0.09** 0.09** 1.00   
(10) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate  0.04** 0.14** 0.07** 0.11** 0.09** 0.05** 0.08** 0.08** 0.32** 1.00  
11) Wear button/Place sign to support 
      candidate  0.10** 0.11** 0.12** 0.20** 0.17** 0.13** 0.15** 0.14** 0.21** 0.21** 1.00 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table-E4: Case 4 Correlations: Online and Offline Participation Activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
(1) Online persuasion to support/opp candidate   1.00            
(2) Online vol. to work for a campaign  0.26**  1.00           
(3) Online donation to candidate/campaign 0.27** 0.17**   1.00          
(4) Discuss politics online  0.43** 0.18** 0.26** 1.00         
(5) Visited website of campaign  
0.27** 0.14** 0.34** 0.36** 1.00 
      
 
(6) Viewed video about campaign  
0.27** 0.14** 0.28** 0.37** 0.41** 1.00 
     
 
(7) Forwarded political email/audio/video 0.39** 0.16** 0.28** 0.47** 0.37** 0.42** 1.00      
(8)  Offline persuasion to support/oppose cand. -0.23**  -0.04   0.05* -0.03 0.10** 0.08** 0.06* 1.00     
(9) Offline vol. to work on campaign 0.09**  -0.03 0.28** 0.14** 0.20** 0.11** 0.15** 0.14** 1.00    
(10) Offline donation to a candidate/campaign 0.05* 0.05* - 0.10** 0.06** 0.06** 0.03 0.10** 0.12** 0.17** 1.00    
(11) Attend rally/Meeting for candidate 0.17** 0.13** 0.28** 0.20** 0.25** 0.20** 0.24** 0.11** 0.45** 0.18** 1.00  
(12) Wear button/Place sign to support  
         Candidate 
0.20** 0.09** 0.27** 0.22** 0.26** 0.17** 0.24** 0.15** 0.37** 0.21** 0.34** 1.00 
 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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